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Falsified medicines are a global health and pharmaceutical sector 
issue which affect supply chains in low, middle and high-income 
countries. There are many methods to identify substandard and falsified 
medicines. However, the European Union has introduced the Falsified 
Medicines Directive (FMD) to combat this problem. This directive 
requires the majority of all prescription-only medicines to be serialised, 
risk-based verified at wholesaler level and decommissioned at the end of 
the supply chain at a healthcare facility; using digital medicine screening 
technology (DMST) often referred to as medicines authentication 
technology.  
This thesis implemented a DMST into a live hospital environment 
for use by healthcare professionals. This thesis looked at the technical and 
operational effectiveness of the proposed digital solution in a hospital, 
gained user consensus on the strengths and limitations of the hospital 
DMST and implemented technological change to understand if the 
proposed changes demonstrated a quantitative or qualitative benefit. This 
thesis explains how the health information technology (HIT) intervention 
was perceived by the users and draws on literature to explain the observed 
results. This thesis involved the development and testing of a mobile app 
based DMST which could be used by public for the verification of 
medicines. This thesis involved a sample of social media users to gain an 
understanding of the consumer-based medicine verification concept, its 
limitations, and its opportunities from a convenience sample cohort. 
 iv 
A DMST in a hospital environment can work effectively in 
practice. However, some factors such as DMST offline instances, poor 
compliance to the DMST alerts and poor staff engagement remain a risk 
for this solution. It is established that ‘active’ alerts, such as an audio alert 
can improve adherence to policy (detection rates) and that staff-led 
technology improvements have a positive impact on technology 
compliance. There is also a consumer appetite for a mobile DMST app, 
and although some consumers are happy to share their data, this cohort 
would prefer if a hospital or University controlled the data generated by 
the app due to concerns relating to data management. This thesis has 
generated evidence to support the development of DMST systems for 
hospitals and mobile phone users. 
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Governments, pharmaceutical companies and charities spend 
millions annually to fund clinical trials in an attempt to develop vaccines, 
biologicals and pharmaceuticals to tackle some of the most dangerous 
diseases that face our planet. Doctors, pharmacists and nurses deal with 
these medicines on a daily basis, prescribing, supplying and administering 
these products to ease pain, prolong life expectancy and cure disease. 
However, some of these medicines are substandard or falsified. Countries 
around the world have introduced legislation which requires the 
serialisation of medicines by manufacturers. This will help healthcare 
professionals to verify or track and trace medicines to ensure that falsified 
medicines are identified and investigated. This thesis reviews the 
prevalence of falsified medicines, the terminology, regulations and laws 
governing medicine falsification, the methods to detect falsified 
medicines, and public health campaigns to raise awareness of this 
international problem. This thesis then investigated the Falsified 
Medicines Directive (FMD) digital drug screening approach and how the 
FMD and the mandated screening approach impacts hospital pharmacy 
practice. The technical and operational effectiveness of the drug screening 
approach is assessed, and pharmacy staff are surveyed using the Delphi 
method approach, to identify improvements for the proposed technology. 
The ‘most important’ suggestion as identified by the participants, was an 
active audio alert, is implemented and qualitative interviews identify the 
effectiveness of alerts in the workplace and considerations for building 
technologies which use health information technology alerts. The thesis 
 2 
then finishes with a survey based on mobile phone digital drug screening 
and consumer perception of safe medicine supply. 
The outcomes of this thesis relate directly to the implementation 
of the FMD in pharmacy practice but also provides wider learning 
associated with other screening technologies. In terms of pharmacy 
practice this thesis answers key questions relating to the proposed drug 
screening technology. There are also learnings in chapter six which will 
contribute to theory on innovation with ownership (JKK), how health 
information technologies are developed in the future, and learning which 














1.0: A Literature Review of Medicine Falsification 
Regulations and Approaches to Protect Public 
Health 
The Prevalence of Falsified and Counterfeit Medicine 
Internationally 
Medicine falsification is a problem that is often perceived to affect 
high-value medicines in low and middle-income countries (LMICs). 
However, the trade of counterfeit, falsified or substandard medical 
products is a lucrative industry affecting all medicines and countries 
across all levels of development (Figure 1.0). In France in 2013, 1.2 
million doses of falsified aspirin, a well-known low-cost medicine,  
without an active ingredient were seized (1). In the USA in 2012, falsified 
Avastin® (bevacizumab) a high-cost drug lacking active ingredient was 
discovered, affecting 19 medical practices (2-3). According to the 
pharmaceutical security institute over the past five years, there has been a 
56% increase in the global incidence of counterfeiting, illegal diversion 
and theft incidents with 2017 seeing the highest levels to date (4). This 
upward trend can be seen in the UK supply chain also where 11 cases of 
falsified medicines were detected over a 11year period (2001-2011) (5). 
The direct effect of medicine falsification includes deterioration of 
medicine quality and therefore poor patient outcomes, unnecessary drug 
side-effects, and death in some of the worst cases (6-13). The indirect 
effects of drug falsification include a loss in government tax revenue and 
the funding of illegal activity which may include terrorist organisations 
(14). High profile cases of falsified medicines include anti-cancer agents 
such as Avastin® (Bevacizumab) (US)(7) and Herceptin® (Trastuzumab) 
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(UK, Finland and Germany) (9). Epidemic cases of substandard medicines 
exist, such as those seen in India and Bangladesh, where unsafe levels of 
ethylene glycol were found in paracetamol elixir. The India and 
Bangladesh example was responsible for the renal failure and death of 
over 88 patients (mostly children) (11) and represented an international 
medicines safety issue.                  
The prevalence of medicine falsification is difficult to accurately 
estimate due to its clandestine nature. The World Health Organisation 
(WHO) estimates that up to 1% of medicines in HIC’s (This estimate is 
not based on data gathered )  and 10.5% (95% CI 9.9-11)  of medicines in 
low income and 10.6% (95 CI 10.3-10.9) in middle income countries  are 
counterfeit or falsified (15). This number is estimated to be 50% (estimate 
not based on data) when considering medicines purchased online (16). 
The problem of medicine falsification does not only involve tablet 
formulations but covers the entire formulation spectrum from injectable 
to inhaled medicines (Figure 1.0). Many falsified medicines may contain 
incorrect or low-grade ingredients, incorrect doses, or may be 
inappropriately labelled which can result in adverse events, sub-
therapeutic treatment or no treatment at all.  One of the most serious 
outcomes from the emergence of medicine falsification is the issue of 
antimicrobial resistance. Antimicrobial resistance is reaching a global 
pandemic level and is one of the biggest threats to global health today 
(17). Since the golden age of antibiotics in the (1970’s) there have been 
few new antibiotic agents discovered, and now due to the global health 
issue of antimicrobial resistance, existing antibiotics are under threat. 
 5 
Resistance is caused by inappropriate use and irrational prescribing of 
legitimate medicines but may also be adversely affected by falsified and 
substandard medicine use. Patients may purchase substandard and 
falsified medicines either unknowingly or without comprehension of the 
issues associated with taking poor quality medicines. These substandard 
medicines may be fake medicines purchased online, from street vendors, 
unknowingly supplied by healthcare facilities, or may be medicines which 
are legitimate and not appropriately stored in countries with high average 
temperatures and low levels of health literacy or understanding of 
adequate drug storage. 
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Avastin 400mg/16ml infusion. 
Cancer. USA. 2012. 
£924.Contained no active 
ingredient A 
Seretide 25/250mcg evohaler. 
Asthma. UK. 2009. £59. Recalled 
product. Harm is un-quantified B  
 
Aspirin 75mg tablet. Antiplatelet. 
France. 2013. 81p (1.2million 
doses). Contained glucose only C 
Erectile dysfunction drug. 
Singapore. 2008. Contained 
glyburide, an antidiabetic drug. 
150 hospitalised, 7 with severe 
brain injury. Four died H 
Paracetamol Syrup. Bangladesh 
and India. 1990 onwards. £3. 
Syrup contained the toxin diethyl 
glycol. Killing at least 88 people 
in India and Bangladesh. F, G  
Glibenclamide tablet. Diabetes. 
China. 2009. £8. Contained 6 
times the normal dose. E  
Antimalarial. 39 countries, Sub-
Saharan Africa. Substandard 
products resulting in treatment 
failure and ~122,350 deaths in 
children under 5 years of age I 
Figure 1.0: A selection of falsified and substandard medicine incidents worldwide (* pricing for an original pack, according to British 
National Formulary, February 2018). 
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know                                                                                                                                                C. 
www.safemedicines.org/2013/05/french-customs-seizes-12-million-doses-of-
counterfeit-aspirin.html                                                                                                                                                   
D. www.medicinesauthority.gov.mt/file.aspx?f=903 
E. The Effects of Falsified and Substandard Drugs - Countering the Problem of Falsified 
and Substandard Drugs - NCBI Bookshelf [Internet]. [Cited 2016 Feb 17]. Available from:                                         
http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/books/NBK202526/#ref_000225 
F. Hanif M, Mobarak MR, Ronan A, Rahman D, Donovan JJ, Bennish ML. Fatal renal 
failure caused by diethylene glycol in paracetamol elixir: the Bangladesh epidemic. BMJ. 
1995 Jul 8;311(6997):88–91.                                                                                                                                       
G. Singh J, Dutta AK, Khare S, Dubey NK, Harit AK, Jain NK, et al. Diethylene glycol 
poisoning in Gurgaon, India, 1998. Bull World Health Organ. 2001; 79(2):88–95.                                                                                                                            
H. http://www.who.int/bulletin/volumes/88/4/10-020410/en/                                                                                                  
I. Renschler JP, Walters KM, Newton PN, Laxminarayan R. Estimated Under-Five 
Deaths Associated with Poor-Quality Antimalarials in Sub-Saharan Africa. Am J Trop 
Med Hyg. 2015 Jun 3; 92(Suppl 6):119–26 
 
A.www.fda.gov/Drugs/DrugSafety/ucm291960.htm                                                                                                                                                                     
B. www.gov.uk/drug-safety-update/counterfeit-medicines-what-pharmacists-should-know                                                                                                                                               
C. www.safemedicines.org/2013/05/french-customs-seizes-12-million-doses-of-
counterfeit-aspirin.html                                                                                                                                                  
D. www.medicinesauthority.gov.mt/file.aspx?f=903 
E. The Effects of Falsified and Substandard Drugs.Countering the Problem of Falsified 
and Substandard Drugs.NCBI Bookshelf [Internet]. [Cited 2016 Feb 17]. Available from:                                    
http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/books/NBK202526/#ref_000225 
 
 Herceptin 150mg infusion. 
Cancer. Austria, Finland, 
Germany, Sweden, UK. 2014. 
£407. Diluted product or 




In recent years, the term counterfeit has been used interchangeably 
with the term falsified which has confused discussion internationally. To 
understand these terms relevant government and non-government 
organisation websites and publications were searched to identify the most 
common terminologies used by each organisation. The European 
Medicines Agency (EMA), the US Food and Drug Administration (FDA), 
the World Health Organisation (WHO), the European Commission (EC), 
UK Legislation national archives, European legislation publications and 
websites were searched to identify the terminologies used by each 
organisation.   
The current definition of a  falsified medicine as defined by 
European and UK law  is any medicinal product with a false representation 
of ‘(a) its identity, including its packaging and labelling, its name or its 
composition (other than any unintentional quality defect) as regards any 
of its ingredients including excipients and the strength of those 
ingredients; (b) its source, including its manufacturer, its country of 
manufacturing, its country of origin or its marketing authorisation holder; 
or (c) its history, including the records and documents relating to the 
distribution channels used’ (18-20). The WHO previously used the all-
encompassing term ‘Spurious/Falsely-Labelled/Falsified/Counterfeit 
(SFFC) Medicines’. This term related to medicines which were 
deliberately and fraudulently mislabelled with respect to identity or 
source. This term has recently been relinquished and replaced with the 
terms Substandard and Falsified (SF) and unlicenced or unregistered 
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(Table 1.0). The problem with using the term ‘Counterfeit' and ‘Falsified' 
interchangeably is that the former refers to intellectual property breaches 
and the latter refers to medicines that try to pass themselves off as a 
legitimate product. In Europe, there is a clear line drawn between both 
‘falsified' and ‘counterfeit' medicines. The EMA classifies a counterfeit 
medicine as any medicinal product that does not comply with intellectual 
property rights or infringes on trademark law (21),  and falsified medicines 
are defined as fake medicines that pass themselves off as real, authorised 
medicines (22). In the US the term counterfeit is used in all cases. The US 
legislation does not refer to falsified medicines and instead refers to 
counterfeit medicines. In the US the term ‘Counterfeit’ used to describe 
both intellectual property breaches and fake medicine. The FDA describes 
a ‘Counterfeit' medicine as ‘A fake medicine. It may be contaminated or 
contain the wrong or no active ingredient. They could have the right active 
ingredient but at the wrong dose’ (23). 
It is essential that the international community recognise the single 
SF definition described in Table 1.0, not only to harmonise discussion 
internationally but to standardise the legal penalties for the manufacture 
and distribution of SF and counterfeit medicines. As a result of the new 
WHO definition, most countries use the term SF medicine however due 
to use of the term counterfeit in US legislation; ‘counterfeit’ is the 
preferred term in North America. For this thesis, the Falsified Medicines 
Directive (FMD) definition of a falsified medicine is used when referring 
to a falsified medicine. When the term counterfeit is used, this is referring 
to cases of falsified medicines within the US.  
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The term ‘Fake’ medicine is also useful way of describing falsified 
medicine to the general public. However, the WHO definitions of 
Substandard and Falsified should be used when discussing this matter on 
a professional and legal basis. Counterfeit should only be used in the EU 
when referring to intellectual property infringements. 
Table 1.0: A description of medicine quality terms (24). 
Term Definition Source 
Substandard  Also called ‘out of specification’, these 
are authorised medical products that fail 
to meet either their quality standards or 
specifications or both. 
 
WHO (25) 
Falsified   Medical products that deliberately or 
fraudulently misrepresent their identity, 
composition or source. 
 
WHO (25) 
Falsified Any medicinal product with a false 
representation of ‘(a) its identity, 
including its packaging and labelling, its 
name or its composition (other than any 
unintentional quality defect) as regards 
any of its ingredients including 
excipients and the strength of those 
ingredients; (b) its source, including its 
manufacturer, its country of 
manufacturing, its country of origin or its 
marketing authorisation holder; or (c) its 
history, including the records and 





Medical products that have not 
undergone evaluation or approval by the 
National or Regional Regulatory 
Authority (NRRA) for the market in 
which they are marketed/distributed or 
used, subject to permitted conditions 
under national or regional regulation and 
legislation. 
WHO (25) 
Counterfeit  Any medicinal product that does not 
comply with intellectual property rights 
and/or infringes trademark law. 
EMA (22) 
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Counterfeit A fake medicine. It may be contaminated 
or contain the wrong or no active 
ingredient. They could have the right 
active ingredient but at the wrong dose’. 
FDA (23) 
1.2: Anti-Counterfeiting and Falsification Laws and 
Regulations 
 A literature review of PubMed, Google Scholar, and government 
legislation archives was conducted using search terms such as ‘Falsified’, 
‘Counterfeit’, ‘Medicine’ ‘Drug’ and ‘Regulation’, ‘Policy’, 
‘Legislation’. Regulations and legislation were identified and summarised 
in (Table 1.1. and Table 1.2.). Legislation in Europe and the US relating 
to medicines falsification, counterfeiting and tracking have been in place 
for many years. This legislation has been modernised and replaced across 
Europe, the US, and the rest of the world, most notably the EU Falsified 
Medicines Directive published in 2011 and the US Drug Supply Chain 
Security Act (DSCSA) published in 2013. 
1.2.1: European Regulation  
 
Table 1.1: European anti-falsification regulations. 
The ‘Bollini 
Law’ 2001 
This change of regulation requires medicines to be tracked 
to the point of sale using two barcodes, placed on the 




General of foreign trade (DGFT) for pharmaceutical 
products exported from India requires serialisation of 
medicine from India with a 2D data-matrix barcode before 
entry into the European market. Examples of which are 
seen on products in the United Kingdom imported from 
India. The serialisation of products imported from India 
employ the GS1 standard serialisation format which 
comply with FMD standards. These product lines are 
likely to remain serialised by these standards. 
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The FMD, introduced in 2011 (18-19) by the European 
Commission, aims to harmonise legislation and practice across 
Europe. The main points of the FMD, which are relevant to this 
thesis are listed below (27). 
§ A 2D barcode containing a unique product identifier serial number, batch 
number, expiry date, and General Trade Item Number (GTIN) are printed onto 
each medicine carton along with the same human-readable data. 
§ Tamper-evident seals will be required for all serialised products. 
§ Over the counter medicines (unless deemed vulnerable) will not require 
authentication. 
§ All prescription only medicines (unless excluded via risk assessment) will 
require authentication. 
§ Before supply to the public, all European pharmacies must decommission 
medicines. 
§ Manufacturers are responsible for the cost of the national medicines verification 
database which facilitates the cross-checking of 2D barcodes against a known 
list of legitimate products. 
 
 It is likely however that changes to pharmacy workflow and costs 
generated within the pharmacy itself, as a result of the FMD, will not be 
the responsibility of the manufacturers. These costs will be the 
responsibility of community pharmacies, GP practices, hospitals and any 
other groups that are governed by FMD regulations and are involved in 
medicine dispensing. 
At manufacture product data regarding the batch number, expiry 
date, unique identifier, GTIN, reimbursement code (if adopted by member 
states) contained within the 2D data matrix is attached to each product 
package. This data, along with the anticipated country of issue or sale will 
be directed to the European Medicines Verification System (EMVS) this 
is illustrated in Figure 1.1. This information is then sent to the relevant 
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national medicines verification system (NMVS); dependant on the 
intended country of sale (Figure 1.1). Medicines are then scanned by the 
pharmacist upon supply to the patient to ensure the medicine has not been 
falsified, recalled or reached its expiry; with certain dispensations for the 
secondary care setting The FMD also covers important issues such as 
medicines sold online and introduces a pan-European EU common logo 
to identify legitimate medicine suppliers. There is no reference within the 
FMD legislation which relates to patient verification. 
The delegated regulations, which followed the FMD, published on 
February 9th, 2016 are a series of instructions further describing the FMD 
product safety features. These regulations detail the requirements for 
manufacturers, wholesalers and pharmacies (both primary and secondary 
care) and mark a three-year countdown to compliance across all affected 
sectors of healthcare (February 9th, 2019). Chapter two builds on the 
information from chapter one and takes a deeper look in to the FMD and 
how it relates to the hospital pharmacy sector. 
UK and Brexit  
The UK is due to leave the EU on 29th March 2019. The FMD 
scanning of 2D data matrices by dispensers is due for full implementation 
by February 9th 2019. The FMD has already been added to UK law. It 
could be removed post Brexit however there has been no indication from 
the MHRA that this will happen.  
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 Figure 1.1: Post FMD product and data movement through the pharmaceutical supply chain. 
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1.2.2: US Regulations 
 
A number of regulations existed prior to the most recent legislation; the 
Drug Supply Chain and Security Act. These regulations are listed and 
explained in Table 1.2. 




(Also known as 
‘The Lanham 
act’) (28) 
States that anyone who shall without the consent of the 
registrant, counterfeit during production, be liable for 
civil action and further describes the penalties for 
reproducing or counterfeiting without permission. 
Trademark 
counterfeiting 
act of 1984 (29) 
Amends the US trademark act 1946 and has made the 






Includes amendments that direct the secretary of health 
and human services to cease production and recall any 
issued food, drug or cosmetic if it has a probability of 




protection act of 
1996 (31) 
Amends the US trademark act 1946 allowing the court 
to seize vehicles used for transporting counterfeit goods 
and also awards statutory damages to plaintiffs instead 
of actual damages or profits. This act also amends the 
tariff act of 1930 and importantly permits the secretary 
of the treasury to destroy forfeited counterfeit trademark 
products. This act also details civil penalties for ‘aiding 
and abetting' the importation and sale of products with a 
counterfeit American trademark. Section 10 states that 
limits on fines are set based on first and second seizures, 
but more importantly, these fines are ‘based on the value 
that the merchandise would have had if it were genuine' 
and not based on their market value as counterfeit 









Signed by President Clinton in 1999, this is an act in US 
history which relates to the sale of goods via websites 
that deceive affiliation. This act protects patients from 
purchasing counterfeit medicines from sources 





goods act 2006 
(33)  
Before this act, signed by President Bush in March 2006, 
only counterfeit goods could be confiscated. This act 
rectified this anomaly and now permits the confiscation 
of the equipment used to produce and package 
counterfeit goods also, with a further provision to 
prohibit trafficking in counterfeit labels, stickers, and 
other markings. The fine structure also sees change for 





Act of 2012 
(34) 
This bill, which aims to increase penalties and prison 
sentences for traffickers of counterfeit products, 
increases the penalty for those who counterfeit 
medicines and requires the attorney general to give 
increased priority to cases relating to counterfeit drugs. 
This legislation was required following the importation 
and distribution of a counterfeit Roche product 
(Avastin®) to a number of US doctors in February 2012. 
This counterfeit drug contained chemicals ranging from 
starch to salt with some cases containing solvents such 
as acetone and caused widespread concern throughout 
the legal drug supply chain. Considering there were 385 
federal prosecutions for counterfeiting goods between 
2006 and 2010, the mean sentence was only 10 months; 
a penalty that does not reflect the crime committed. The 
counterfeit drug penalty enhancement act increased the 
penalty which now includes a fine, imprisonment for any 
term of years including life, or both, for trafficking in 
counterfeit drugs. 
 
The US Drug Supply Chain Security Act (DSCSA) 2013 which is 
title II of the US Drug Quality and Security Act, pertains to the regulation 
of the drug supply chain and increases security via the tracing of 
prescription-only medicines and their associated records electronically 
from the point of manufacture to the pharmacy (35-36). This act, similar 
in many ways to the European FMD, requires manufacturers to attach or 
imprint a unique product identifier onto each medicine container. The act 
requires that all previous transaction data is provided at the point of 
transfer from one verified party to another (Table 1.3). Similar to the 
FMD, packages returned to manufacturers, wholesalers or re-packagers 
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for resale shall be verified before future distribution. This act has the 
potential to generate enormous change within the US healthcare system, 
promoting supply chain security and helping to prevent the occurrence of 
future counterfeiting cases. The final compliance deadline for dispensers 
is 2023 with further deadlines in place for other stakeholders (35). 




A statement in paper or electronic form with the 
transaction information for each prior transaction 
going back to the product manufacturer. 
Transaction 
Information (TI) 
Information including the product’s proprietary 
or established name, strength and dosage form, 
product NDC number, container size, number of 
containers, product lot number, transaction date, 
date of the shipment (if more than 24 hours after 
the transaction) and the entities’ business names 




Substantiation in paper or electronic form that the 
entity transferring ownership is authorised to 
receive the product. 
 
Mutual and Specific Requirements for Supply Chain Partners 
 
 The DSCSA describes some stakeholder requirements, some apply to 
all parties (mutual), and some contain subtle differences between the 
supply chain actors (exclusive). The DSCSA impacts all partners 
regarding trading, quarantine, returns practice, medicine verification, 
responding to alerts and the opportunity to use an external electronic 
database provider.  
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Mutual Requirements  
 
(A) Trading 
 From 2015, all stakeholders shall trade only with authorised trading 
partners. The transaction data (Table 1.3) is to be exchanged at each 
transaction and data relating to each transfer of ownership shall be 
maintained for not less than six years. In the event of a recall or for 
investigations, the manufacturer's wholesalers and repackagers shall 
provide the transaction history, transaction information and a 
transaction statement for the relevant product no later than one 
business day or 48 hours after receiving the request, whichever is the 
shortest time. In the case of dispensers, the dispenser shall provide 
appropriate information no later than two business days after receiving 
the request (or another reasonable time as determined by the 
secretary). 
(B) Quarantine 
 By January 2015 all relevant stakeholders shall have systems in 
place to deal with suspect product quarantine, product investigation 
and cleared products (when a suspect product is found to be legitimate) 
and keep records of investigations of suspect products for not less than 
six years after the conclusion of the investigation. 
(C) Returns 
  When saleable products are returned, wholesalers and repackagers 
must provide transaction data, and the verification of medicines shall 
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occur. However, dispensers are not required to provide such data when 
returning products. Regarding non-saleable returns, transaction data 
(Table 1.3) does not need to be provided by any stakeholder. 
(D) Electronic Database 
  A pharmaceutical company, wholesaler, repackager or dispenser 
may satisfy the requirement of the DSCSA by operating a database 
under their control or by utilising a secure database operated by 
another entity. The entity providing this database shall provide the 
requirements set out by this act and respond to requests; they may also 
provide data to other members of the pharmaceutical distribution 
supply chain. The use of an external entity to provide this database 
does not exempt the manufacturer from requests to verify medicines. 
Manufacturers’ Specific Requirements  
 From November 2017, manufacturers shall affix or imprint a product 
identifier to each package or the homogeneous case of a product intended 
to be involved in a commercial transaction, and manufacturers should 
maintain the product identifier information for not less than six years. 
(A) Suspect and illegitimate products 
 In addition to the systems and processes required for suspect 
products mentioned previously, manufacturers must have further 
systems or processes in place for product disposition within the 
organisation as well as aiding in trading partner disposition of the 
affected product. In the case of illegitimate products, a 
manufacturer is to retain a product sample for further 
investigations and prepare for making notifications, responding to 
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notifications, terminating notifications and retaining records of 
notifications for not less than six years after the conclusion of the 
disposition. 
(B) Requests for verification 
  From November 2017, manufacturers are to accept requests 
for product verifications from an authorised repackager, 
wholesaler or dispenser and reply within 24 hours to notify the 
interested party as to the status of the queried drug i.e. whether the 
product identifier, including a standardized numerical identifier 
(SNI) on the product, matches the manufacturer's records. If there 
is a disparity between the products SNI and the manufacturer's 
records this product shall be treated as suspect, therefore triggering 
an investigation. 
Wholesale Distributor Specific Requirements 
 When dealing with returns, wholesale distributors may accept returns 
from dispensers and repackagers only if the returned product can be 
associated with the relevant transaction information and transaction 
statement. If a wholesaler wishes to make a non-saleable return of a 
product to a manufacturer then in general terms transaction statements and 
associated information is not required. Starting from November 2019, 
wholesalers may only deal with products which are encoded with a 
product identifier (some exceptions may apply), distributors may disclose 
transaction information, e.g. transaction history and lot level information 
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in the presence of a written agreement between the wholesaler and the 
purchaser. 
(A) Suspect and Illegitimate Products 
If a wholesaler understands that they are in possession or control of a 
suspect product or have been made aware by the secretary the following 
steps are to be taken: 
1. Quarantine such a product until it is cleared or dispositioned. 
2. Notify the Secretary. 
3. Conduct an investigation in association with trading partners 
within the supply chain.  
 
TH’s and TI’s shall be validated and starting November 2019 the 
product shall be verified at package level including the standardised 
numerical identifier. If such a product is subsequently cleared, a 
notification shall be made to the secretary, with the wholesalers 
retaining investigation records for not less than six years. Should a 
suspect product be found to be an illegitimate product, the wholesaler 
shall quarantine the product until disposition and take reasonable 
action to facilitate the disposition of products in the possession of 
trading partners. Samples of illegitimate products should also be kept 
for laboratory analysis. 
Dispenser Specific Requirements 
 The dispenser shall supply the same information as manufacturers, 
wholesalers and repackagers when transferring ownership of a product to 
another owner with the exception of (i) supply to another dispenser to 
supply a specific patient need and (ii) dispensing to a patient. The 
dispenser shall also capture the TI, TH and TS as part of a suspect or 
illegitimate investigation and maintain such information for not less than 
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six years following the transaction, although a dispenser may enter into a 
written agreement with a third party to confidentially maintain such data.  
 Dispensers are to have systems in place to comply with the DSCSA’s 
requirements in identifying ‘suspect’ and ‘illegitimate’ products under 
product verification processes. When a product is determined to be 
suspect, the dispenser shall quarantine the product and ‘promptly’ 
investigate to determine if the product is illegitimate. If a product is 
determined to be illegitimate, within 24 hours of making this 
determination, the dispenser must notify the FDA and all relevant trading 
partners.  
 Unlike other trading partners, who must investigate all suspect 
products, dispensers are only required to verify the product identifier of at 
least three packages or 10% of such suspect products, whichever is 
greater. Similarly, until November 2017, there is a significant exception 
from the requirement for pharmacy dispensers to respond to requests for 
information from FDA or state officials. In the event of a recall, dispensers 
may be asked for information by government officials only if such recall 
involves a serious adverse health consequence or death to humans. 
  From November 2020, a dispenser will engage in transactions only if 
a product is encoded with a standardized numerical identifier (SNI) that 
includes, in both human-readable forms and on a machine-readable data 
carrier, the product's lot number and expiration date. Serialisation is 
achieved through the use of product identifiers (SNIs) within phase I of 
DSCSA implementation.  
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Repackager Specific Requirements 
 From November 2018, a repackager shall affix or imprint a product 
identifier to each package and homogenous case due for the transaction, 
maintain this information for six years after the aforementioned 
transaction and engage in transactions encoded with a product identifier 
(some exceptions exist). As with manufacturers, wholesalers and 
dispenser, suspect medicines should be quarantined until proven to be 
illegitimate or cleared. Any products found to be illegitimate shall be 
notified to the secretary within 24 hours and dispositioned with a sample 
of the product retained for analysis. During the investigation process, the 
repackager shall co-operate with the relevant supply chain partners 
associated with the product in question and any records relating to an 
investigation shall be retained and maintained for not less than six years. 
Political Changes 
 In 2017 Mr Donald Trump was elected president of the United States, 
although Mr Trump has expressed distaste towards the over-regulation 
imposed by the FDA, so far this largely relates to the licensing of new 
medicinal products (37). Regarding anti-counterfeiting and tackling IP 
infringements Mr Trump has published an executive order which 
announces that secretary of homeland security shall develop a plan to 
combat violations of US customs laws, the enforcement of laws to ‘protect 
intellectual property right holders from the importation of counterfeit 
goods’(38). Although this executive order supports the idea of protecting 
IP owners from counterfeiting, it is still unknown, whether or not 
President Trump will make changes to the DSCSA described above.  
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1.2.3: Rest of the World Regulations (non-exhaustive list) 
 
The FMD and DSCSA are recent, high-profile examples of 
regulations relating to medicine falsification and counterfeiting. These 
regulations are due for complete implementation by 2019 and 2023 
respectively; however, many international regulations previously existed. 
Countries such as India, Argentina, Brazil, South Korea, Turkey and 
China all have regulations in place, and many other countries are drafting 
regulations or continuing with medicines serialisation in the absence of 
regulations.  
India 
India has implemented a track and trace system and central data 
portal for exported medicines according to the Directorate General of 
Foreign Trade.  This policy change takes into consideration primary, 
secondary, tertiary medicine packaging and requires data relating to 
packaging to be uploaded to the central portal of the government of India 
or a designated agency before releasing drug formulations for sale or 
distribution (26). 
Primary packaging 
Although India plans to place a 2D barcode on the primary 
packaging of drug formulations (the packing in direct contact with the 
active ingredient) with human-readable data, this currently is optional and 
has been placed on hold (26). 
Secondary Packaging  
India has opted to include a one or two-dimensional barcode (1D 
or 2D) with a 14-digit GTIN along with a batch number, expiry date and 
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unique serial number on medicines’ secondary packaging (e.g., outer 
carton).  
Tertiary Packaging 
A 1D code must be placed on tertiary packaging, i.e. serial 
shipping container code. This change of regulation via public notice was 
published on 5 January 2016 (26). The requirement for printing barcoding 
on the packaging is already in place. All manufacturers must maintain and 
upload the parent-child packaging relationship data onto the central portal, 
effective from 31st March 2016. An exemption is in place, however, for 
small-scale industrial (SSI) manufacturers, deferring maintenance of 
parent-child relationship data on the packaging until 31 March 2017. Even 
SSI manufacturers are required to upload tertiary-level data onto the 
central portal from 22 May 2015 (26). 
 Serialised product records should be maintained by the 
manufacturer until six months after the product expiry date (39).  
Argentina 
Argentina has implemented a GS1 standard traceability system 
with central portal and serialisation through regulation 3683 (39-40). 
Under this regulation, each medicinal unit will be given a unique identifier 
that includes a batch number and expiration date. This regulation has taken 
a different approach to implementation. It does not aim to serialise all 
prescription medicines from the outset, as the FMD does. Instead, it has 
started with an initial list of medicines to be included in the serialisation 
scheme and to add to this list in subsequent years. In 2012, critical-risk 
medicines such as antibiotics, insulin, clotting factors, a range of 
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cardiovascular drugs and central nervous system drugs such as those for 
epilepsy and Parkinson’s disease were included. More than 200 drugs 
were added to the traceability scheme in 2013 (39-40). Pharmaceutical 
companies are required to store an unambiguous code supervised and 
audited by the National Administration of Drugs, Foods and Medical 
Devices (ANMAT) on each unit pack, and all information must be 
provided in Spanish, with all codes complying with GS1(Global Standard 
One) format. Each supplier should place a unique identifier, batch number 
and expiration date on each unit, i.e., a GS1 standard 2D data-matrix. Each 
supply chain actor must record ‘logistical movements’ of drugs and supply 
that information to the ANMAT-managed database in real-time. 
Brazil 
Brazil has introduced a regulation mandating the serialisation of 
medicinal products. Brazilian federal law 11.903 of 2009 (41) requires 2D 
serialisation (with human-readable text) of secondary packaging with data 
relating to tracking medicines requiring transmission to the Brazilian 
Health Regulatory Agency (ANVISA). Packaging serialisation will be 
accompanied by a tamper-evident stamp, and supply chain protagonists 
will be required to transmit data to ANVISA. A 180-day implementation 
timeline for manufacturers and a one-year period for the other supply 
chain members start upon publication of the final regulation (39). Brazil 
required all manufacturers to serialize and trace three batches of products 
through the supply chain before 10 December 2015 and unit level 




South Korea has issued a Ministry of Health and Welfare 
Notification 2011-58. This notification requires a barcode or radio 
frequency identification (RFID) tag to be applied to primary, secondary 
and external containers and medicines’ packaging materials manufactured 
within or outside South Korea. Expiry date and lot number are required 
for traceability of a selection of drugs from 2012 and prescription-only 
drugs from 2013. 
Turkey 
Turkey was one of the first countries to implement unit level 
serialisation and a centralized government portal. One of the key reasons 
for implementing medicine serialization in Turkey was to reduce 
reimbursement fraud. Pharmacists were required to scan a 2D data matrix 
barcode before reimbursement. The Turkish system has evolved to require 
medicines to be scanned at multiple stages before the pharmacist 
supplying the product to a member of the public. The identifiers included 
in the Turkish 2D data-matrix include a global trade item number (GTIN), 
serial number, expiration date, batch/lot number and group separator with 
accompanying human-readable data.(43- 44) Data-matrices were added to 
products after the publication of Regulation no. 26775. Sale of medicines 
produced before this date was permitted until 31 December 2009 (43- 44). 
China 
The China Food and Drug Administration (CFDA) enforced the 
serialisation of individual saleable pharmaceutical products (unit level) 
and case level with a 20-digit code, a central portal (China drug 
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identification, authentication and tracking system) was also implemented. 
Full serialization of all medicinal products was due by 2015 and, although 
pharmaceutical companies continue to serialise products, at this stage the 
current traceability system has been placed on hold (43, 45) CFDA also 
has encouraged the National Institute for the Control of Pharmaceutical 
and Biological Products (NICPBP) to extend drug surveillance among 
rural areas by using mobile laboratories, disguised as vehicles (white 
vans), that are equipped with instruments and chemical analysis 




1.3: Methods to Detect Falsified Medicines 
A literature review covering the methods to detect falsified 
medicines was conducted. This review searched Science Direct, PubMed, 
Google Scholar and grey literature using the search terms ‘Detection’, 
‘Identification’, ‘Analysis’, ‘Screening’, ‘Falsified’, ‘Counterfeit’, 
‘Medicine’, ‘Drugs’ and ‘Technology’. This search found research papers 
which identified a number of different approaches used to detect falsified 
medicines and in some cases the effectiveness of the approaches (Table 
1.4). The mode of action of each technology is explained with basis 
advantages and disadvantages also described. 
From the literature review, it is evident that the detection of 
falsified medicines is a practice usually conducted by field researchers 
(from universities and non-government organisations) and customs 
officers at international borders or as part of internet pharmacy 
investigations. There are some exceptions, such as Belgium, Italy and 
Greece where individual medicines are serialised and digitally verified 
against a list of products known to be legitimate. There are many methods 
at the disposal of investigators which include traditional laboratory 
techniques, less frequently used emerging technologies and visual 
checklists (Table 1.4), with advertising and awareness campaigns (Table 
1.5) also playing an important role in educating patients and healthcare 
professionals to the threats of counterfeit medicines.  
For the moment, it appears that cross-border checks are 
responsible for many counterfeit or falsified drug seizures worldwide; 
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however, it would appear that random customs checks alone are no longer 
suitable in the face of a growing international drug falsification. As a result 
of random searches or notifications through international criminal 
communications, customs officers identify and investigate suspicious 
packages of medicines crossing international borders with samples 
traditionally sent to laboratories for analysis using methods such as 
chromatography or spectroscopy. This practice alone is proving 
ineffective, as counterfeit medicine rates increase year on year (46). Cross 
border checking, for example, do not account for counterfeit/falsified 
medicines made in the same country that they are sold or supplied. 
Random custom checks are important, but systematic medicines 
verification checks are also useful. Criminals work in a clandestine 
manner, making every effort to bypass safety and security systems put in 
place to protect patients; therefore, an evolving multi-prong, multi-stage 
approach to counterfeit or falsified medicine detection is required. With 
the advent of relatively inexpensive, emerging portable methods to 
identify counterfeit drugs, the future could see checks carried out not only 
by customs officers and field operators but also doctors, pharmacists upon 
supply to a patient, nurses upon administration to a patient or even by the 
patient themselves.  
It is important to understand the methods and technologies 
available to detect falsified medicines and to comprehend their advantages 




Table 1.4: A summary of available methods to detect substandard 
and falsified medicines. 
Laboratory 
1 Chromatography LCMS(47), LC-QTOF-MS(48), TLC(49), 
HPLC (48). 
2 Spectroscopy FTI(49), MIR(50), NIR(48)(51-52), 
NMR(50)(52) Raman (51) and XRF(48). 
3 Other Analytical 
Methods  
X-Ray Diffraction (52), Chemical-Physical 
Tests (colorimetric (52-53), dissolution 
(54), density and viscosity(55), Dynamic 
Thermal Analysis (54), Micro Fluidics (56) 




CD3 (60-61), TruScan™ (51-52, 62), Scio. 
(63). 
2 Mini-laboratories King QRS (64), GPHF minilab (65, 62), 
Pharma check (59, 66). 
3 Mobile Phone or 
Social Network 
MPedigree (66-69), Sproxil, Authenticait, 
Pharmasecure, Epothecary and Medscape 
(70). 
4 Serialization and 
Verification 
RFID(71,72), 2D Serialization (73). 
 
5 Edible Serialized 
Trackers 
TrueTag (62), Nanoguardian (62). 
6 Algorithms and 
Data Security  
Machine learning for increasing the 
identification of illegal online pharmacies, 
blockchain for securing data during the 




1 The WHO Checklist (50,64). 
 
1.3.1: Laboratory  
 
Many laboratory techniques used for the detection of counterfeit 
drugs are the same techniques used in the synthesis and analysis of 
medicinal products for manufacturing or research purposes. Such 
techniques are usually required for in-depth analysis and provide time-
delayed responses to field investigators or customs officials. These 
approaches include chromatography, spectroscopy and a number of other 
individual methods which are explained below. The following approaches 
to SF medicine detection and associated publications identify how these 
techniques work. Sensitivity or specificity of these techniques were 
largely unreported in these studies. There was also little or no reference to 
the cost per test for each technique. 
Chromatography 
 
This technique relies on a mobile phase (solvent) and a medium 
(e.g. chromatography paper) which is used to separate a chemical mixture 
into its multiple compounds. The compounds are separated at different 
stages on the chromatography paper, revealing the makeup of the mixture 
or product. This overarching term covers multiple analytical techniques, 
including thin layer chromatography (TLC) and high-pressure liquid 
chromatography (HPLC). These techniques can also be combined with 
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spectroscopy to analyse compounds, e.g. Liquid chromatography-mass 
spectrometry (LCMS).  
Bernard et al. (47)  demonstrates the use of chromatography, 
namely LCMS, as a technique to identify counterfeit cardiovascular drugs 
in Africa. This research pilot identifies the technique as a valuable method 
to identify drugs, however, due to a relatively small sample size, the 
experiment was not exposed to nor did it detect any falsified medicine, 
therefore this research is not entirely useful in determining the 
effectiveness of this technique. Lee et al. (48) demonstrated the role of 
liquid chromatography quadrupole time-of-flight mass spectrometry (LC–
QTOF–MS), where a spectral library of sildenafil and associated 
analogues were generated to allow for the identification of falsified 
medicines. Custers et al. (49) describes TLC as slow but easy and cheap. 
Custers identifies HPLC coupled with ultraviolet detection or mass 
spectrometry as a more expensive and sophisticated method of 
identification.  
 It is clear that chromatography can identify medicines that are 
entirely different however there is no evidence from this study that 
chromatography alone could differentiate between chemically similar 
drugs such as morphine and codeine or counterfeit drugs which contain 
similar doses of the active ingredient. Moreover, chromatography is a 
destructive technique which renders the tested product unusable. 
Furthermore, chromatography is time-consuming, requires the use of a 
laboratory, a number of materials, and trained lab technicians. The training 
required and cost of materials makes chromatography an expensive 
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approach subject to human error and unsuitable for routine verification in 




This term categorises some of the techniques identified as possible 
counterfeit drug detections methods. By definition spectroscopy is ‘The 
branch of science concerned with the investigation and measurement of 
spectra produced when matter interacts with or emits electromagnetic 
radiation’(74). Spectroscopy covers a variety of techniques. Each 
technique utilizes a different type of radiative energy involved in the 
analysis interaction. These techniques include Fourier-transform infrared 
spectroscopy (FTI)(49), mid-infrared spectroscopy (50) (MIR), near-
infrared spectroscopy (NIR)(48, 51-52) nuclear magnetic resonance 
spectroscopy (50-51)(NMR), Raman spectroscopy (51-52), and X-ray 
fluorescence spectroscopy (XRF)(48).  
In the past, the process of preparing a sample for spectroscopy 
analysis required the crushing of a product with or without further 
dissolution. This dissolution process required preparation, staff training 
and time. However refractory spectroscopy using MIS, NIR and Raman 
spectroscopy can be a relatively quick process involving little or no 
sample preparation. NIR and Raman spectroscopy analysis can be 
performed on medicines without destroying the product (52). When 
compared to chromatography, which requires the separation of products 
into active ingredients, the spectroscopy approach is preferred due to its 
potentially non-destructive nature. NMR, on the other hand, does require 
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the dissolution of a solid sample for testing, (49-50) and the results 
generated are almost indisputable. If NMR analysis was used it would 
occur after the medicine is initially identified as suspicious or counterfeit 
using a cheaper identification technique. The NMR analysis process 
involves the employment of a large facility rarely found outside of a 
pharmaceutical company or university chemistry laboratory, making this 
expensive instrument largely inaccessible for efficient, routine use. 
However, with the advancement of emerging technologies, spectroscopy 
instruments are becoming increasingly available in portable variations, 
encouraging their use as first-line detection methods. 
Other Analytical Methods 
 
X-ray diffraction has also been identified as a method to detect 
falsified medicines. There is an argument proposed by Maurin et al. (75) 
which favours x-ray diffraction above NIR. This study tests the X-ray 
diffraction technique and generates drug results for both legitimate and 
falsified drugs and explains that the comparison between falsified and 
legitimate samples show a clear distinction. The author explains that the 
differences seen with NIR are not as clear as X-ray diffraction and as such 
required detailed analysis to identify differences from legitimate and 
falsified medicine results.   
Chemical-physical tests such as colorimetric tests, (53,76) 
dissolution tests (54) or density and viscosity tests (55) can be cheap, 
effective and easy to perform, these tests are, however, generally regarded 
as less specific (50). 
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Wilczyński et al. (55) describes the use of dynamic thermal 
analysis in detecting falsified medicines. This technique involves the 
heating of a tablet to 60°C and comparing data such as thermographs of 
known legitimate medicines with those being tested. The process takes 
into consideration both tablet content and coating, as differences in 
product coating may affect product cooling. This technique is simple and 
requires no sample preparation. Although a temperature of 60°C means 
that further testing of the sample would not be possible. Heating a 
medicine to such an extent would contradict the manufacturer’s storage 
requirements of almost all medicinal products, rendering the medicine 
unusable for therapeutic use.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                       
Colorimetric testing using paper microfluidics is typically engaged 
for the identification of suspicious artesunate, an anti-malarial drug. 
Koesdjojo et al. (56) have developed a kit containing paper-based test 
strips that perform the colourimetric assay upon adding an artesunate 
sample. The test kit utilises paper microfluidics (four layers with dried 
reagents) and is based on the reaction of an alkali decomposition product 
of artesunate with a diazonium salt, fast red TR, that results in an 
appearance of a yellow colour in the presence of artesunate. This test kit 
allows for quantitative analysis of artesunate tablets by providing a key 
that comes along with the kit. It is possible to also use a colour analyser 
on a camera phone to take a digital image of the chip and analyse the 
colour. The intensity of the yellow colour produced corresponds to the 
approximate concentration of artesunate. The specificity of colourimetric 
detection is dependent on pH, and among a list of other anti-malarial 
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artesunate is the only drug that gives a yellow colour at a pH of 4. 
Therefore, the reaction must be maintained at pH 4 to be specific to 
artesunate and avoid positive test results in the presence of certain other 
antimalarials. This test appears effective as an initial tool, but due to the 
equipment and process it would require adaption for testing further 
medicine and as such would not be suitable for rapid systematic detection.  
Ultraviolet light is also used in the detection of counterfeit 
medicines, usually coupled with other techniques in a laboratory setting 
and is used by some emerging technologies described below (57-59). 
1.3.2: Emerging Technologies 
 
 Emerging techniques include the creation of new identification 
and analysis approaches as well as adaptations of established methods to 
improve ease of use and portability. Such advances include handheld 
devices which are usually lightweight, easy to use and more accessible 
than their laboratory counterparts. Portable and semi-portable minilabs 
also exist which contain all the necessary functions to perform drug 
analysis coupled with simple functionality, which allows them to be used 
by non-laboratory trained staff. Other technologies include SMS networks 
and medicine serialisation coupled with subsequent verification which 
include RFID, 2D data matrix and edible medicine trackers.  
Hand-Held Devices   
 
  The CD3 device is a third-generation handheld electronic tool 
produced by the FDA which uses light –emitting diodes (led), covering 
the ultraviolet to the infrared spectrum, for visual fluorescent comparison. 
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This device compares an image of a known legitimate medicinal product 
or packages with a suspected counterfeit product image; often falsified 
medicines or their packaging produce different images under light to 
legitimate medicines. This device can operate via mains power or can be 
battery operated making it portable. The price is likely to be much cheaper 
than traditional lab equipment, therefore it has potential for widespread 
use (60-61). This technique, however, does not provide an absolute 
answer and requires interpretation which could be considered a matter of 
opinion. For example, in a study by Ranieri et al. (61), it was noted that 
personnel using the CD-3 device, on two occasions identified the 
authentic medicine as falsified i.e. false positive. Although this is a safer 
outcome than a false negative, this suggests that misinterpretation is 
possible. The CD3 facilitates the testing of tablets while still within the 
original packaging, however only if such packaging is translucent in 
appearance. This device does not facilitate a response quick enough to be 
suitable for the routine identification of medicines at the point of 
dispensing but may prove to be useful in tandem with other techniques, in 
countries where counterfeiters have developed means to bypass the 
serialisation process or where such legislation is absent (60-61). 
Thermo Scientific TruScan™ is another handheld device relying 
on Raman spectroscopy, (51-52, 62) to examine the composition of any 
given product including the API, fillers and coatings. The advantages are 
that testing is quick and can be performed without destruction of the 
product or packaging. The device size is substantially smaller than the 
laboratory version, and as such, it can be used to complete reliable and 
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repeatable authentication on a daily basis without the employment of 
highly trained staff.  
ScioTM is an example of a new, affordable miniature handheld 
near-infrared spectroscopy tool which can be used by consumers for 
pharmaceutical analysis (63). This device is coupled with a mobile phone 
app and works by comparing the spectroscopy graph results with a 
database of known legitimate product spectral data to understand whether 
or not the tested product is legitimate or not. 
Mini Laboratories 
 
Kings College London has produced a prototype device called a 
medicines authentication unit using quadrupole resonance spectroscopy 
(QRS) (77)  is capable of detecting not only counterfeit but also 
substandard and degraded pharmaceutical products. This process is 
achieved using radiofrequency spectroscopy, a non- invasive and non-
destructive technique; a notable advantage over other analytical 
techniques (77). Other advantages include the portable nature of the 
device and the clear Yes/No response, which leaves minimal room for 
misinterpretation. Considering the clear response, portable nature and 
analytical intelligence, if scaled appropriately the QRS minilab detection 
technique may be a viable option alone or in tandem with other detection 
techniques for routine or field-based detection.                                                                                                                          
GPHF Minilab unlike the Kings College devise has a four-step 
process which includes prior dissolution and the use of chromatography 
to produce a result. Knowledge of analytical chemistry is required to 
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operate this device which is a major stumbling block for quick, systematic 
checking. Hall et al.  (62) state that the total cost per test per dose is $2 
which is also relatively expensive compared to international generic drug 
prices. 
Pharmacheck is another example of a minilab and would appear to 
use colourimetry in the same fashion as described above (58, 77). This 
device standardises the process which facilitates mobile testing. Although 
this product appears to have attracted much media attention, there is not 
much research published which explains how it operates or how reliable 
it is. 
Social Network and Communication 
 
Mpedigree an African social network company established in 2007 
by a Ghanaian entrepreneur which sells software to pharmaceutical 
manufacturers. This software facilitates the printing of a 12-digit code, 
concealed by a scratch-off panel onto pharmaceutical containers. Once the 
code is revealed the consumer can send an SMS message, free of charge, 
which generates an instant reply describing the authenticity of the product. 
(67-69) This strategy provides a simple solution to a difficult problem and 
encourages patient involvement in their healthcare. Furthermore, this 
technique matches the technology landscape of LMIC’s, using SMS 
messaging as opposed to an internet connection; which can be sparse in 
developing regions such as sub-Saharan Africa. MPedigree certainly has 
a role to play in SF medicine detection in sub-Saharan Africa today. 
However, the strategy would not facilitate direct healthcare provider 
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verification, as to do so would involve tampering with the unsold product 
(67). 
Other mobile phone technologies have since become available 
which use a variety of methods to identify medicines as either legitimate 
or not. Using a products 2D or QR code or texting functionality. New 
mobile phone approaches such as those produced by Sproxil, 
Authenticateit, Pharmasecure, Epothecary and Medsnap (70) aim to make 
medication authentication available to patients.  
Serialisation 
Radio frequency identification (RFID) is a collective term for 
technology that uses radio waves to track people or products. The system 
is made up of a microchip and an antenna (RFID tag); the signalling device 
is called a reader which also has an antenna. The reader emits 
electromagnetic waves which are picked up by microchip antenna which 
modifies the message and sends it back to the reader where the data is 
converted into readable digital data (71-72). RFID systems are not 
standard and can vary depending on the product they are attached to. Some 
RFID’s contain their own power source and some feed off energy emitted 
from the signalling device. This system is frequently used for tracking a 
product or person and as such demonstrates many advantages for use in 
the drug tracing industry (72). 
Medicine serialisation, verification and authentication require 
multiple stakeholder compliances to succeed. The approach requires the 
widespread 2D barcode serialisation of medicines by drug manufacturers; 
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the risk-based scanning (verification) of medicines by wholesalers and the 
systematic authentication of the 2D data matrix on the medicine packet at 
a pharmacy. This method has been proposed by both the EU (18-19) and 
US (36) governments and is set for international implementation in other 
nations also. Once implemented is expected to be a cheap and robust way 
to authenticate the majority of medicines before administration to a 
patient. This type of tracking also facilitates the identification of expired 
and recalled medicines (18-19) which may result in some financial 
advantages for healthcare facilities including better stock control, better 
waste management, more efficient drug recalls and a change in the 
reimbursement process, and thereby reducing fraud.  
The advantages are not just limited to cost saving but may also 
relate to improving clinical outcomes. The serialisation method could link 
patient records to product scanning which would allow researchers and 
clinicians to identify and compare patient medicine compliance in hospital 
with compliance in the community. The system could also be used to 
monitor antibiotic supply to reduce inappropriate antibiotic use. Finally, 
serialisation could facilitate patient adherence modules with the ability to 
deliver patient advice at the point of authentication.  
Despite these advantages, there are sure to be many workflow 
adjustments required by manufacturers, wholesalers and pharmacies to 
comply with impending regulations; which if not handled effectively may 
cause unwarranted disruption to drug supply in the respective sector. The 
hospital environment is likely to experience a disruption in the early stages 
of implementation as this new approach may further complicate an already 
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complex drug supply process, especially regarding split pack and robotic 
dispensing, satellite pharmacy hub supply, medicine returns and 
information technology integration issues between dispensing systems 
and national databases. 
There are many organisations which provide manufacturers with 
serialisation solutions. These companies can generate 2D barcodes and 
aggregate codes which is an efficient capability for multipack scanning. 
There are two companies available to provide a verification system in 
Europe. Both NMVS providers  have been selected by the EMVO and are  
blueprint providers (78). These companies will be using information 
technology to check a product code against a national medicine’s 
verification repository and decommission medicines based on the unique 
codes printed on their carton. 
Edible Trackers 
 
Truetag (62) is a low cost edible, heat resistant, tracking micro-tag 
device manufactured from high purity silica available not only to prevent 
falsification but also to provide informatics and ensure product quality. 
Hall et al. (62) explain that an individual pill can be tagged at the cost of 
$0.01 each and markets it as a technology that is complementary to RFID 
or 2D barcode authentication.   
NanoGuardian (62) also provides individual unit tracing and 
authentication and can store unique codes. It is compatible with 2D 
serialisation and RFID tracking. Information stored can include expiry 
dates and manufacturer information including the drugs anticipated 
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destination. The positives of these technologies are low cost, high tech., 
with edible codes available in invisible ink. Regarding systematic 
authentication, the negatives of this technique, in isolation, are the 
disruption of individual packs; therefore, these technologies would be best 
placed in partnership with RFID or 2D serialisation as mentioned 
previously. 
Algorithms and Data Security 
 
Research into machine learning suggests that algorithms can be 
used to identify and help to close down online pharmacies operating 
illegally. There are many illegal online pharmacies, and digital approaches 
could facilitate the identification of these pharmacies in a more effective 
manner than random identification. Regarding securing the data 
transmitted during medicine authentication (e.g. as part of the FMD or 
DSCSA) blockchain technology has been suggested. This approach which 
has been available for many years, widely associated with bitcoin 
transactions, can encrypt data every time a pharmaceutical product 
transfers ownership and acts as a ledger for transactions. Blockchain 
technology may help to secure this data and reduce instances of unique 
serial code breaches.  
1.3.3: Visual Check 
 
Healthcare professionals are responsible for the systematic 
checking of medicines to ensure that they are safe for administration. This 
task falls to pharmacists, nurses and to a lesser extent doctors, due to their 
limited role in medication dispensing and administration. The general 
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checking procedure includes an inspection to ensure that the correct 
product, form and strength have been selected and are in-date. The ability 
to identify one drug as falsified and another as safe using a standard visual 
check, where holograms and logos are assessed (52) is based on staff 
perception. The unstructured approach in a busy environment leaves this 
process open to error. The ‘WHO Checklist’ (64) (79) currently available 
online, adds rigour to the checking processes, introducing a stepwise 
approach to identifying signs of product falsification. Although this 
checklist would add significant time to the checking process, until 
handheld devices such as the CD3 are widely available or until medicine 
serialisation and verification according to the FMD and DSCSA are fully 
rolled out; this checklist is the only reasonably resource available for the 
identification of falsified medicines by healthcare professions. Nursing 
and pharmacy staff are unlikely to perform the box-ticking exercise 
associated with the tool exactly. However, education and training 
surrounding the WHO checklist is likely to increase the chance of 
detecting a falsified medicine and will also help to raise awareness. 
1.3.4: Raising Awareness 
 
Patients are an important group in the fight against falsified 
medicines, and it is crucial that they are made aware of the signs of drug 
falsification. Those in LMIC’s are especially vulnerable, however, with 
low levels of education, the ability of LMIC citizens to understand and 
change behaviours as a result of awareness campaigns remains a problem. 
Organizations that run awareness campaigns include the WHO, The 
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Centre for Safe Internet Pharmacies (CSIP), Interpol and The National 
Agency for Food and Drug Administration and Control (NAFDAC). 
The International Medicines Products Anti-Counterfeiting 
Taskforce (IMPACT) is a WHO group (80) which works on behalf of the 
194 (81) WHO member states to tackle the international issues of 
counterfeit medicines. The group aims to build networks across member 
states to halt the production of illegal counterfeit medicines. IMPACT 
have also generated a number of publications pertaining to education and 
raising awareness. These publications include, ‘The impact handbook’ 
(80), ‘The BE AWARE toolkit for healthcare professionals’ (79) and the 
‘Counterfeit drugs kill campaign’(82) which details the emotive image of 
a snake wrapped around medication accompanied by the headline 
‘Counterfeit Drugs Kill’. 
CSIP is a not for profit organisation comprising of internet 
industry leaders. This organisation aims to alleviate the issues of falsified 
medicine sales online and have run a number of campaigns. These 
campaigns include the ‘Be safe buy smart’  (83) campaign urging patients 
not to take risks when buying medicines online. The ‘Be safe buy smart’ 
campaign has partnered with internet and payment industry leaders such 
as Google, Yahoo, Microsoft, American Express, PayPal, Visa, and 
MasterCard to identify and remove thousands of websites delivering 
counterfeit medicines (83). ‘Be safe Rx’ is a campaign which is run by the 
Food and Drug Administration has similar aims to CSIP campaign. Both 
campaigns raised awareness of the risks associated with buying medicines 
from illegal online pharmacies (84). 
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‘Proud to be’(85) is a campaign launched by Interpol, the largest 
international police organisation with 190 members (86). This 
organisation amongst other activities investigates international crime 
trends and links national police services together even in situations where 
previous national relationships have failed. The ‘Proud to be’ campaign 
focuses on the problem of falsified and counterfeit medicines 
internationally and features a song which raises awareness by describing 
the issue through music. In addition to this campaign, operation Pangea 
(87), a high profile activity, was conducted by Interpol in 2015. This 
operation continued for one week in June to combat the sale of counterfeit 
and falsified medicines online, an operation which has grown from 10 
countries in 2008 to over 100 in 2015. This operation recovered 20.7 
million fakes worth an estimated USD 81 million in 2015 which attracted 
much publicity. This publicity is likely to deter counterfeiters and raise 
awareness amongst healthcare professionals and the general public. 
NAFDAC in Nigeria often publicise the issue of drug 
counterfeiting and have been proactive in the identification of counterfeit 
medicines through the utilisation of emerging technologies such as 
TruScan™ (handheld Raman spectroscopy), GPHF minilab and mobile 






Table 1.5: A list of organisations and their associated awareness 
campaigns. 
Organisation Campaign 
IMPACT Counterfeit drugs kill 
CISP Be safe buy smart 
FDA Be safeRX 
Interpol Proud to be 
Fight the Fakes Fight the Fakes 
Global Governments Operation Pangea 
NAFDAC Website advertising: Options available to 
identify drugs 
ASOP Multiple campaigns against illegal online 
pharmacies (89) 
1.4: Conclusions 
The fight against falsified medicines is multifaceted. This 
literature describes the regulations which relate to medicine falsification 
and counterfeiting and the technological, scientific and practical 
approaches to identify these medicines. Consumer behaviour requires 
change, criminal activity in this area requires curbing, effective 
mechanisms of identification need developing, and policies need to be 
introduced to tackle this global issue. The ideal anti-counterfeiting or 
falsification method should be a policy-driven approach which is simple 
to perform, non-destructive, demonstrates high authentication speed, 
meets stringent security standards, is cost-effective, and meet the demands 
of a multitude of stakeholders while integrating coherently with multi-
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sector work streams. Unique serialisation appears to be the most 
appropriate solution however due to poor internet access in LMIC’s, 
serialisation is likely to help HIC’s the most initially. Despite the use of 
serialisation and its growth in recent years, organisations are reminded 
that falsification or counterfeiting experts will always strive to ‘beat the 
system' which may give rise to the need for multiple or alternative 
protection measures and frequent campaigns to deter illegal counterfeiters 
and raise awareness amongst the public. 
The argument exists that healthcare professionals and 
policymakers should understand all tools available in the fight against 
drug counterfeiting and should not be blind sighted by incumbent 
legislation, however, the reality of the current legislative situation is that 
the FMD, DSCSA and other international deadlines are fast approaching. 
These regulations will play a big role in poor quality medicine detection, 
and non-compliance with these regulations is not an option.  
The medicine screening process using serialised barcodes has 
worked successfully in Italy, Belgium and Greece for many years in the 
community pharmacy setting. However, there is little published academic 
evidence available to support this approach in the primary or secondary 
care environment. It is useful to conduct a study to understand more about 
the FMD approach in the hospital environment and to identify the 
compliance and detection rates of expired, recalled or potentially falsified 
medicines. It will also be important to identify obstacles to 
implementation and to identify workflow issues. These are areas which 
are covered in chapter two. 
49 
 
Note: Large sections of this chapter have already been published in the 
following article 
Naughton et al. 2016. Combating Counterfeit Medicines: Legal 
Frameworks and Emerging Technologies. RAPS [Internet]. [cited 2016 


































2.0: The Impact of The Falsified Medicines 
Directive on Pharmacy Practice  
2.1: Introduction  
Chapter one identified and explained a variety of international 
regulations which relate to medicine falsification and medicine 
serialisation. Chapter one also identified the technologies available to 
detect falsified medicines. Considering the international introduction of 
systematic medicines serialisation and verification, this seems to be the 
most widespread solution to combat the issue of falsified medicines. It is 
therefore pertinent to pursue further research in this field. This chapter 
assesses the FMD, now part of UK law, and its effect on pharmacy 
practice. This chapter also provides an overview of hospital pharmacy 
operations and how pharmacies can ensure compliance with the 
incumbent regulations based on analysis of both community and hospital 
workflows and the UK drug distribution cycle. This chapter helps to 
understand potential points to authenticate medicines within pharmacy 
operations, and also aims to understand some of the advantages and 
obstacles which are likely to be faced during FMD digital drug screening 
roll-out  (90). 
The FMD will bring about positive effects such as increased 
supply chain security and a reduction in illegal movement of medicines 
from the intended country of use to another, which causes medicine 
shortages and price increases. However, less obvious advantages also 
exist. Once medicines are serialised there will be the potential to better 
identify short-dated and soon to expire medicines thus reducing 
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medication waste. There will also be a better understanding and control of 
stock which will facilitate the cost-effective and efficient recall of drugs 
when required. If digital medicine screening technologies are integrated 
into pharmacy medicine record (PMR) software, there will be the 
capability to deposit individual medicine identifiers into patient records 
and allow for unprecedented levels of patient-level drug recalls. A better 
understanding of stock levels will also facilitate a potential reduction in 
local medicines shortages and a more efficient system of inventory 
management. As seen in Belgian community pharmacies there will also 
be the opportunity to load 2D-data matrices with drug specific information 
relating to adherence, counselling or adverse event recording. Finally, the 
FMD will generate a wealth of data which will prove valuable for 
pharmacovigilance purposes and also the monitoring of antimicrobial 
prescribing and therefore resistance. 
The challenges for hospital pharmacy which accompany the FMD 
relate to the cost of integrating medicines screening or authentication 
technologies into existing systems. Existing systems include the use of 
robotics and patient medication records. There will be a cost and 
inconvenience associated with restructuring pharmacy workflows and 
added administrative duties which will arise from dealing with the 
quarantine of recalled, expired and falsified medicines identified by the 
new technology. The less obvious challenges include the understanding of 
how the FMD will work in practice and how issues such as how to manage 
split pack dispensing, pharmacy satellites, aseptic units, ward stock 
decommissioning, data matrix aggregation, decommissioning unit dose 
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dispensing, reversing the decommissioning of pharmacy returns and 
dealing with technological issues such as offline instances. 
2.2: Operational Comparison of Hospital Prescription and 
Dispensing Process Compared to Primary Care  
Medicine authentication has existed in the community pharmacy 
sector, in Belgium, Italy and Greece for over ten years (91). Although 
there have been pilots in the area of medicines authentication, few appear 
to have been published, and none appear to have been conducted in a 
hospital setting (92). There is a difference between hospital and 
community pharmacy regarding prescription and dispensing workflow 
processes. These following sections aim to describe the UK community 
and hospital pharmacy prescription and dispensing workflows to identify 
obstacles and challenges which may affect the roll-out of medicines 
authentication technology in both sectors. 
2.2.1: UK Community Pharmacy 
 
Within the community sector, the FMD will require the vast 
majority of prescription-only medicines (POM) and a selection of high 
risk over the counter (OTC) medicines to be verified for authenticity and 
decommissioned at the point of supply to the public. The proposed digital 
authentication technology (software) is likely to be integrated into existing 
PMR software and will employ the use of existing scanning equipment 







A prescription may enter a pharmacy in either of two ways. 
Prescriptions may be sent directly from a prescriber using prescribing 
software to a designated pharmacy electronically. Alternatively, a 
prescription may be printed or handwritten by the prescriber and given 
directly to the patient or representative to fill at a pharmacy of their choice. 
In the UK printed prescriptions also often have an electronic element; they 
often have a straight-line barcode which can be scanned in a pharmacy to 
display the prescription details. For this reason, the majority of pharmacies 
have barcode scanning equipment.  
Electronic Prescription Process 
 
Electronic prescriptions are electronically transmitted daily from 
GP surgeries to pharmacies. Pharmacies must refresh their e-prescription 
inbox to identify e-prescriptions. Alternatively, patients may arrive at a 
pharmacy and indicate to the pharmacist that there is an e-prescription in 
their inbox (When an e-prescription is identified, a copy is printed by the 
pharmacist for dispensing. From this point forward, a copy of the e-
prescription is treated in the same way as a paper prescription (with the 
exception of reimbursement). 
Paper Prescription Process 
A patient may present a paper prescription at a community 
pharmacy, or they may have their prescription collected from a GP surgery 
by a member of the community pharmacy team. When a patient arrives 
with a prescription and delivers it to a counter assistant, the assistant will 
pass the prescription to a qualified member of staff (dispenser, technician 
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or pharmacist). The staff member will then generate labels to match the 
prescription. The staff member will then dispense the prescription by 
applying the correct label to the correct product according to the 
prescription. A pharmacist or a technician (usually that has not been 
involved in the picking, labelling or dispensing of the product) will then 
check the prescription. If the patient is waiting for the prescription, it is 
handed directly to them after confirming their identity. If the patient has 
left the pharmacy, or the patient collects their prescription monthly, then 
the prescription is stored in a secure location before collection. During this 
process, the pharmacist must also screen the prescription for clinical 
appropriateness. 
In a busy community pharmacy, safety and efficiency are 
paramount. Authentication of medicines could occur at multiple stages in 
the dispensing process (Table 2.0). The scan could take place at the 
dispensing stage, the checking stage or the handing out stage. The majority 
of prescriptions in the UK are monthly collections and therefore prepared 
in advance which will influence where authentication takes place. 
Table 2.0: A selection of advantages and disadvantages of 
authentication at the different stages of the dispensing process in 
community pharmacy. 
 
Stage Advantages Disadvantage 
Labelling stage The terminal used to label 
the product may be used to 
perform the medicine scan, 
relinquishing the need for 
additional authentication 
terminals. 
Unsuitable medicines are 
identified early in the 
process. This provides the 
pharmacy with a better 
Authenticating at 
this stage may slow 
down the labelling 
process by 
occupying a terminal 
for a longer period 
of time. If performed 
at this stage this task 
may be performed 
by a less qualified 
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chance of procuring a 
replacement medicine to 
satisfy the patient's drug 
order, should the product in 
stock be identified as SF. 






Unsuitable medicines are 
identified early in the 
process, which provides the 
pharmacy with more time to 
procure a replacement 
medicine should the product 
in stock be identified as SF. 
This staff grade may 
be less qualified to 
deal with SF 
medicines. 
Decommissioning at 
this stage may 
require a financial 




Checking stage SF medicines are identified 
by highly trained registered 
professionals. Identification 
occurs closer to the patient, 
reducing the risk of a 
falsified medicine not being 
identified between the 
moment of authentication 
and the moment of supply. 
 
SF medicines are 
identified at one of 
the last points before 
supply to the patient 
if the medicine is 
recalled and an 
alternative product is 
unavailable; this 
may disrupt patient 
supply. Medicines 
that are checked may 
be placed in storage 
for up to a month 
before collection, in 
which time a 
medicine could 





Medicines are verified as 
safe at the final stage before 
reaching the public. 
Authentication technology 
can be configured to send 
alerts to the healthcare 
assistant, which facilitates 
patient education and 
counselling. 
Medicines identified 
as unsuitable for the 
public at this stage 
may cause 
inconvenience to 
patients if there is no 
replacement stock 
available. This step 
would be carried out 
by the least qualified 
staff members which 
may increase the 
inadvertent supply of 





Regarding community pharmacy, the FMD is clear that medicines must 
be decommissioned at the point of supply to the patient. However, there 
is no clarity as to the exact stage of ‘supply to the patient’ that the final 
decommissioning will take place, and by whom. Decommissioning could 
take place at multiple stages within the pharmacy (Table 2.0). 
2.2.2: UK Hospital Pharmacy 
 
The complexities of hospital pharmacy are different to community 
pharmacy due to the operations involved in the movement of written drug 
requests from the wards to the pharmacy such as drug charts, inpatient 
request sheets, online requests and phone calls. Further complexities in a 
hospital pharmacy include robotics, hospital clinics and workflow 
complexities such as separate areas or rooms for preparing controlled 
drugs and extemporaneously prepared medicines. Furthermore, each 
hospital pharmacy has a different layout and work process, unlike large 
retail pharmacy chains which can often have identical layouts. Hospital 
pharmacies are necessarily tailored to the specialist needs of the hospital 
or trust both physically and operationally. The services that a hospital 
provides has an impact on the medicines a hospital pharmacy supplies, 
prepares or produces.  
The actors in the dispensing process include the assistants who 
accept and conduct administrative prescription duties such as filing or 
tracking prescriptions, dispensers who process the prescriptions, pick the 
medicines for preparation and prepare these medicines with the 
appropriate labels. The final actors in this process are the accredited 
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checking technicians and pharmacists who check the product label and 
prescription for technical accuracy. Therefore, there are a variety of stages 
in the drug supply process where medicines could be de-commissioned 
(Table 2.1). Considering the assistant does not deal directly with 
medicines the possible actors in the dispensing process available to 
decommission or authenticate medicines are deemed to be the dispensers 
and the checkers. 
Table 2.1: A selection of advantages and disadvantages of 
authentication at the different stages of the dispensing process in 
secondary care. 
 
Stage Advantages Disadvantage 
Goods in SF products are identified 
upon receipt from the 
wholesaler and issues can be 
rectified early in the drug 
supply chain. The 
decommissioning process is 
completed without an impact 
on frontline services. 
Scanning drugs by 
workers in the hospital 
pharmacy stores 
department would be a 
new process which 
may require further 
staff numbers to carry 
out the activity. After 
scanning at goods in, 
medicines may be 
recalled or expire. As 
they would not be 
scanned again before 
dispensing to a patient, 
this would increase the 
risk of supplying a 
patient with an 
expired, falsified or 
recalled drug. 
Labelling  As per Table 2.0 As per Table 2.0 
Dispensing  As per Table 2.0. Also, some 
hospitals have a process 
where labels are not produced 
until the correct medicine is 
scanned. Incorporating the 
scanning of the 2D data-
matrix at this point adds no 
additional time to that process 
while complying with the EU 
FMD. 
As per Table 2.0 
58 
 
Checking  As per Table 2.0. Many UK 
hospitals are familiar with 
scanning prescriptions at this 
stage to facilitate prescription 
tracking in the hospital. 
Therefore, scanning 
medicines at the same time 
could be incorporated. 
 
As per Table 2.0. 
Also, hospital 
dispensaries in the UK 
largely dispense for 
the same day and have 
less flexibility in 
managing their 
workload, unlike in 
community where 
monthly prescriptions 
can be dispensed in 
advance. Scanning 





Handing-out  As per Table 2.0. As hospitals 
deal with more specialist and 
rarely used medicines 
supplied to outpatients, it can 
be difficult to remember 
counselling advice associated 
with these medicines. A scan 
at this stage may generate 
drug information to remind 
staff of specific, less 
frequently used specialist 
medicines advice. Handing 
out of medicines within 
hospitals in the UK is often 
conducted by accredited 
checking technicians and 
pharmacists thus decreasing 
the likelihood of exposing less 
qualified staff to this task. 
As per Table 2.0. An 
exception, lesser 
qualified staff, do not 
routinely hand out 
medicines directly to 
patients. Also, patients 
do not always collect 
medicines from the 
pharmacy department. 
Medicines can be 
collected by ward-




2.3: An Analysis of the FMD and Hospital Pharmacy Sector  
Since the publication of the FMD in 2011 and the subsequent 
delegated regulations (DR) in 2016, there has been much discussion 
around the level of FMD compliance required by secondary care 
institutions. Due to the complex nature of the secondary care drug 
distribution cycle, the FMD allows certain dispensations for ‘Healthcare 
institutions', this chapter reviews the FMD and delegated regulations to 
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understand and explain these dispensations and the impact of the FMD on 
secondary care.  
The falsified medicines directive covers four themes, the supply 
chain, active ingredients and excipients, the internet, and product safety 
features. Product safety features include product serialisation with 2D 
data-matrix barcodes at manufacture, tamper evident seals for all products 
governed by the FMD, which includes the majority of prescription-only 
medicines and a minority of high risk over the counter medicines (18-19,  
24, 27). The authentication of medicine occurring at the pharmacy or 
‘healthcare institution’ level with a risk-based verification at wholesale 
level aims to prevent falsified medicines from reaching patients.  
2.3.1: FMD Compliance in Secondary Care 
 
The FMD is a safety tool for secondary care and compliance for 
all secondary care supply chain protagonists is mandatory – subject to a 
small number of exceptions when compared to primary care requirements. 
To understand the importance of authentication in secondary care in the 
UK, it is necessary to first understand the drug distribution cycle. Using 
the UK and the National Health Service (NHS) as an example (Figure 
2.0) it is clear that the movement of drugs from the manufacturer to the 
hospital ward and corresponding patient differs between individual 










Sources estimate that a drug can travel through as many as 20 to 
30 partners in the drug supply chain before reaching clinicians and the 
desired patient, making drug tracing challenging (93). Furthermore, many 
NHS trusts return unused medicines dispensed to hospital wards back into 
stock to control drug expenditure. Although this is a crucial move to 
manage finances and maintain the high level of healthcare that the UK has 
become accustomed to, this practice further complicates the drug 
distribution cycle in secondary care (Figure 2.0). The complexity of the 
drug distribution cycle within the NHS also poses challenges vis-á -vis 
most large NHS trusts hold a wholesaler dealing license. Having a 
wholesaler dealing licence permits each trust to routinely supply 
medicines to institutions such as community hospitals, hospices and the 
ambulance service not to mention the supply of scarce, time critical, 
medicines to other hospitals and community pharmacies in urgent 
circumstances; often out of normal working hours. These practices 
coupled with numerous drug entry points, via wholesalers, direct 
manufacturers and other suppliers create an entirely necessary yet 
convoluted drug distribution chain and environment which is open to the 
entry of illegitimate medicines. Such a distribution cycle is unparalleled 
in the primary care setting and creates an incredibly porous system with 
restricted transparency (93). 
 




2.3.2: Mandatory FMD Secondary Care Requirements  
Wholesaling Pharmacy Distribution Units 
 
As highlighted previously many NHS organisations have 
wholesaler dealer licenses and as such are obliged to comply with FMD 
regulations regarding wholesale supply. According to article 23 of the 
FMD delegated regulation (DR) (page 21)(19), a Central Hospital Trust 
Storage and Distribution Unit (CHTSD) (Figure 2.0) with a wholesalers 
license would have to authenticate medicines before supply to certain 
persons or institutions, in a hospital setting this would more frequently be 
paramedics and emergency medical practitioners, universities, prisons, 
hospices and nursing homes rather than to other healthcare institutions 
such as hospitals. 
Misconceptions: The Hospital Dispensation to Decommission 
 
The draft DR published in August 2015 and final DR published in 
February 2016 contains details of the consultations prior to the adoption 
of the DR which describes most stakeholders as supportive of checking 
the unique identifier at the end of the supply chain, namely at community 
and hospital pharmacy level (19).  Despite this support there is a special 
dispensation for “specific institutions” (page 9 point 23) (19) which could 
remove the obligation of safety feature verification to ensure that the 
verification measures on those parties ‘is proportionate’(19). This phrase 
has caused widespread confusion and has led many to believe that 
hospitals are exempt from the FMD legislation. It means that specific 
institutions such as care homes, prisons and ambulance services are not 
required to decommission medicines. 
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Point 23 (page 9) of the DA (19) states that: 
‘It should be possible for the Member States to exempt specific institutions 
or persons authorised or entitled to supply medicinal products to the 
public from the obligation of verification of the safety features in order to 
accommodate the particular characteristics of the supply chain in their 
territory and ensure that the impact of the verification measures on those 
parties is proportionate.’ 
The DR states that ‘specific institutions’ may be exempt from 
authentication which does not necessarily equate to ‘healthcare 
institutions’ which specifically means a hospital, in- or out-patient clinic, 
or health centre (Point 2, Page 14) (19).. However, the term ‘specific 
institutions' is not explained further in either the directive or the delegated 
regulation.   
Article 26 ‘derogations from Article 25’ helps to further clarify this point, 
stating: ‘Persons authorised or entitled to supply medicinal products to 
the public who do not operate within a healthcare institution or within a 
pharmacy are exempted from the obligation to verify the safety features 
and decommission the unique identifier of medicinal products where that 
obligation has been placed on wholesalers by national legislation in 
accordance with Article 23’(19). 
Truths: Healthcare Institution Decommissioning Exemption. 
 
Within article 26 (derogations to article 25)(19), the DA sets 
criteria below, which, if met, would remove the requirements for 
healthcare institutions to authenticate (decommission).  
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‘(a) The person authorised or entitled to supply medicinal products to the 
public obtain the medicinal product bearing the unique identifier through 
a wholesaler belonging to the same legal entity as the healthcare 
institution;’ 
Regarding secondary care environment, this would relate to the CHTSD 
(Figure 2.0) with wholesale dealers licence operating within the trust and 
therefore part of the same legal entity.  
 (b) The verification and decommissioning of the unique identifier is 
performed by the wholesaler that supplies the product to the healthcare 
institution;  
In the case of secondary care, the ‘Wholesaler' would be the CHTSD 
which would be responsible for authenticating or decommissioning the 
product before delivery to a specific hospital with the NHS trust in 
question. 
(c) No sale of the medicinal product takes place between the wholesaler 
supplying the product and that healthcare institution;  
The CHTSD (‘Wholesaler’) cannot sell decommissioned products to a 
hospital within its own trust. The CHTSD is permitted to ‘supply’ but not 
‘sell’ a decommissioned product to a hospital within the same legal entity, 
i.e. a hospital within the same trust. 
(d) The medicinal product is supplied to the public within that healthcare 
institution (19). 
The decommissioned medicine would have to be then supplied to a patient 
in a hospital that is part of the same legal entity of the wholesaler 
(CHTSD). This restriction would disqualify any medicines 
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decommissioned by the CHTSD from being sold to other legal entities 
such as community pharmacies or other hospitals via a wholesale dealer’s 
licence. 
To qualify for an exemption to decommission a trust would have 
to receive its medicines via a pharmacy distribution unit department 
(CHTSD) or a similar variation of a CHTSD as per Figure 2.0. The 
CHTSD unit would have to perform the decommissioning and such a unit 
would have to hold a wholesaler’s licence and form part of the same legal 
entity. As most NHS Trusts work via a CHTSD, and many have a 
wholesale dealers licence, this would be possible. The practice of 
decommissioning by the pharmacy CHTSD or wholesale level adds an 
extra step at the ‘goods in’ stage with little or no added clinical value. 
Information regarding expiry dates, recall status and suspicious medicines 
is dynamic. To revert to a system in which medicines are decommissioned 
at the ‘goods in’ stage totally detracts from the core principle of the FMD. 
The core of the FMD is that ‘Persons authorised or entitled to supply 
medicinal products to the public should verify the authenticity and 
decommission a unique identifier at the time the medicinal product is 
supplied to the public so to access the most up-to-date information 
concerning the product and avoid that products which are expired, 
recalled, withdrawn or indicated as stolen are supplied to the public.’ 
point 24 (page 9) (19). 
Decommissioning Before the Point of Supply to the Patient  
 
The DA states that within the ‘Healthcare institution’ medicines 
may be verified before the point of supply to the public: 
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‘In order to avoid an excessive impact on the daily operations of 
healthcare institutions, it should be possible for the Member States to 
allow persons authorised or entitled to supply medicinal products to the 
public operating within healthcare institutions to perform the verification 
of the authenticity and the decommissioning of a unique EN 10 EN 
identifier earlier than the time the medicinal products are supplied to the 
public, or exempt them from this obligation, subject to certain conditions' 
point 25 (page 9). 
The quotation in the previous paragraph is an exception to the rule that 
‘Persons authorised or entitled to supply medicinal products to the public 
should verify the authenticity and decommission a unique identifier at the 
time the medicinal product is supplied to the public’ (Article 25, point 2, 
page 21). 
If a healthcare institution does decide to decommission a medicine before 
the point of supply to a patient this can only occur ‘provided that no sale 
of the medicinal product takes place between the delivery of the product 
to the healthcare institution and the supplying of it to the public’. This 
restriction revokes the suitability of such medicines for wholesale supply, 
having an impact on the hospital wholesale business. To promote intra-
trust and inter-trust movement of medicines it would make clear financial 
sense to decommission at the point of supply to a patient. This includes in 
the pharmacy for a patient-specific supply, or at ward level by a nurse. 
This ensures safety closer to the patient and allows flexibility for trusts to 
continue wholesale trading as usual.  
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‘The Ten-Day Rule’ 
For practical reasons the DR has permitted all pharmacies to revert 
the ‘decommissioned’ or ‘dispensed’ status of a drug to allow it be 
dispensed at a later stage if the conditions from Article 13 (point1 page 
18-19) below, are fulfilled: 
‘(a) the person performing the reverting operation is covered by the same 
authorisation or entitlement and operates in the same premises as the 
person that decommissioned the unique identifier;  
(b) the reverting of the status takes place not more than ten days after the 
unique identifier was decommissioned;  
(c) the pack of medicinal product has not expired;  
(d) the pack of medicinal product has not been registered in the 
repositories system as recalled, withdrawn, intended for destruction or 
stolen and the person performing the reverting operation does not have 
knowledge that the pack is stolen;  
(e) the medicinal product has not been supplied to the public’ (19). 
The opportunity to reverse the decommissioning process facilitates the 
correction of decommissioning errors, with a ten-day window to perform 
this reversion which means that any medicine that decommissioned over 
ten days previous would not be suitable for sale. It is unclear why ten days 
was chosen as the deadline for re-commission medicines. However, the 
‘Ten-day rule’ has a crucial part to play in establishing the most 
appropriate management approach to this regulation. The ten-day rule will 
not cause problems for pharmacies that dispense medicines via paper 
prescription from walk in patients. However, in the case of prescriptions 
prepared in advance this will cause disruption. In the UK for example 
68 
 
prescriptions are often done in advance of the patient collecting the 
prescription. Prescription can be done for up to three months prior to 
collection and if the patient does not collect the prescription and the 
product is not recommissioned within ten days, this could cause medicine 
wastage. 
2.3.3: Where to Decommission Medicines in Hospital 
The Point of Supply 
 
The DA demonstrates (pg. 9 point 24) (19) that the verification of 
a product is not only to establish authenticity but also to inform the 
operator whether a product is expired, recalled, withdrawn or indicated as 
stolen using up to date information. It may take many months and, in some 
circumstances, years between a hospital receiving medicine and 
delivering it to a patient, in this time medicine may have expired, been 
recalled, or queries may have been raised as to its source. Therefore, to 
best utilise this dynamic information, the authentication of medicines as 
close to the patient as possible is a reasonable approach. Authenticity 
checks as close to the patient as possible provide certainty of safety up 
until the last moment that the medicine is supplied to the patient. Drug 
distribution is a complicated process, the further up-field that a check is 
performed the greater chance there is of bypassing the up-field check 
through alternative means. Checking at the point of supply or 
administration to a patient is the final, rate-limiting step and is less likely 




Regarding take-home prescriptions, the most effective place to 
authenticate might be at the point of dispensing; in terms of an in-patient 
supply, the safest place to authenticate would be at ward level before 
administration to the patient. This would provide a safety net for busy 
nursing staff and would work especially well with e-prescribing systems.  
Authentication could verify with the electronic prescribing system that the 
medicine selected matched the medication prescribed and that the 
medicine was not expired, or recalled, falsified or withdrawn. This is a 
model already being used in the US where we see the use of barcode 
eMAR technology. This model involves the electronic prescribing of 
medicines by medics, the clinical screening and ordering of medicines by 
pharmacists, the scanning of a patient's wristband and a drug being 
administered by the nurse. This process not only reduces prescribing and 
screening errors but the scanning of a patient’s wristband and the drug 
packet caused non-timing errors in medication administration relative 
reduction of 41.4% (P<0.001)(94). If hospitals in the UK were to follow 
the US model and scan the FMD 2D data matrix, they could reach FMD 
compliance while reducing administration errors.  
Regarding the FMD, whether it is a pharmacist in a dispensary or 
a nurse on ward level each member of staff must physically pick up each 
medicine container and check that they have selected the correct product. 
This checking process includes the checking of the contents of the 
container, the drug name, drug form and the expiry date of the product. 
Authentication or decommissioning at this stage would add 300 
milliseconds (the maximum FMD authentication time and it is unknown 
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why this limit was chosen)). In fact, considering, the inclusion of tamper-
evident packaging, reducing the need to open most medicine packs during 
the checking process, the FMD regulations will provide improved 
efficiency to current practice.  
Medicines authentication services also have the capability to 
provide educational material when specific medicines are scanned which 
would be of great benefit in secondary care. This application could 
provide an onscreen injectable monograph to help nurses in the 
administration of intravenous drugs or provide key points to pharmacists 
counselling on rarely dispensed drugs saving time associated with using 
paper-based information which further supports the argument of scanning 
as close to the patient as possible. These opportunities to educate would 
only be possible if medicines were decommissioned at the point of supply. 
Authentication at ‘Goods In’  
To authenticate at ‘goods in’ would remove all requirements for 
pharmacists or nurses to scan medicines at the point of supply and allow 
this directive to be implemented without an impact on frontline services. 
The disadvantage of managing this process at the goods-in stage, as 
mentioned previously is that medicines that were in date were not recalled 
or appeared un-suspicious at goods in, may prove to be dangerous between 
the time they are decommissioned and the point of supply to the patient.  
Authenticating at the goods in stage would place the onus on 
distribution staff and would act as an entirely new step in the goods in 
process. This additional medicine handling and scanning process, would 
be a big change to practice as scanning is not routinely done at the goods-
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in stage. There have been discussions surrounding the aggregation of 2D 
data matrix codes to permit the decommissioning of multiple packs at 
once. The creation of aggregated codes will be set up to benefit large 
pharmaceutical wholesalers and is unlikely to deliver the same benefits to 
a CHTSD, due to lower and more sporadic ordering volumes. It is not 
always the case that medicines are distributed to hospitals in unbroken 
parcels or palettes, which would largely require the decommissioning of 
each individual medicine packet, a practice that would likely require the 
creation of further posts and financial outlays in an already financially 
constrained health care system. Unlike authentication at the point of 
supply, where useful up to date information regarding the status of the 
drug (expired, recalled, suspicious, product shortage, reimbursement 
status, or healthcare pop-up advice) is provided, decommissioning at the 
‘goods in’ stage offers little or no advantage to distribution staff. With no 
information incentives to prevent clinical errors during decommission, 
compliance by distribution staff may not be as effective as those seen at 
the point of supply to the patient. 
There are some safety and management issues associated with 
decommissioning at the ‘goods in' stage in terms of rare and time-critical 
medicines. A hospital may be in possession of a critical medicine, 
however, due to its decommission ten days previously the new directive 
would not permit its wholesale supply to another trust in an emergency 
situation, which may put a patient lives at risk. The decommissioning of 
products at the point of supply would alleviate this issue as medicines 
would only be decommissioned when supplied to a hospital ward or 
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patient. Therefore, medicines within the dispensary or CHTSD would 
always be available for wholesale as they would only be decommissioned 
upon exit from either area. The alternative would be to create a two-stream 
system where a certain percentage of medicines were decommissioned at 
goods in and others decommissioned at the point of supply to the patient. 
A system of this description would be possible but could prove difficult 
to manage and may cause internal confusion. 
Implementing the FMD in the Hospital Context 
 
Contextual understanding is a concept that is often referred to in 
social sciences to describe an environments attributes and the effect of 
these attributes upon the outcomes of change.  The contingency theory  
(95- 96)) postulates the context phenomenon. This theory explains that it 
can be observed and measured whereas other theories such as Burrell, 
1994 (97) argue that context is probably not quantifiable and some argue 
that it is a socially constructed phenomenon (98). 
Regarding implementing regulatory driven innovations in 
healthcare, context plays an important role. As described above, hospitals 
do not employ a linear approach to operations. The modern UK healthcare 
system promotes the advent of tertiary referral centres. Specialist services 
are increasingly shifting from the district general hospital environment to 
the large teaching hospitals. In terms of secondary care, context differs 
based on staff quality and number, workload, technological advances, 
specialist services, management structures and approaches. When 
deciding on the optimum point to decommission it is worth considering 
how secondary care nuances mentioned previously, such as robotic 
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dispensing, ward-based dispensing, split packs, satellite pharmacies, 
aseptic production and ward stock supply processes might be managed 
within the regulatory and practical constraints of the FMD.  
There are some legal, practical and safety reasons which justify 
authentication as close to the patient as possible. However, the context 
within each hospital is likely to differ which will inevitably impact the 
uptake and compliance of authentication both locally and at a national 
level. Three broad dimensions of context are suggested by Dopson et al. 
(98) macro, meso and micro contexts. Regarding information technology 
projects within the NHS, macro-level contextual factors include high level 
financial, policy and regulatory issues which require debate and decision 
before implementation can take place. The costs and time taken to reach 
decisions at a macro level are likely to influence the opportunity to 
effectively manage micro contexts which will ultimately threaten the 
successful implementation of an information technology project within a 
given context. As there is a firm European deadline of February 2019 if 
key decisions such as choosing an authentication provider or adapting 
individual hospital operations are not made well in advance, this will 
result in severe pressure on front-line staff and a rushed implementation 
agenda. The success of implementing an innovation such as medicines 
authentication, (although an EU-wide agenda) principally affects a single 
department within a hospital or trust and will, therefore, rely largely on 
the consideration of meso and micro contexts within the hospital to 
facilitate implementation or roll-out.  
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Ferlie et al. (99) mentions that good relations between professional 
groups and active networking with university and professional institutions 
and a pro-research culture are positive micro contexts involved in the 
adoption of a policy, whereas negative micro contexts include power 
struggles and disengagement by a key stakeholder. Ferlie et al. mention 
that ‘soft management' from well-placed clinicians can be an effective 
way of persuading professional colleagues to change traditional working 
practices' Ferlie also mention the importance of a multidisciplinary team 
in breaking down professional boundaries. It is therefore anticipated that 
a well-funded, pro-research hospital attached to a University is more likely 
to be more successful with FMD implementation that smaller less 
forward-thinking hospitals. 
2.4: Conclusions 
This chapter conducted an in-depth analysis of the FMD, and its 
effect on the hospital pharmacy sector. It has also identified the dispenser 
and either accuracy checking technicians or pharmacists as suitable staff 
for the decommissioning of medicines. This chapter analyses hospital 
pharmacy workflows compared to the community pharmacy sector 
workflows and demonstrates the regulatory, legal, practical and safety 
justifications for medicine decommissioning as close to the patient as 
possible in the UK. Considering the authentication of medicines has been 
occurring in community pharmacy for a number of years (in Belgium, 
Italy and Greece) and the additional operational complexities of the 
hospital sector it is recommended that a medicines authentication study is 
conducted in a secondary care setting initially. A study in a hospital setting 
75 
 
is required to address concerns, which include the technical and 
operational effectiveness of the approach, the key point in the dispensing 
process to authenticate and improvements which may facilitate an 
effective implementation. Oxford University Hospitals NHS Foundation 
trust and more specifically the Horton Hospital, due to its varied services 
and experienced staff is a suitable study site to make these assessments. It 
would also be appropriate to observe the context of the hospital and study 
implementation to identify meso and micro contexts which may affect 
health information technology implementation or technology uptake 
within the hospital and further identify and investigate management 
concepts and strategies to improve innovation implementation and 
adoption. Chapter three will investigate the FMD mandated DMST in a 
live environment, assessing both technical and operational performance 
of the approach. 
Note: The majority of this chapter has been published in the following 
outlets: 
Naughton B, Vadher B, Smith J, Smith G, Chapman S, Dopson S, et al. 
EU Falsified Medicines Directive mandatory requirements for secondary 
care: A concise review. Journal of Generic Medicines. 2015 Sep 1;12(3–
4):95–101. 
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3.0: The Quantitative Analysis of a Manual 
Medicine Screening Technology in Secondary Care 
3.1: Introduction 
The current methods for detecting falsified medicine, are varied 
and span from laboratory-based methods through to SMS texting with 
most detection being conducted by customs officers at international 
borders, using the former approach. Technology in drug detection has 
advanced, and many techniques are now available which include 
spectroscopy, chromatography, SMS, hand-held or portable laboratories, 
radiofrequency identification and serialisation (100) All of these 
techniques have been discussed in detail in chapter one. Serialisation is 
the process of identifying a medicine with a unique code printed onto the 
medicines pack and verification is the process for identifying and 
checking that code. Regarding the FMD, the term ‘authentication’ relates 
to the final scanning of medicine and the subsequent decommissioning of 
a product at the point of supply to the patient to ensure authenticity. The 
2011 FMD (18-19, 24, 101) and the 2013 DSCSA (102) have adopted the 
serialisation and verification approach for substandard and falsified (SF) 
medicine detection. This serialisation and verification process is a low 
cost, non-destructive and quick method for detecting counterfeit 
medicines. The FMD requires the systematic authentication of medicines 
at the point of supply to the patient while the DSCSA requires verification 
at every point of sale and exchange throughout the drug distribution cycle, 
currently without authentication at the point of sale or administration to 
the patient. Although practices similar to those proposed by the FMD exist 
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within the Italian, Greek and Belgian primary care markets, principally as 
a reimbursement method, FMD legislated serialisation and authentication 
technologies are alien to many countries. Furthermore, they have not been 
academically assessed and may prove challenging to implement, 
especially in the complex secondary care environment for reasons 
explained in chapter two (103). This chapter describes the piloting of the 
FMD mandated medicines verification technology and the associated 
processes. This pilot assesses the effectiveness of this technology and 
highlights issues which require resolution before the 2019 FMD 
implementation deadline. 
3.2: Methods 
The objectives chosen below aimed to assess the technical and operational 
effectiveness of the digital medicines screening or authentication 
technology and the following measures were used to measure 
effectiveness. 
OAR Operational Authentication Rate: The number of 
medicines scanned by staff as a percentage of those 
entered into the study i.e. staff scanning compliance  
ADR Absolute Detection Rate: The number of medicines 
quarantined as a percentage of those entered into the 
study with quarantine alerts 
ODR Operational Detection Rate: The number of medicines 
quarantined as a percentage of those identified as 
requiring quarantine by the technology i.e. staff 
quarantine compliance in response to alerts 
RR Response Rate: The time taken to send data from a 
medicine scan to an external database, for that data to 
be verified and for a response to be returned to the 




Primary Objective  
• To identify the OAR, ADR and ODR of medicines authentication 
technology in the secondary care environment. 
Secondary Objectives  
• To identify the optimum point in the dispensing process to 
authenticate medicines based on OAR and ODR’s. 
• To identify an average RR for this study. 
3.2.1: Study Site 
 
The district general hospital involved in this study is one of four 
hospitals in a large UK national health service teaching foundation trust. 
As explained in chapter two this site was selected due to the presence of 
both specialist and general medical and surgical services provided. The 
variety of clinical services available ensured a diversity of medical 
treatments in hospital circulation and provided a balanced portfolio of 
medicines available for serialisation during this study.  
3.2.2: Methodology  
 
A literature review was conducted using ‘Google Scholar’, 
PubMed’ databases’ and online grey literature to understand if medicine 
verification pilots or studies had been conducted to estimate the 
effectiveness of the medicines authentication approach. Much of the work 
in this area existed in grey literature. Studies reported in the grey literature 
often did not contain explanations of the methods used to conduct these 
studies and do not use live serialised medicines. As the initial number of 
recalled, expired or suspicious medicines in the samples of these studies 
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are not known from the outset, it is difficult to assess the effectiveness of 
the detection approach. Without knowing the number of illegitimate 
medicines within the system initially, it is not entirely possible to test the 
effectiveness of the approach. Instead, tests have been conducted with 
codes which have known responses. This does not reflect the reality of 
scanning in a busy healthcare environment and does not provide an insight 
into the obstacles faced during authentication on a daily basis.  The 
approach seen in these studies do not take into consideration the 
prevalence of any medicines that may have slipped through the system 
through poor rate of staff scanning or issues relating to poor stock control. 
One study by Simoens et al. (104) goes some way to answer these 
questions. The Simoens et al. (104) study involved existing serialised 
medicines within Belgium, which were scanned by community 
pharmacists for reimbursement purposes. This study aimed to identify the 
reliability of the authentication technology to correctly identify medicine 
as either authentic, expired, recalled or suspicious. The method used by 
Simoens relied on a mystery shopper entering the pharmacy and asking 
the pharmacy to authenticate their drug. This included 1309 medicine 
packets presented by multiple mystery shopper encounters to 116 Belgian 
pharmacies. The first limitation of this study relates to the low number of 
medicines scanned. This paper does not explain whether or not the patient 
presentation of medicine for scanning is common practice in this context. 
If this is an unusual request this may have heightened the pharmacies 
awareness and increased compliance with procedures and awareness to 
technology alerts. Authenticating a medicine at the request of a patient is 
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a much different action to the passive authentication of medicines as a part 
of routine dispensing practice. As this study does not reflect the 
anticipated process post FMD implementation, it does not answer key 
questions such as operational authentication rates and other issues which 
may arise in a live dispensary environment. By knowing the outcome of 
each barcode, the researchers could understand how accurate the 
medicines authentication approach was by matching the result provided 
by the pharmacist with the true status of the medicine. Although this study 
assessed the technical effectiveness of the approach, it did not assess the 
operational effectiveness or highlight any potential issues which may arise 
as a result of the FMD, i.e. medicine authentication at the point of supply 
to the patient. Considering the limitations of the approach taken by 
Simoens et al., a new method was created. The method used in this study 
was unique to this study and was designed by the lead researcher.  
3.2.3: Study Set-up 
 
It was important that the number of medicines entered into the 
study was tallied with the numbers authenticated by the staff and the 
number quarantined to understand weaknesses within the pharmacy 
dispensing end of the pharmaceutical supply chain. Entering medicines 
known to be recalled, expired or suspicious into the legitimate supply 
chain presented ethical and safety challenges, because if they were not 
identified during the study screening process they would enter the supply 
chain. Therefore, two dimensional (2D) barcodes were created which 
were pre-programmed with a message to identify a medicine as expired, 
recalled or authenticated elsewhere. All medicines included in this study 
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were to the best of the researcher’s knowledge safe for administration. 
This approach was anticipated to satisfy the need to reconcile medicine 
numbers throughout the supply process without introducing expired, 
recalled or falsified medicines into the supply chain. 
3.2.4: Sample Selection 
 
Medicines were selected using a set of inclusion and exclusion 
criteria (Figure 3.0). These criteria ensured that the medicines selected for 
inclusion reflected the categories of medicines governed by the FMD and 
the most commonly falsified drug groups, which included the top 50 
medicines by turnover and the top 50 medicines by cost at the study 
hospital site. Duplicate products and medicines not covered by FMD 
legislation were then excluded. This process returned a list of 87 products. 
The top 15 by usage and top 15 by value were then included in the study. 
A reduced number of study products was implemented for practical 
administrative reasons (Appendix 1.0) This approach is taken to ensure 
the sample of study medicines was diverse and represented the major 
clinical indications and formulations (Appendix 2.0). This approach 
ensured that a variety of products of differing clinical indication, 
formulation and cost were included in this study, and therefore, 
represented the variety of medicines used in the secondary care 
environment, and avoided the excessive inclusion of medicines which are 
not governed by FMD legislation. An exception was made for some high-
















The global standards one (GS1) two-dimensional (2D) data matrix 
labels were produced and cut to size to limit the product area obscured by 
the label. Corresponding 2D data matrix codes were loaded and stored in 
an excel spreadsheet. The authentication technology was integrated into 
the hospital patient medication record (PMR) by creating an interface 
between the PMR and authentication software. This interface allowed an 
operator to scan a drug while in the PMR system to verify its status against 
a database of known to be safe medicine codes. The DMST software was 
operated by an existing computer terminal. The medicine codes were 
presented as a 2D data matrix and scanned using a handheld, terminal 
powered, barcode scanner. This process identified the product as either 
‘authenticated elsewhere’ (falsified), ‘item expired’, ‘item recalled 
(product or batch)’ ‘authenticated’ or ‘already authenticated here’ (Figure 
Exclusion criteria 
• Unlicensed medicines 
• Clinical trial material 
• GSL Medicines 
• Medical device without drug 
component 
• Medicines not issued directly to a 
patient including ward stock, fluids, 
TTO packs 
• Fertility/Homecare medicines 
• Contrast media 
 
Inclusion criteria 
• Licensed medicinal 
products  
• POM, P + CD 
medicine categories 
• Listed on site PMR in 
top 50 (by transactions 
or value)  
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3.1 and Figure 3.2). A further description of the methods can be found in 
the research protocol in Appendix 2.0. 
3.2.6: Labelling Procedure 
 
Each 2D barcode was listed in an excel database. Drug details such 
as product name, form, strength, pack size, and the date the product was 
labelled was recorded in the database when the adhesive code was adhered 
to each study medicine, providing a complete record of study medicines 
serialised and the date of inclusion into the study. The 2D data matrix was 
attached to each study product according to a hierarchy of position 
described in the study protocol to ensure that the obscuring of important 
clinical data such as product name, strength form, batch number or expiry 
date was not excessive during the study period. 
2D data-matrices were attached to all study medicines each 
Monday and Wednesday between the hours of 07:00 and 14:00, weekly. 
This maintained the serialisation of product lines throughout the study. 
96% of medicines labelled, once authenticated by the operator would 
provide an on-screen symbol to indicate the product as safe for use and 
‘authenticated’. If a product authenticated within the organisation were to 
be re-authenticated, the system would display an ‘already authenticated 
here’ message (Figure 3.1). This ‘authenticated here’ message was useful 
when dealing with multiple authentications of split pack medicines. Both 
‘authenticated’ and ‘already authenticated here’ messaging did not require 
quarantine (Figure 3.1). One percent of medicines were labelled with a 
2D data-matrix which generated a pop-up message of ‘Authenticated 
elsewhere’ (Figure 3.2) indicating that this drug may have been 
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counterfeited or falsified (copied) and introduced or re-introduced into the 
legal supply chain. A further three subgroups were introduced into the 
study, classified as recalled packs (1%), recalled products (1%) and 
expired products (1%) at a frequency of one percent per subgroup (Figure 
3.2). All study products which were labelled with a 2D data-matrix, 
generating a warning popup message had the expiry and batch number 
recorded in the excel database upon inclusion in the study to facilitate 
follow up, should any of the study products require subsequent 
investigation. The 1% figure used in this study was based on the World 
Health Organisation (WHO) estimates that approximately 1% of the  
medicines in high income countries are falsified (16). To ensure equity 
amongst subgroups the expired medicine and recalled medicines groups 




Figure 3.1: Pop-up messages triggered upon authentication of medicines that do not require quarantine. 
 
 
Figure 3.2: Pop-up messages triggered upon authentication of medicines requiring quarantine.
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3.2.7: Study Design 
 
A two-week pilot was conducted initially to ensure the technology 
and proposed study process was practical and without external database 
communication issues. The study was then separated into two parts. Stage 
one involved the authentication of medicines at the checking stage (by 
pharmacists and accredited checking technicians) and stage two at the 
dispensing stage (by dispensers and some accuracy checking technicians) 
according to the authentication protocol in Appendix 2.0. 
All staff were subjected to the same basic training (presentation 
and demonstration) and were instructed to authenticate according to the 
authentication protocol. Operators authenticated medicines at the point of 
supply to the patient or ward for named patients. Ward stock 
authentication was not included in this study. Data cleansing and analysis 
was conducted for authentication and detection data using a cleansing and 
analysis form (Appendix 3.0). This form was independently checked by 
a second researcher to confirm study results. 
3.2.8: Statistical Analysis 
 
Drug sample size studies were conducted to ensure the total 
sample of study drugs was large enough to obtain acceptable confidence 
intervals and margins of error using sample size calculations (105). The 
total population was based on 2015 average eight-week dispensing figure 
of 9605 products, and the sample sizes were 2115 (stage one) and 2077 
(stage two). Percentages were used for normalisation. To demonstrate a 
significant difference between the outcomes in stage one (checkers) and 
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stage two (dispensers), Chi-squared tests and Fisher's exact tests were 
used. Both tests are suitable for nominal data however Chi-squared test is 
suitable for sample sizes greater than 1000 and fishers test is best suited 
to smaller sample sizes.  A p value of <0.05 was deemed as being 
significant, and confidence intervals of 90% were used throughout (106). 
3.2.9: Operator Groups  
 
Stage one contained a selection of pharmacists and accredited 
checking technicians. Stage two contained a selection of dispensers and 
accredited technicians. Dispensers could not be involved in stage one by 
law and pharmacists would not routinely be involved in stage two due to 
departmental policy; dispensing is not a role conducted by pharmacists 
during normal working hours, and this hospital did not provide an out of 
hours on-call service based at that site. Accuracy checking technicians are 
largely responsible for involvement in stage one and there are likely to be 
instances where they would also be involved in stage two. However, this 
is standard practice across the UK. No one person was permitted to be 
involved in both stages for the same prescription according to hospital 
policy.  
3.2.10: Blinding and Disclaimers 
 
Operators: Although the 2D labels contained some adjacent print, 
which if analysed carefully over numerous scans could reveal a trend 
between expired and recalled medicine labels, to do so would be very time 
consuming, unlikely to have occurred and was not mentioned in operator 
feedback. The operators were blinded as to which drugs were falsified, 
expired or recalled. The researcher was not blinded at the point of 
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labelling. As authentication was performed towards the later stages of the 
prescription preparation process, authentication had no part to play in 
stock control during this study. The study did not relate to or use any 
patient data. 
3.2.11: Patient Involvement 
 
Patients, carers or laypersons did not participate in this research. 
The design of this study, the research questions and the outcomes 
measures, were informed by clinical, technical, research and industry 
leaders and did not include patient involvement. Clinical, technical, 
research and industry leaders were involved in the recruitment to and 
conduct of this study. Results will be disseminated to study participants 
through internal presentation and access to the research manuscript once 
available. Participants have been acknowledged in publications where 
applicable. Further information regarding the methods used in this study 
can be found in the study protocol (Appendix 2.0). 
3.2.12: Ethical Approvals 
 This study was classified as a service evaluation study according 
to NIHR guideline’s and agreed by PhD supervisors; as such did not 
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  n= Number of study products containing error messages                  
         (...)= Number of total products entered into the study 
 
Figure 3.3: Flow diagram which identified the total number of 
medicines serialised for each stage of the study (study medicines), 
medicines scanned by the authentication technology and cross 
checked against the secure database (decommissioned medicines) and 
the total number of medicines in each stage quarantined for 
researcher investigation (detected medicines). 
 
A total of 4,547 drugs were entered into this study, (2,115 in stage 
one; 2,077 in stage two) 180 of which contained a pre-programmed 
message popup which described the product as either authenticated 
elsewhere (falsified), expired or recalled and requiring quarantine (92 in 
stage one, 88 in stage two) (Figure 3.3). The stage one group 
Stage 2 Stage 1 
 
n=92 (2,115) n= 88 (2,077) 
Study 
Medicines 










authenticated 1,447 medicines of which 59 required quarantine. The stage 
two group authenticated 1,344 medicines, of which 54 required 
quarantine. Not all medicines that were identified as requiring quarantine 
were quarantined. Only 48 of the 59 medicines in stage one and 47 of the 
54 medicines in stage two were quarantined. 
Table 3.0: Numerical representation of OAR, ADR and ODR 
percentages.  














64.7%                      
(62.9-66.4)   
 
3.7%                                         
(1.4-6.2)  
p<0.05 










(79.5- 94.6)  
5.7 %        



















90 % Confidence Intervals were used throughout (110) (108) 
 
The OAR relates to the number of medicines authenticated in a 
particular stage as a percentage of the total number of medicines entered 
into the stage. For this study, the OAR was 66.3% overall, 68.4% (66.8-
70.1, 90% CI) (Stage one) and 64.7% (62.9-66.4, 90% CI) (Stage two) 
(Table 3.0). There were no technical issues observed with technology. 
The ADR demonstrates the ability of the authentication process 
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(technology and operator) to detect a counterfeit, expired and recalled 
medicine, i.e. taking into consideration the human operator and the 
complex hospital environment that the technology operated within. 95 of 
the 180 medicines requiring quarantine were quarantined, 48 (52.3%) in 
stage one and 47 (53.4%) in stage two. This demonstrates a difference in 
ADR of 1.2% (-11 to 13.5, 90% CI, p=0.12) between the groups. The ODR 
demonstrates the relationship between medicines identified as falsified, 
recalled or expired by the technology and those correctly quarantined by 
the staff. The ODR was 81.4% (73-89.7, 90% CI) in stage one and 87% 
(79.5- 94.6 90% CI) in stage two. This was a 5.7% (-5.55 to 16.9, 90% CI, 
p=0.15) difference between the groups. 
Table 3.1: Breakdown of medicine subgroups and detection 












Stage One 22 24 24 22 











Stage One 13 12 18 16 











Stage One 7 12 13 16 
Stage Two 7 16 12 12 
 
There were five groups of drugs, with five corresponding pop-up 
messages entered into this study, falsified drugs (authenticated 
elsewhere), recalled products (product recalled), recalled batch (batch 
recalled), expired medicines (item expired) and safe to use medicines 
(authenticated). Across both stages, 31.8% of falsified medicines, 58% of 
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recalled drugs (product and batch) and 64% of expired medicines were 
detected (ODR) (Table 3.1). 












 Yes Yes Yes 
Pack Recalled 
 
Yes  No No 
Expired Yes No  No 
Product 
Recalled 
Yes No No  
 
Z tests by proportion for independent groups identified if the 
differences between ODR in each subgroup were significance (Table 3.2) 
(Yes or No outcomes were generated using Table 3.1 data). There was a 
statistical difference between the counterfeit group and all other 
subgroups, both individually and as an entire group, this means that the 
percentage of medicines in the falsified drug group detected was 
significantly lower than those in the other groups (recalled and expired). 
An image of the authenticated elsewhere (falsified, requiring quarantine) 









Figure 3.4: Pop up message warnings which are generated when a 
falsified medicine (left) and a medicine which has already been 
authenticated on site (right) are scanned.  
 
 
Figure 3.5: Average response times versus FMD response time limits. 
 
The medicines authentication technology response rate (RR) is the 
total time taken for the information scanned from the 2D data matrix to 
make a round trip from the scanning terminal to the authentication 
database and back. The mean response time over each eight-week period 
was 152 milliseconds in part one and 165 milliseconds in stage two 

















Medicines were entered into an active secondary care dispensary 
system. The data generated (Figure 3.3 and Table 3.0) identified a gap 
between serialised medicines entered into the system and those identified 
by the authenticating technology, the operating authentication rate (OAR). 
There also appears to be a disparity between medicines identified as 
requiring quarantine by the technology and those separated for quarantine 
(ODR) (Figure 3.3). The OAR which represents user compliance across 
both stages was 66.3%. When compared to the expected standard of 100% 
this figure appears to be relatively low, however, this figure should be 
considered in light of the novelty of the technology, the frequent problems 
encountered in technology implementation projects within the NHS (111) 
(112) and the lead time to legal compliance. The OAR demonstrated a 
statistically significant difference of 3.7% (1.4, 6.2, 90% CI, p<0.05) 
between stage one and stage two, which consisted of two largely different 
operator groups. A 3.7% difference in authentication rates could lend itself 
to the argument that the pharmacists and accuracy checking technicians at 
the checking stage are more adept at manual medicines authentication at 
the point of checking than their dispenser counterparts at the point of 
dispensing. This difference could be due to the professional registration 
obligations of the operators in stage one and professional good practice 
which protects the staff involved in stage one from interruption during the 
medicines checking process. However, once the FMD compliance 
deadline of February 2019 is reached staff will be legally obliged to 
authenticate medicines and failure to do so will be against the law. 
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Although it has not been made clear by UK regulatory authorities it is 
likely to be classed as a dispensing error and treated in the same way. 
There were no concerns raised during this study regarding the 
technical solution. Although stage one data demonstrated an ADR lower 
than stage two, a difference of 1.2% (-11 to 13.5 90% CI, p=0.12) relating 
to sample sizes of 59 (stage one) and 54 (stage two) was identified by a 
Fisher’s exact test as non-significant p=0.12. It was observed that even 
when the technology identified a drug to be falsified, recalled or expired 
the staff across both stages did not always quarantine that medicine. ODR 
rates demonstrated a non-significant 5.7 % (-5.55 to 16.9, 90% CI, p= 
0.15) difference between stages. Therefore, one group could not be 
described as ‘better’ than another in this study, in terms of operational 
detection rates. Despite the lack of statistical significance between groups, 
there is a clinical significant difference between the overall group (stage 
one and two combined) in terms of ADR and ODR compared to the 
expected legislative detection rate of 100% (Table 2.0). Detection rates 
appear to be influenced by two main factors, the compliance of staff in the 
authentication of medicines (OAR) and increased awareness to messaging 
which identifies a medicine as falsified, recalled or expired (ODR). 
There was a total of 92 (stage one) and 88 (stage two) medicines, 
containing quarantine messaging, introduced into this study (Figure 3.3). 
These figures included a collection of medicines which varied in their pre-
programmed messages to include; authenticated elsewhere (falsified), 
product recalled, batch recalled and item expired (Table 3.1). Across both 
stages, 31.8% of counterfeit medicines, 58% of recalled drugs and 64% of 
96 
 
expired medicines were detected (Table 3.1). There was no demonstrable 
difference between stage one and two for any of the subgroups in Table 
3.1. As a total group, however, there is a difference between the ADR rates 
for the ‘authenticated elsewhere’ subgroup (31.8%) and those of other 
subgroups (60%)  (Z-test) (Table 3.2). This is likely due to confusion 
between the ‘authenticated elsewhere’ and ‘already authenticated here’ 
messages which are similar in terms of message content and colour 
(amber) (Figure 3.4), with the former requiring quarantine and the latter 
requiring no action.  
The Response Rate (RR) is the time taken to send information to 
an external database, cross-check and retrieve a reply which states the 
status of the drug. The RR was 152 milliseconds (stage 1) and 165 
milliseconds (stage 2) (Figure 3.5) over 2,791 scans, which is appropriate 
for systematic authentication of medicines when compared to the accepted 
FMD regulatory limit of 300 milliseconds (18-19). This data is however 
based on a relatively small sample and may not necessarily be repeated in 
the presence of a larger throughput of medicines scanned through an 
NMVS. This response rate would require regular assessment once this 
technology is implemented nationally and internationally. If the electronic 
system goes offline the pharmacist has the option to supply the medicine 
and verify the code at a later stage. This would be a difficult situation for 
a pharmacist to be placed into. Therefore, it is important to keep response 
times quick and offline issues as infrequent as possible. There is currently 
no UK information regarding how the GPHC or the MHRA will deal with 
poor authentication compliance. 
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3.4.1: Study Positives and Negatives 
 
There was some participant group crossover in this study; 
however, this is standard practice in UK NHS hospital dispensaries, 
reflecting normal working patterns in the medicine supply process. This 
study was carried out in a single hospital, and therefore, similar studies in 
a number of other UK hospital sites could adopt the present study design 
and replicate the work to identify whether the results of this study are 
indicative of the entire NHS environment. Due to the emerging nature of 
this technology, there have been no other studies in this field to compare 
results. In addition, this study included a large sample of study drugs 
which generated results large enough to demonstrate statistically 
significant outcomes for some parameters. 
3.5: Conclusions Context and Impact 
 
Government organisations such as the Federal Bureau of 
Investigation (US), the Internal Revenue Service (US) and the National 
Health Service (NHS) (UK) are no strangers to information technology 
project failures (113). The NHS in the UK has experienced a recent 
struggle with the national programme for information technology 
(NPfIT), which required the implementation of the electronic patient 
record by 2005 (a target set in 1998). By the spring of 2002, only 2% of 
trusts had reached this target (111-112). The government then ring-fenced 
the information technology budget and pledged £2.3bn to NPfiT with the 
aim of implementing electronic patient records by 2007. Electronic patient 
records are yet to be completely rolled out across all NHS trusts. FMD 
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rollout will happen at all pharmacies around the UK in February 2019. 
Some of the failing associated with the NPfiT project related to poor 
stakeholder involvement. It is important to include stakeholders during 
FMD roll-out to avoid failure in implementation. 
It is important to understand the role that context plays in 
implementing healthcare innovation. Each hospital will have a different 
context which will affect innovative implementation, and it is important 
to understand the internal and external context that facilitates the 
successful implementation of healthcare technology (114-115). 
This study involved the presentation and the dissemination of a 
protocol to the participants.  Carthy et al. (116) raises concerns regarding 
the growing number of protocols and guidelines which require attention 
by NHS staff, which in this case may also have a part to play in non-
compliance. It is therefore important to understand that protocols alone 
are not adequate when introducing technology into a complex 
environment (103) and to instead use for interactive methods of education 
staff.  
The more specific issue of pharmacy healthcare professional non-
compliance can also be seen in a study by Thomas et al. in 2016 (117) 
which conducted qualitative interviews to understand the reasons for 
pharmacy non-compliance to procedures. Reasons for non-compliance 
included work demands, high workload and the social norm within the 
pharmacy. Staff felt like they were unable to follow procedures due to lack 
of staff, the pressure to reach targets and poor communication. Therefore, 
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adequate funding is required to ensure pharmacies have the resources they 
need to implement FMD roll-out.  
Another factor which affects adherence to processes is the use of 
pop up reminders by authentication technology providers. Pop-ups and 
alerts in healthcare are commonly seen in electronic prescribing systems. 
Shojania et al. (118) has conducted a systematic review of evidence for 
the benefits of  pop-ups and demonstrated a 4.2% increase in adherence to 
processes across all studies (interquartile range 0.8-18.8%). Shojania then 
goes on to say that an increase in adherence was much smaller than those 
expected. In cases where action was required following the alert the level 
of improved adherence increased to a median 12.9% [IQR 2.7%– 22.8%] 
v. 2.7% [IQR 0.6%–5.6%]; p=0.09).  Although Shojania explains that this 
difference may have been confounded by exceptional practice in a 
particular hospital, it suggests that it is worth considering the inclusion of 
a rate-limiting "action taken field", to facilitate improved adherence to an 
authentication protocol.  
Medicines verification technology is an approach which aims to 
safeguard EU and US citizens against falsified, expired and recalled 
medicines. The potential shortfalls of this technology should ideally be 
addressed before the EU (2019) and US (2023) regulative deadlines. 
Further qualitative research is required to understand the contextual 
reasons for less than optimum authentication and detection rates. It is key 
to investigate the technology, process, and educational adjustments 
required to improve the authentication and detection rates demonstrated 
in this study which in turn would improve patient safety. Chapter four 
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proceeds to investigate DMST user opinion and aims to identify ways to 
improve the quantitative results seen in chapter three. 
Note: The majority of this chapter has already been published in: 
Naughton B, Roberts L, Dopson S, Chapman S, Brindley D. Effectiveness 
of medicines authentication technology to detect counterfeit, recalled and 
expired medicines: a two-stage quantitative secondary care study. BMJ 
Open. 2016 Dec 1;6(12):e013837
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4.0: A Delphi Method Study to Establish Expert 
Opinion on Digital Medicine Screening Technology 
in Secondary Care 
 
4.1: Background and Introduction 
Chapter three describes a study which investigated the quantitative 
effectiveness of a medicine authentication technology from a technical 
and operational point of view. Chapter three describes how this 
technology was piloted in a live hospital environment and provides a 
better understanding of the obstacles which face hospital pharmacy 
regarding FMD compliance. Chapter three also assessed the best point in 
the hospital dispensing process to authenticate medicines. This chapter 
takes a more qualitative approach to technology assessment and aims to 
identify expert user opinion on the aforementioned technology and how it 
might be improved for future use.  
Despite the 2019 legislative technology compliance deadline for 
pharmacies, dispensing general practitioner practices and hospitals across 
Europe, there is little qualitative evidence to support this international 
technological approach to falsified drug detection in practice. If 
implemented incorrectly this international change has the potential to 
cause considerable upset for healthcare providers. This study aims to 
qualitatively evaluate and inform the optimisation of medicine 
authentication technology in secondary care.  
Stakeholders from different sectors, such as hospital pharmacy, 
community pharmacy, wholesalers, and pharmaceutical companies in 
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each EU country have joined to form a National Medicines Verification 
Organisations (NMVO). Each NMVO will make decisions regarding 
authentication technology providers which may relate to functionality, 
speed of data response, usability and technology limitations. The study 
aims to identify the positives and negatives of the incoming technology 
and educate decision makers as to the potentially useful technological 
changes that could be adopted or mandated as part of the incumbent 
medicines authentication technology. 
A group of ten secondary care healthcare professionals with 
experience in medicines authentication were surveyed. Participants were 
surveyed directly following the stage two study in chapter three, which 
lasted for eight weeks and was conducted in 2015. The Delphi method 
approach was used to carry out this survey. The Delphi method approach, 
originally used as a systematic forecasting tool (119-120), has been 
increasingly used to gain consensus expert opinion and aid decision 
making in a variety of research areas. Delphi methodology provides 
clearer outcomes and recommendations than traditional surveys often 
produce, achieved by collecting responses and summarising responses for 
reconsideration by participants until a consensus is achieved. 
User feedback and opinion can be gathered using many different 
approaches which include, basic surveys, qualitative interviews or the 
Delphi method survey approach. The key to this stage of the study was to 
encourage users to identify technological improvements based on their 
recent use of the technology. It was considered important to allow the 
users a forum to freely express their thoughts without being judged by the 
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researcher or their peer group. At the same time, it was important for users 
to consider the opinions of their peers. The Delphi study allows for the 
contributions of opinions while removing the element of peer pressure and 
maintaining anonymity. This consensus approach is an effective way of 
involving users and making changes which support the views of the 
majority. 
The planning of this study was based largely on the Hsu and 
Sandford paper (120) which describes evidence for successful Delphi 
studies such as the number of survey rounds, consensus figures and 
thematic analysis (120). Delphi method consensus varied across studies 
and opinions differ on a suitable percentage of consensus. This study 
compliments those conducted by Green in 1982 (24) and Ulschak in 1983 
(25) (in Hsu and Sandford in 2007) (120) which promote a consensus of 
70% and 80% respectively. The default consensus in this study was 70% 
with 80% used where possible. The standard deviation was chosen as a 
method to measure central tendencies with an arbitrary <1.0 SD used to 
supplement the consensus. This quantified the spread of responses across 
the entire group. The Delphi method generates useful improvements, 
suitable for the context in question and facilitating staff involvement in 
change (121). 
4.2: Methods 
Twelve participants from a UK hospital pharmacy department 
with experience of using medicines authentication technology as part of a 
service evaluation project and satisfied the study inclusion and exclusion 
criteria (Table 4.0) were invited to take part in a Delphi method study. An 
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implied consent model was used, with information regarding the nature of 
the study contained in the invitation email (119-120,122-124) and 
repeated on the first page of the questionnaire. This information described 
the study and its voluntary nature. From a total population size of 12, 11 
invitations were accepted. One staff member was unavailable to attend the 
interview due to sickness, and one staff member was initially invited 
inappropriately, as they did not meet the inclusion criteria. 100% (n=10) 
of available eligible participants responded. 
Table 4.0: Inclusion and exclusion criteria for study participants. 
 
 
Prospective participants were asked to complete an electronic 
questionnaire (119,125) with an estimated completion time of 15 minutes 
or less. Participants received a total of two questionnaires (123) (i.e. one 
                                               
1 Staff were a mixture of GPHC  (General Pharmaceutical Council) 
registered pharmacists and GPHC registered accuracy checking 
technicians (nationally recognised qualification). 
 
Inclusion criteria 
Staff accredited in the professional checking process at the test site1.  
Staff with multiple experiences of using the authentication technology. 
Staff willing to complete multiple surveys. 
Staff that have attended basic training as part of the stage one project 
on medicines authentication (chapter three). 
Exclusion criteria 
Staff that have used the system once or not at all. 
Staff that has not passed the trust checking accreditation test. 
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for each of the two rounds of the study). The initial invite was followed 
by reminders at approximately 8-day intervals until completion. The 
question and response format included three different categories of 
questions (Table 4.1), a 7-point rating scale, a Likert scale and a 
descriptive or open-ended response format. Likert scales were used to 
prioritise suggestions for the improvement of the technology made by 
participants during stage one (chapter three) and the first round of this 
Delphi study. In some cases, the staff identified four suggestions, and in 
some cases, they identified five suggestions, therefore two Likert scales 
were employed (1-4 and 1-5). 
Table 4.1: Question Types  
4.2.1: Consensus 
 
The 7-point rating scale consensus was achieved when 70% of 
respondents selected either of two adjacent answers on a seven-point 
rating scale (i.e. 1 or 2, 2 or 3, 3 or 4 etc. (126) and the median score fell 
within the range of the two consensus answers (127) (Table 4.2). 
Regarding the 5 point, Likert scale question format  (126) consensus was 
achieved when 80% of the respondents selected one of three adjacent 
7-Point rating scale: This question format rates performance from 1 to 
7, with ‘1’ indicating a negative response and ‘7’ indicating the most 
positive response. The median response was collected for consensus 
evaluation. 
Likert scale response format: This question style requires respondents 
to prioritise suggested improvements, regarding importance from ‘1’ to 
4’ or ‘1’ to ‘5’ with ‘1’ indicating most important and ‘5’ indicating 
least importance (median). 
Descriptive or open-ended response format (d):  This response 
format does not require prioritisation or rating, rather the suggestions 
are summarised into improvement ideas and resubmitted to the 
participants for consideration. In round two, participants were then 




answers in either direction i.e. whether participants classed the suggestion 
as “important” (1-3) or “not important” (3-5). The same rules were applied 
to the 4-point Likert scale. However, ‘Important’ was classified as 1-2 and 
‘not important' was classified as 2-4, with the consensus achieved when 
70% of respondents selected one of two answers in either direction (i.e. 1 
to 2 or 2 to 4) (Table 4.2). In the case of a 5-point scale, the median must 
also have been below 2.5, and in consideration of a 4-point scale, the 
median score must also have been below 2 to be considered ‘important’ 
(120) (Table 3.0). 
Regarding the Likert scale questions generated from the 
descriptive or open-ended questions in round one. Consensus was 
assessed dependent on the theme of the response, e.g. if 80% of 
respondents selected one of three descriptive adjacent answers of the same 
sentiment (positive or negative) on a 5-point scale and the median score 
fell within the consensus category. 
Table 4.2: Summary of consensus. 
 














One of two 
adjacent answers 






One of three 
adjacent answers 
in either direction 






One of three 
adjacent answers 
in either direction 
Descriptive/Open Used only in round one. Suggestions were 
grouped into similar themes and participants in 
round two were asked to rank them according to 
importance (Likert scale)  
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4.2.2: Summary of Survey Rounds 
 
Round one involved three demographic questions, followed by a selection 
of closed questions relating to rating scales, performance and open 
questions requiring suggestions for technological improvements. These 
questions were followed by descriptive questions to evaluate the quality 
of the survey. A selection of questions was chosen based upon written 
feedback from users, during a stage one of the study which involved the 
use of authentication technology during an eight-week period. Round two 
was similar to round one. However, closed questions that achieved 
consensus were removed. Non-consensus questions were re-submitted to 
the participants with further explanation.  
Answers to the open-ended questions in round one were 
thematically categorised and summarised to remove duplicate suggestions. 
In round two the experts were asked to answer further questions based on 
the most frequently occurring themes, which included Likert scales or 
descriptive style questions. The total number of suggestions per question 
varied between four and five suggestions which directly affected the 
number of options available in the round two survey. A valid consensus 
result was considered as ‘achieved’ when consensus had been met and the 
median scores also fell within the consensus group (Table 4.2). 
Suggestions that fell within these parameters and had a standard deviation 
of less than 1.0 were considered as the most relevant improvements for 
the authentication technology. There was no follow up with participants 
after study completion. 
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4.2.3: Ethical Approvals 
 This study was classified as a service evaluation project 
according to NIHR guidelines and PhD supervisors and therefore did not 
require ethical approval. 
4.3: Results 
The questions which reached immediate consensus are described 
in Table 4.3 and Table 4.4. Answers in text boxes with no shading 
identify the results which reached consensus with a low standard deviation 
less than one (<1.0). Answers in text boxes with grey trellis shading 
identify a consensus response with a standard deviation of greater than 
one (>1.0). Standard deviation (SD) was not used to determine consensus. 
SD was used as a further measure, to identify consensus results with the 
smallest deviation from the group mean. 











Based on your experience of the Medicines 
Authentication System (MAS), how would 
you rate its general speed on a scale of 1 to 7? 





Based on your experience of the MAS, how 
would you describe its usability on a scale of 
1 to 7? (1 represents very difficult, and 7 







There were some system errors reported by 
the MAS users throughout the pilot. On a scale 
of 1 to 7, how often did you experience these 
types of errors? (1 represents never, and 7 
represents very often) (These errors may have 
included issues with reading the 2D barcode, 
duplication of the scan on screen or warnings 
such as "The system has no resources",” item 
can is invalid please scan product again" or 
"test product not found") 
 
1/7  0.67 
Round 2 
7. Question 4: How would you rate the impact of 
the MAS on the service you provide on a scale 
of 1-7 (where 1 represents very disruptive, and 



















The following are a list of reported, proposed 





Change the medicine scanning list on the 
screen to ensure the last scanned item appears 







Review the pop-up screens as the Red 
‘warning’ screens could be mistaken for the 










Incorporate ‘important information’ pop-ups 






5 During round one of this survey, further 
suggestions were made to improve the 
Medicines Authentication System (MAS) or 
the pilot. Please rank the suggested changes 
below in the order of importance (1 being 
most important and 5 being least important). 
 
  
(ii) Sounds could also be enabled to ensure 







6 During round one of this survey, there were a 
variety of suggestions made to increase the 
rate of authentication (scanning). Valid 
suggestions were subdivided into three 
categories 1. Process Change 2. Technology 
change and 3. Education. In terms of Process 
Change, please rank these suggestions in 
order of importance (with 1 being the most 
important and 5 being the least important) 
 
  
(I) Make the symbol indicating an item that 






7 During round one of this survey, there were a 
variety of suggestions made to increase the 
rate of authentication (scanning). 
Valid suggestions were subdivided into three 
categories 1. Process Change, 2. 
Education, and 3. Technology change in 
terms of Education and Technology change 
please rank these suggestions in order of 
importance (with 1 being the most important 
and 5 being the least important) 
 
  
(iv) A system change that knows how many items 
have been booked in and prescription is not 
able to be tracked out as verified until all 






8 During round one we explained that there 
had been occasions where products have 
been handed out despite showing a pop-up 
warning box. We asked you to list three 
suggestions of how this occurrence might be 
reduced. Valid suggestions were subdivided 
into two categories 1. Education and 2. 
Technology change. In terms of education 
please rank these suggestions in order of 
importance (with 1 being the most important, 
and 4 being the least important) 
 
  
(I) Encourage the dispenser or checker to take 





9 During round one we explained that there 
have been occasions where products have 
been handed out despite showing a pop-up 
warning Box. We asked you to list three 
suggestions of how this occurrence might be 
reduced. Valid suggestions were subdivided 




Technology change. In terms of technology 
change please rank these suggestions in order 
of importance (with 1 being the most 
important and 4 being the least important) 
 
(ii) An audible alert to accompany the pop-up 





(iii) Making it mandatory to complete an ‘action 
taken’ documentation process so that staff 
scanning are prompted to think about what 
the red warning means and be accountable 






The most important suggestions in this study are those which 
established consensus amongst the group (Table 4.3 and Table 4.4) with 
a narrow standard deviation. Improvements included  reviewing the colour 
and information in warning pop up screens to ensure they were not 
mistaken for the “already dispensed here” pop up (2.0)( SD 0.87), 
encouraging the dispenser or checker to act on the warnings (2.0) (SD 1.0) 
(Education), including an audible alert to accompany the pop-up warning 
box (1.0) (SD 0.9) (Technology), and making it mandatory to complete an 
‘action taken’ documentation process to improve the quarantine process 
for potentially counterfeit, expired or recalled medicines. 
(Technology) (2.0) (SD 0.94). A full list of questions and results can be 
found in Appendix 4.0. 
4.4: Discussions and Conclusions 
The serialisation and authentication of medicines have been 
proposed as part of international regulation. Considering that serialisation 
and verification with or without authentication will affect EU hospital 
pharmacies and is likely to affect US hospitals wishing to wholesale 
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supply, it is important to gauge its current appropriateness and identify 
improvements for this technology.    
There were no concerns regarding the speed and usability of 
authentication technology raised during this chapter. There was limited 
impact on the daily activity of the staff and was classed as ‘not disruptive’.  
This study also identified some suggestions to improve authentication and 
detection rates including the importance of making a clear differentiation 
between the various warning messaging to avoid misinterpretation. 
Participants identified a concern with the similarity of warning messaging 
which may have had an impact on the decision to quarantine and may have 
contributed to the suboptimal detection rates seen in chapter three relating 
to the chapter three. Phansalkar et al. (128) explained that colour plays an 
important role in the differentiation between alerts on clinical information 
systems. As seen in this technology, Phansalker explains that red, amber 
and green are commonly used colours to differentiate between alerts. 
Phansalker states that  
‘Color, shape, and size are the variables commonly manipulated 
to make visual alerts distinct from one another, although these 
manipulations must take into account any coding for 
prioritisation’.  
In the technology investigated in this chapter and in chapter three the same 
colour (amber) with a different written message, was used to identify two 
alerts which required two different actions (128). The participants in this 
study made a suggestion which supports Phansalkers point. The 
participants suggested that the colour of the amber alerts which required 
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quarantine should be changed to red to help them to prioritise the action 
that should be taken.  
As with all changes to practice, adequate education and training 
are required. There was a basic presentation and education approach used 
which included the provision of an authentication protocol used in the 
previous chapter (Appendix 2.0). This may have contributed to 
inadequate authentication and detection rates due to the use of standard 
educational support or perhaps due to the sheer volume of procedures and 
protocols that staff are required to adhere to as part of the normal working 
day. The systematic authentication of medicines is a big change of practice 
and may benefit from a structured training and revalidation package. If we 
refer to previous large information technology projects such as the 
implementation of the electronic patient record (EPR). This was a much 
more complicated electronic system with a structured training package 
which largely includes presentations, demonstrations, workshops, drop-in 
sessions and protocols. A varied, informed and interactive approach, as 
used in the EPR project, is required to build operator background 
knowledge and to instil the clinical and legal importance of authenticating 
medicines as well as the impact of authentication on medicine detection 
rates. 
The quantitative service evaluation study in chapter three 
identified a disparity between medicines identified as requiring quarantine 
and those actually quarantined. This qualitative study contained within 
this chapter demonstrated a consensus that a pop-up warning message 
alone is not an adequate prompt in the complex, non-linear and busy 
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hospital environment. The operators in this study are in agreement that an 
extra noise to indicate that a medicine requiring quarantine would improve 
the effectiveness of this technology. Not only would this remind the 
operator to act but it may also bring attention to the entire team that a 
medicine requiring quarantine had been identified, generating peer 
pressure to act on the warning. 
Participants also emphasised the importance of an electronic 
‘action taken’ documentation process. Operators relied on recording the 
medicine for quarantine on a paper proforma sheet located beside the 
terminal; their view was that this could be improved with the inclusion of 
an ‘action taken’ function incorporated into the authentication technology 
software. In a systematic review study by Shojania et al. the action taken 
alert has been identified as potentially more effective than a ‘non-action' 
alert, (11) demonstrated in a small group. This ‘action taken’ approach 
may facilitate an improved detection rate and may also support a reporting 
system which would benefit managerial monitoring of falsified, recalled 
or expired medicines within a department. This would also allow staff 
responsible for product quarantine to tally medicines physically 
quarantined with medicines identified by the technology as requiring 
quarantine. 
Information technology systems such as electronic prescribing, or 
in this case medicines authentication technologies are relatively new 
approaches to optimise healthcare information. Shojania et al (118) 
demonstrate that evidence to support computer alerts is currently limited. 
Regarding electronic prescribing, Shojania concludes by stating ‘Further 
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research must identify design features and contextual factors consistently 
associated with larger improvements in provider behaviour if computer 
reminders are to succeed on more than a trial and error basis’. Further 
research is also required regarding medicines authentication technology to 
identify the approaches which facilitate operational compliance. Hospitals 
in the NHS vary slightly depending on the services they provide, which 
makes context an important factor in technology success (98). Following 
on from the remarks made by Shojania et al. further research is required 
to understand how contextual factors can facilitate successful 
technological projects in the UK National Health Service. One such 
contextual factor may include incentives to authenticate medicines. The 
use of reimbursement codes within the 2D data matrix is hypothesised to 
help the authentication rate of medicines, a practice seen in the Belgian 
community pharmacy setting. There will be a legal mandate to 
authenticate medicines. However, incentives such as reimbursement upon 
authentication may prove to augment authentication and detection rates.   
The results of this study should inform key opinion leaders, 
policymakers and technology manufacturers regarding medicines 
authentication technology and potential authentication technology 
improvements. Considering the limited evidence to support medicines 
authentication the outcomes of this study should also service decision 
makers in their discussions surrounding the selection of medicines 
authentication technology providers. Considering the suggestions 
identified in this chapter, chapter five aims to implement an active sound 
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alert and re-assess the digital MAT approach to understand the effect of 
an ‘Active’ audio alert on digital drug screening. 
Note: The majority of this chapter was published in the following 
publication. 
Naughton B, Roberts L, Dopson S, Brindley D, Chapman S. Medicine 
authentication technology as a counterfeit medicine-detection tool: a 
Delphi method study to establish an expert opinion on manual medicine 





5.0: The Effect of a User Instigated Audio Alert on 
the Authentication and Detection Rate of Falsified, 
Expired and Recalled Medicines in the Hospital 
Sector 
5.1: Introduction 
 Chapter three discussed the effectiveness of medicines 
authentication technology at the end of the supply chain, in a hospital 
setting (73) and chapter four discussed improvements to this technology. 
As explained previously medicines authentication technology involved 
the scanning of a two-dimensional barcode and digital crosschecking 
against a national database to determine whether or not a medicine had 
been recalled, expired or potentially falsified. The technology example 
employed, coloured pop-up alerts to identify a medicine as requiring 
attention (amber) or quarantine (red) or no action (no pop-up, a purple 
symbol to acknowledge the scan had been completed successfully). 
Chapter three identified a number of issues related to the relatively poor 
authentication and detection rate of this approach. Accuracy checking 
technicians and pharmacists at the checking stage of medicine supply were 
identified as the best-placed personnel within the dispensary to carry out 
the decommissioning process, based on scanning compliance data. The 
authentication technology in chapter three didn’t experience any technical 
communication issues (with the exception of occasional offline episodes) 
and had a favourable average response time of less than 300 ms. However, 
not all medicines in the chapter three study were scanned and of those 
scanned not all were appropriately quarantined according to the study 
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protocol (Appendix 2.0) This demonstrated a significant operational 
quality concern with the digital medicine screening approach (73).  
Pop-up alerts have been used by many health information 
technologies (HIT’S) over the years to alert healthcare professionals to 
important information such as prescribing reminders or counselling 
advice. There is, a scarcity of research related to the effectiveness of these 
pop-up alerts in health information technology; the research that does exist 
relates to the point of care computer reminders, associated with electronic 
health records and medical prescribing systems. A systematic Cochrane 
review by Shojania et al. in 2010 (118) investigated the effect of point-of-
care computer reminders on physician behaviour and identified that 
computer reminders improved the process of care by a median of 4.2%. 
As mentioned in previous chapters, this improvement was smaller than 
what was expected from the implementation of computerised order entry 
and electronic medical record systems. In chapter four it was explained 
that Shojania et. al. introduced the concept that reminders may not be as 
effective as first anticipated and that ‘active’ reminders may be of most 
benefit, although this was based on limited data. 
  This chapter aims to repeat the chapter three study under nearly 
identical conditions with one alteration to the Medicines Authentication 
Technology (MAT). This change involved the inclusion of an audio alert, 
which was suggested by study participants as part of the Delphi method 
study (129) discussed in chapter four. This audio alert, sounded upon the 
authentication of a falsified medicine (authenticated elsewhere), 
authenticated here medicine, expired pack, recalled pack, or recalled 
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product. The primary aim was to understand if the audio alteration would 






• To identify the OAR, ODR and ADR rates of falsified, recalled or 
expired medicines over an eight-week period using a MAT with a 
sound alert and to compare this to the identical scenario without a 
sound alert from chapter three. 
Secondary Objectives 
 
• To establish MAT offline frequency (how often the system failed 
to connect to the database). 
• To identify the frequency of false positives in this approach. 
• To identify MAT response times (how long it took for the 
technology to communicate with the database and return a 
response). 
5.2.2: Study Site 
 
This study was performed in the same NHS teaching hospital trust site 
which hosted the baseline study in chapter three. 
5.2.3: Technology Alteration 
 
A MAT was altered to generate a sine waveform, with a frequency of 530 
hertz and sound length of 1 second. The volume was between 90 and 98 
decibels. 
5.2.4: Product Serialisation Method                                                                                
The sample used from chapter three was replicated for this chapter. 
Medicines were labelled with a pre-programmed two-dimensional 
barcode sticker, twice a week, every week in the morning and early 
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afternoon for an eight-week period to ensure that product lines in the study 
remained serialised for the entire eight weeks as per chapter three. The 
pre-programmed 2D barcode sticker identified each product as being 
‘authenticated’, ‘already authenticated here’, ‘authenticated elsewhere 
(falsified)’, ‘product recalled’, ‘batch recalled’ or ‘expired’ at frequencies 
described in Table 5.0. The results from chapter three acted as the control 
with the new data contained within this chapter acting as the intervention. 
For ease of reference and comparison, the results from chapter three are 
represented in this chapter also. Medicines with serialised stickers 
attached were recorded in a database controlled by the researcher; this was 
compared to the medicines quarantined by the staff members and those 
recorded as scanned by the MAT provider’s database. Data analysis was 
conducted by two separate researchers to ensure the analysis was accurate. 
Table 5.0: A description of each pop-up alert and corresponding 
frequency throughout the investigated sample. 
 
Popup Message (Colour) 
 
Frequency as a percentage of 
serialised products entered 
into the study 
Authenticated (Passive purple 
symbol) 
96% 






Product Recalled (Red) 1% 
Pack Recalled (Red) 1% 
Pack Expired (Red) 1% 
5.2.5: Statistics 
 
Percentages have been used for normalisation. To demonstrate a 
significant difference between the outcomes in this chapter and chapter 
three, Chi-squared tests and Fisher's exact tests have been used. Both tests 
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are suitable for nominal data however Chi-squared test is suitable for 
sample sizes greater than 1000 and the fishers exact test is best suited to 
smaller sample sizes.  A p value of <0.05 is deemed as being statistically 
significant, and confidence intervals of 90% have been used throughout 
(109, 130-133) 
5.2.6: Comparability of Studies 
 
The method used in this study was almost identical to the approach 
taken in chapter three, stage one (Medicine decommissioning by 
pharmacists and accuracy checking technicians at the checking stage). The 
same portfolio of medicines was used over an eight-week period and the 
participants were given the same presentation and demonstration of the 
authentication technology as per the protocol. Despite the best efforts of 
the researchers, there may have been some perceived differences between 
both studies, these are noted in Table 5.1. 
5.2.7: Ethical Approvals 
 
This study was classified as research according to NIHR 
guideline’s and as such required ethical approvals which can be found in 
Appendix 4.0, p 290.  HRA approval and Trust R&D approvals were also 













Table 5.1: Potential differences between the 2015 study (chapter 

















Previous results have not 
identified an association 
between exposure and 
increased compliance. 
There was a greater than 
one-year interval between 
studies 
Conducted as a 
service 
evaluation study 
Conducted as a 
research study 
The chapter five study 
involved ethical approval 
and written consent  
This study was 
proposed by the 
researcher 
The study was based 
on a consensus 
improvement 
suggested by the 
participants 
Compliance may have 
been increased by the 
motivation to implement 
an idea that was suggested 






















Key               
n= Number of study products containing error messages.                                                        
(...)= Number of total serialised products entered into the study. 
Figure 5.0: A flow chart which identified the total number of 
medicines included in both studies (study medicines), the total 
number of medicines scanned (decommissioned medicines) and the 
total number of medicines detected (detected or quarantined 
medicines).(73) 
 
This chapter and chapter three refer to studies carried out in 2015 
and 2016 respectively and were each conducted over the same duration, 
using the same 30 serialised medicines, which explains the similar number 
of products serialised in each study. Figure 5.0 shows the number of 
medicines authenticated was greater in the 2016 study; this higher 
authentication rate correlates to the higher number of medicines detected 
Chapter three 
(2015) (Stage 1) 
 (Chapter Three) 
 
n=92 (2,115) n= 89 (2,188) 
Study 
Medicines 














by the authentication technology and therefore the higher rate of medicine 
correctly quarantined by the operator in response to the technology alert.  
Table 5.2: A demonstration of the OAR, ODR and ADR during the 















85.6%                      
(84.4-86.9%)   
+17.2%                                         
(15.2-19.3%)  
p<0.05 











+13.5 %        


















(109)    
90% confidence intervals used throughout (108, 110). 
 
There has been a statistically significant improvement in 
authentication and detection rates in the 2016 study compared to the 2015 
study. During the 2016 study, regular evaluations of the technology were 
performed to ensure the technology was accurately communicating with 
the external database. And no issues were identified in this regard. There 
did appear to have been instances where the medicine authentication 
technology identified a medicine as requiring quarantine, and staff failed 
to do so which is represented by an ODR of less than 100% (Table 5.2). 
MAT communication with the database was assessed to understand the 
125 
 
factors contributing to poor quarantine compliance. In all cases of 
instruction to quarantine by the MAT, without appropriate quarantining, 
there were no offline issues at the time of notification. The technology 
records data in coordinated universal time (UTC) and from the seven cases 
in the 2016 study where medicines were authenticated but not 
quarantined; there was no trend which indicated the type of medicines day 
or time of day as a factor which contributed to quarantine non-compliance. 
The same examination took place for medicines with alerts which were 
included in the study but not scanned (12) and again there was no clear 
indication that the medicine type affected authentication compliance.  
Table 5.3: A breakdown of study medicines with alerts, medicines 
authenticated, and medicines detected during the 2015 (chapter 











 Study medicines with alerts 
2015 22 24 24 22 
2016 21 23 22 23 
 Decommissioned medicines 
2015 13 12 18 16 
2016 16 22 20 20 
 Detected medicines (quarantine) 
2015 7 12 13 16 
2016 12 22 20 (212) 19 
                                               
2 There was one case where the medicine was quarantined without being scanned. Upon 
investigation, it appears that at the time of quarantine the technology appeared to be 
offline. This resulted in a number of medicines being quarantined on precaution. All but 





The data in Figure 5.0 describes medicines serialised and the 
proportion of which contained error alert stickers. Table 5.3 breaks the 
total number of serialised medicines with alerts down to the individual 
alert categories i.e. ‘authenticated elsewhere’ (falsified), ‘product 
recalled’, ‘pack recalled’ and ‘pack expired’. Through breaking down the 
group of serialised medicines with alerts into each of the four component 
groups, we can compare inter and intra-group detection rates. It is clear 
that the ‘authenticated elsewhere’ or potentially falsified alert generated a 
lower number of appropriately quarantined outcomes. 
Table 5.4: Operational detection rates (ODR) for each alert group. 
 
























































90% confidence intervals used throughout (108, 110) 
 
The ODR in all alert groups (Table 5.4) (calculated from data in 
Table 5.3) demonstrates either no improvement or modest improvements 
in operational detection rates across all groups between 2015 and 2016. 
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This change is not statistically significant in most cases which is likely 
due to small sample sizes in each group.  
Table 5.5: Absolute detection rates (ADR) (the ratios of medicines 
correctly quarantined by the operators as a proportion of those 
entered into the study) for each alert group. 
 










































90% confidence intervals used throughout (108, 110) 
 
The ADR, is an especially important statistic from a patient safety 
perspective, as it identifies the number of falsified, expired and recalled 
medicines detected as a percentage of the total number of medicines 
dispensed. The ADR improved between the 2015 and 2016 study across 
all alert groups. The group with the lowest ADR is the falsified medicine 
group, with all other groups demonstrating improvements, moving close 
to acceptable standards (close to 100%). Chapter three identified that there 
were two amber pop-up alerts one which required quarantine 
(Authenticated elsewhere or falsified) and one which did not require 
quarantine (Authenticated here) (Table 5.0). The ‘Authenticated 
elsewhere or falsified’ alert was commonly mistaken and resulted in the 
lowest ADR.  
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Table 5.6: The ADR in the falsified group (amber) versus other 
groups combined (red) (expired and recalled)  
 






















90% confidence intervals used throughout (108,110) 
 
Table 5.7: The ODR for the falsified group (amber) versus all other 
groups (expired and recalled) (red). 
 

















90% confidence intervals have been used throughout (108, 110) 
 
Table 5.6 shows a similarity in the disparity between the falsified 
group and all other alert groups across both studies. Despite the 2016 study 
showing improved results all round, there is still a similar difference 
between the ADR of medicines which contain a red alert (all other groups) 
and an amber alert (Authenticated elsewhere, potentially falsified). When 
comparing the cumulative data from 2015 and 2016 it is clear that the 
detection rate of ‘Authenticated elsewhere’ (falsified) shows worse 
outcomes than all other alert groups combined (Table 5.7). 
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Table 5.8: The response times frequencies of offline issues in the 
chapter three and five studies. 
 

















The EU FMD has mandated a maximum data round-trip (from 
scanning to external database and back) response rate of less than 300 
milliseconds. Across both studies, this has been achieved with a faster 
response rate observed in the 2016 study. Offline issues, however, appear 
to have been more frequent in the 2016 study with >4% increase when 
compared to the 2015 study results. False positives were recorded in both 
studies. A false positive refers to when a medicine is identified as 
requiring quarantine when in fact it does not require quarantine, also 
known as a false alarm. There were 11 cases in 2015, three of which were 
related to offline issues and 37 cases in 2016, of which 17 were related to 
an offline issue. The false positive figure for the 2015 study was extracted 
from previously gathered data. 
False Positives and False Negatives 
Table 5.9: False positives.(110, 134) 
 2015 2016 
False positives  11 (of which three were 
related to an offline 
issue) 
37 (of which 17 were 
related to an offline issue) 
 
The basis of a good diagnostic test relies on its sensitivity and 
specificity. Sensitivity, detection, or true positive rate measures the 
proportion of positives identified as such by the test. Specificity or true 
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negatives, report the proportion of negatives that are correctly identified 
by the test. This technology was tested by the company providing the 
solution and the researcher also performed ad-hoc testing throughout the 
studies to ensure than medicines with preprogramed alerts were being 
identified to the staff and therefore the technical sensitivity and specificity 
was accepted as 1.0, as long as the technology was online.  This approach 
is not entirely technical and relies on the interpretation of alerts from the 
user in a busy environment and the patience to deal with offline issues. 
Table 5.9 identified that the incidence of false positives in 2015 was less 
than 2016. This correlation may be due to the increased instances of 
offline issues identified in Table 5.8. 
Workarounds  
Finally, it was observed during this study that workarounds were 
created by the staff. During instances where medicine would not scan, due 
to an offline issue or otherwise, staff tended to quarantine the product as 
a matter of course. It was also observed that after the staff had 
authenticated a product that was only partly used they would use a pen to 
place a cross through the 2D data matrix to identify the part pack medicine 
as already having been authenticated. 
Discussion 
To knowingly introduce expired, recalled or potentially falsified 
medicine into the legitimate pharmaceutical supply chain would be 
disruptive, unethical and compromise patient safety. The 2015 and 2016 
studies safely assessed the authentication rate, detection rate, response 
time, false positive frequency and offline frequency in a controlled, live, 
131 
 
closed-loop environment without compromising patient safety. Post FMD 
implementation, it may be possible to investigate the prevalence of 
expired, recalled and counterfeit medicines, this has been done in part in 
studies in Belgium where the authentication of medicines is commonplace 
(104). However, medicine scanning or authentication is only effective if 
all medicines are scanned. It will not be possible to identify the absolute 
detection rate of expired, recalled or counterfeit medicines in the supply 
chain unless the total number of falsified medicines in the legitimate 
supply chain are known from the outset, and all products are scanned. 
Therefore, this study is uniquely positioned.  
False Positives and Response Times 
The 2015 study identifies an increase in false positives between 
2015 and 2016 (Table 5.9). The MAT was accuracy tested before use in 
the chapter three and five studies. The ad hoc testing performed by the 
researcher aimed to identify instances of false negatives throughout the 
studies to ensure than medicines with preprogramed alerts were being 
identified to the staff as such. The researcher did not experience any false 
negatives during testing, however there may have been cases where the 
technology gave no result e.g. during offline periods. However, it was not 
possible to quantify the incidence of this occurrence. The number of 
medicines quarantined that did not require quarantine (false positives) 
were compared with the offline issues. It is theorised that the increase in 
offline issues (Table 5.8) caused confusion regarding the test result. This 
confusion resulted in the inappropriate quarantine of products. The impact 
of offline instances (when the scan from the terminal cannot communicate 
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with the national database) on healthcare institutions will cause a delay in 
the supply of medicines to patients, this study suggests that an increase in 
offline issues will result in an increase in false positives. There is no 
evidence in this study to suggest a relationship between false negatives 
and offline issues. An option permitted by the FMD during the offline 
technology scenario is to supply a medicine without evaluating the 
provenance of the product or halting medicine supply until the system is 
back online. Supply without authentication is a risky strategy from a 
professional litigation perspective, and it is not yet understood what would 
happen in the instance where the technology failed and remained offline 
for a period of time, resulting in a dangerous medicine being dispensed 
without first being authenticated. Although this technological approach 
has proven its ability to operate at speeds well below the FMD mandated 
limit of 300 milliseconds, it is clear from this study that offline issues have 
an effect on false positives and are likely to disrupt the delivery of 
medicines to patients. One way to keep offline issues to a minimum would 
be to penalise the NMVS provider for offline instances beyond an agreed 
contracted level. 
The Impact of an Audio Alert on Adherence to Policy 
It is anticipated that the inclusion of an audio alert, as suggested 
by participants would improve the operational detection rate of medicines 
at the point of decommissioning, in an otherwise audio alert naïve 
environment. The outcome of the 2016 study, when compared to the 2015 
study, was favourable in terms of all key measures, operational 
authentication rate, operational detection rate, and absolute detection rate. 
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As there was only one major change from the 2015 study, it would be 
reasonable to attribute these changes to the inclusion of an audio alert. 
Other factors may have also played a role in the improvement in the 
decommissioning and detection rate, and these are explored through 
qualitative interviews in chapter six. 
Shojania et al. explained that the use of computer reminders 
improved adherence to process of care by a median of 4.2% over 28 trials 
which was described by the authors as being ‘much smaller than those 
expected by electronic health records’(135). Although information pop-
ups alone have shown limited effectiveness in the medical record and 
prescribing environment there is a sample of data which identifies that 
reminders which require the user to enter a response generated a 12.9% 
median increase. The 12.9% increase parallels with the active sound alert 
used in this chapter which improved the ODR by 13.5% between chapter 
three (2015) and chapter five (2016) (Table 5.2). This phenomenon can 
be seen across all medicine pop up groups as well as each individual pop 
up (Table 5.5). 
The healthcare environment can at times be chaotic and computer 
reminders or pop-ups can be ignored as frequently as 49% to 96% of the 
time as described by Van der Sijs et al. (135). It is worth considering 
whether or not an ‘active’ computer alert, such as a visual alert which 
requires the user to enter a response, or something as simple as a specific 
noise alert may be more beneficial than a passive computer reminder. A 
passive computer alert may result in staff skipping through pop-up alerts 
or using a workaround to bypass perceived unnecessary interruptions to 
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deal with direct patient care. Considering this theory, it is also important 
to consider the contextual factors which may affect new computer alerts. 
The pharmacy environment in the UK and many other European countries 
use electronic patient medication records which employ a variety of 
medication and patient safety alerts. These alerts have the potential to 
condition healthcare staff to ignore pop-up alerts as seen in studies by 
Indermitte et al. in 2007 (136) where the overriding of computer alerts is 
community pharmacy has become commonplace. The results from this 
thesis showed that the rate of overriding contrasted to Van der Sijs 2006 
study (135). The results in this thesis demonstrated an operational 
detection rate of 83.36 % (Chapter three) and 95% (Chapter five) which 
meant that 16.64% (Chapter three) and 5% (Chapter five) of the pop-up 
alerts were not acted upon. The improvement is likely due to the addition 
of the ‘active alert’ however other factors may also have influenced this 
outcome. 
Peer Pressure and ‘The Hawthorne Effect’ 
During the 2016 study, the addition of a simple audio alert brought 
about a change in operational detection, at the point of scanning this 
resulted in a difference of 13.5% between studies. This result may have 
been wholly or partially the result of an ‘active alert’ however the 
‘Hawthorne effect” associated with the audio alert may also have 
influenced this improvement and reduced the risk of pop-up blindness. 
The Hawthorne effect is a type of reactivity in which the operator alters 
their behaviour in response to being observed. This is usually an unhelpful 
effect as the results recorded during the observation do not ordinarily 
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represent the day to day situation. The participants were not monitored by 
the researcher during the studies. However, there was always another 
employee working alongside each operator. The Hawthorne effect is 
usually related to people being observed by a researcher or manager. In 
this case, the effect is possibly present on more of a peer-to-peer basis. 
The Hawthorne effect or peer pressure may have brought about positive 
change in this study in two ways. Firstly, the audio alert made it very 
difficult for the technology operator to ignore the computer pop-up alert 
as it was accompanied by a sound alert which could be heard by anyone 
in the dispensary. This made it very difficult to ignore, either intentionally 
or unintentionally. Furthermore, it would be easy to close a silent pop-up 
alert on a computer terminal without being noticed by another colleague 
however an audio alert brings with it a peer expectation to act. Finally, the 
audio alert informed staff in the department that a team-mate had scanned 
a medicine which required action, this provided the on looking team-mate 
with an opportunity to help the operator deal with the alert. To credibly 
explore whether or not the Hawthorne effect had a more pronounced 
impact during the 2016 further qualitative interviews which are explored 
in chapter six were required. 
Staff Engagement 
 
A key finding from the systematic Cochrane review conducted by 
Shojania et al. (118) was that a well-developed home-grown clinical 
information system demonstrated a larger improvement when compared 
to other studies 16.8% vs 3.0% median p=0.04. It is interesting to 
understand why a home-grown technology would demonstrate such 
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improved adherence to the process of care. One theory may be that a 
home-grown technology lends its self to technological adjustments 
suggested by the staff members which results in the development of a 
solution which is contextually appropriate. Another theory is that a home-
grown technology empowers the employees, which in turn drives 
compliance irrespective of the technological change. In the field of lean 
processes, the Toyota model is often referred to. Within Toyota, there 
exists a process called Jidoka which essentially means building in quality. 
Furthermore, Toyota also uses a process called process 
call JKK (Jikotei Kanketsu) which means building in quality with 
ownership or taking pride in your work. If a healthcare organisation has 
the flexibility to develop their own solution, tailored to their own needs 
with staff identified improvements like those demonstrated in JKK, it is 
theorised that this will improve overall compliance not only within the 
micro-process, in this case decommissioning medicine, but beyond the 
specific improvement to other related processes. This study covered the 
addition of a noise alert to identify when a medicine required quarantine; 
this improvement was a direct result of user consensus via a  Delphi 
method study (129). Although it was expected that this audio alert would 
only affect behaviour at the point of scanning a medicine which required 
quarantine, the audio alert also increased compliance across the entire 
process. It was identified that the operational authentication rate improved 
from 68% (66.8-70.1%, 90% CI) to 85.6% (84.4-86.9%, 90% CI) which 
then had a knock-on effect to absolute detection rate, an improvement 
from 52% (43.6-60.7%, 90% CI) to 83% (76.6-89.7%, 90% CI). It could 
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be theorised that from Shojania et al., and the results from this chapter that 
the JKK principles of building in quality with ownership increased 
compliance beyond the micro process (to quarantine in the response to an 
alert) through into surrounding processes associated with the technology, 
in this case, medication authentication or decommissioning compliance 
(OAR). This concept is further investigated through operator qualitative 
interviews in the following chapter. 
 
The Impact of Alert Colour on Decision Making 
The explanation for the poor detection rate in the ‘authenticated 
elsewhere’ alert group (Table 5.4 – 5.7) relates to the amber pop-up alert 
which is very similar to the ‘Already authenticated here’ pop up which 
was also amber, the former required quarantine and the later did not. It is 
hypothesised that staff may have glimpsed at pop-ups and made rapid 
decisions based on colour and not the message content. It is expected that 
the staff mixed up the pop-up alerts due to similarity and therefore failed 
to quarantine correctly the potentially counterfeit medicines, a theory 
which is substantiated through the qualitative staff interviews which 
follow. 
 5.4: Conclusions 
An audio intervention increases the operational detection rate of 
medicines. Compliance with the technology as a whole has increased 
between chapters three and five which is a likely effect of the JKK theory 
or building in quality with ownership by involving staff in the 
interventional change. Similarities in pop-up colour alerts were also 
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observed as causing staff confusion and, in this case, have resulted in poor 
ODR of the falsified medicine group. Response times below 300 ms are 
realistic and have been proven possible over both the 2015 and 2016 
studies. However, offline issues had a high correlation with false positive 
quarantining and are likely to have caused significant delays during offline 
periods. Finally, the improvements in this study demonstrate that 
decommissioning at the checking stage can work and in turn provide key 
information to professional staff at a suitable time. Systems and change 
management strategies which have been proven to be successful in similar 
contexts could be implemented to ensure that HIT’s are rolled-out 
effectively to facilitate staff adherence, adoption and engagement. Chapter 
six conducts qualitative interviews to learn more about key issues raised 
during this and previous chapters. The aim of chapter six will be to gain 
qualitative data to learn more about health information alerts and to 










6.0: The Effectiveness of Health Information 
Technology Alerts in the Digital Medicines 
Screening Technology Context: A Qualitative 
Study 
6.1: Introduction 
The effectiveness of digital alerts in healthcare information 
technology (HIT) systems are poorly evidenced in the literature. Shojania 
et al. (118) explain in a systematic review that “home-grown” and “active” 
alerts demonstrate some marginal evidence of improved effectiveness 
compared to other point of care reminders but there is a lack of studies 
which investigated the effectiveness of HIT alerts. 
Chapter five involved the implementation of a home-grown audio 
alert at the point of medicine verification and suggested reasons for an 
improvement in detection and authentication rates when compared to the 
same technology in chapter three. This study aims to use qualitative 
methods to explore the findings of chapter three and five further and to 
compare the quantitative results in chapter five to the qualitative results 
obtained during participant interviewing in this chapter. This chapter 
identifies the key themes that emerged throughout qualitative interviews 
and understands staff perspectives on the technological change as well as 
other system or behavioural changes that occurred. 
Qualitative interviews were conducted with participants who had 
been part of three studies. 1. Using a medicines authentication technology 
(MAT) without an audio alert (Chapter three). 2 a Delphi method study 
which involved suggestions for improving the technology (Chapter four) 
and 3. Using a MAT with a user instigated audio alert (Chapter five). This 
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chapter is based on the pharmacy context but is expected to represent how 
healthcare staff interact with audio alerts in the wider healthcare 
environment.  The outcomes of this chapter may also be relevant to other 
industries where digital information alerts are used. 
6.2: Methods 
Qualitative interviews were conducted three days after the 
completion of the chapter five study. Conducting interviews shortly after 
the final study ensured that the thoughts and opinions of the staff were 
current. Ten staff members were interviewed individually over three days. 
The interviews were held in the same room under the same conditions, 
using an interview guide (Appendix 6.0).  Eight of the participants had 
been involved in all previous studies (Chapter three, four and five), and 
two of the participants had experience using the technology with the audio 
feature only (Chapter five). Question one to six, and question 22 form the 
interview guide were demographic or closed questions and were not 
included in the thematic analysis but instead displayed as a frequency in 
Table 6.0. Interviews were recorded using a hand-held voice recording 
device, transcribed into a word document and entered into the Nvivo 
system for thematic analysis. Manuscripts were anonymised by coder A 
(BN) by removing any reference to participant, brand or company names. 
Coder A then read each manuscript, recorded a list of themes and coded 
for those themes using the Nvivo software package. These themes were 
shared with coder B (LR) who carried out a further coding process, 
altering themes and subthemes throughout. Both coder A and B discussed 
the themes and subthemes and agreed on those described in Table 6.1. 
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Coder A then re-coded the manuscripts in light of the agreed themes and 
subthemes. Interrater reliability was conducted with Kappa statistics 
(Table 6.2) using Nvivo software, with calculations based on the 
frequency of characters. Participant names, product brand names and 
company names were removed from all quotes. Product names were 
replaced with generic names. E.g. NexiumÒ would have been replaced 
with esomeprazole. 
6.3: Ethical Approvals 
This study was classified as research according to NIHR 
guideline’s and as such required ethical approvals which can be found in 
Appendix 4.0. (p 290.)  HRA approval and Trust R&D approvals were 
also required which can also be found in Appendix 4.0. (p293 and p294). 
6.4:Results                                                                                                   























1 Anon. F Anon. ACT Yes Yes 
2 Anon. F Anon. ACT Yes Yes 
3 Anon. F Anon. ACT Yes Yes 
4 Anon. F Anon. Pharm. No Yes 
5 Anon. F Anon. ACT Yes Yes 
6 Anon. F Anon. ACT Yes Yes 
7 Anon. F Anon. Pharm. No Yes 
8 Anon. F Anon. ACT Yes Yes 
9 Anon. F Anon. ACT Yes Yes 








(Mode) Yes (Mode) Yes (Mode) 
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Further to Table 6.0 as a response to question 22, all participants 
explained that the introduction of the audio alert had a positive impact on 
the detection of poor quality medicines. When participants were asked 
who initiated the idea or suggested altering the technology, participants 
involved in chapter three, four and five studies successfully identified 
themselves as the group that suggested the implemented audio alert, i.e. 
not an external manager or the researcher. 
Table 6.1: Themes and subthemes identified during thematic analysis. 
 
 Themes in bold and subthemes in italics 
A The effect of an audio alert on behaviour 
1 The characteristics of the audio alert 
2 The effect of the audio alert on adherence to policy 
3 Auto piloting; positive and negative 
B Point of care alert appearance and characteristics 
1 Coloured pop-ups 
2 Point of care alert characteristics 
C Learning and peer influence 
1 Protocols 
2 Errors 
3 Peer influence 
D Impact of the technology 
1 On the individual 
2 On the workforce 
3 On the workplace processes, e.g. controlled drug supply 














Table 6.2: The main themes and subthemes with corresponding 
kappa statistic and percentage levels of agreement or disagreement. 
 









The effect of an audio 
alert on behaviour 
0.77 95.77 4.23 
Auto-piloting 0.72 95.33 4.68 
Point of care alert 
characteristics 
0.78 98.47 1.53 
Coloured pop-ups 0.94 99.78 0.22 
Learning and peer 
influence 
0.74 95.18 4.82 
Impact of the technology 0.80 95.39 4.61 
Technology 
performance issues 
0.73 99.17 0.83 
6.4.1: The Effect of an Audio Alert on Behaviour (A) 
The Characteristics of the Audio Alert (A1) 
The consensus regarding the effectiveness of the sound used for this study 
was positive and was captured by the following quotes (A1,1-3). 
1. “It's not annoying, it's not too piercing or anything like that, 
and it does encourage you to take action” [P1] 
2. “Well, no. It's effective. The only thing it really sounds like is 
the call button in the nurses' station [oh, okay], so that was a 
little bit confusing, to begin with. But it's a distinctive sound, 
and it's a sound that now, to me, you just associate it with that 
[okay]. So, that's quite helpful. It's not a sound I'd mix up with 
any other audio alerts for anything else."[P5] 
3. You associate that sound with something that you need to look 
at [P1] 
4. “It’s just an extra – it’s a buffer; it’s a safety net.  It’s another 
clue that there’s something to look out for’ [P5]. 
 
A1,1-4 are representative of the cohort where 10 out of 10 participants 
described the audio alert generally as having a positive impact on the 
technology. The unique nature of the technical sound appeared to be 
beneficial within the hospital context and was described as “different ….to 
anything else”. Furthermore, it was clear from some of the comments that 
144 
 
prioritisation was key in relation to alerts. If one task was deemed more 
important than another then that took preference (A1,5-6). 
5. “there are times when it is busy and you just have to do what 
you can for the patients, and other things take a bit of a back 
seat if you don’t perceive them to be as important as the 
patient” [P5] 
6. “And on the urgency of what you’re doing. It was perhaps also 
because it’s … it’s not as important as getting the drug at that 
time to the patient. I’m not saying it’s not important, but it’s—
” [P5] 
The Effect of the Alert on Adherence to Policy (A2) 
Throughout the interviews, the frequency of the sound was 
explained to play a part in how staff members responded to alerts (A2,7). 
Furthermore, it was explained by all participants that this was not a sound 
which the staff ignored or imagined could be ignored (A2,8). The cohort 
implied that perceived sophistication of the alert system affected user 
compliance (A2,9). 
7. “Very infrequent.  But then I hadn’t used the system very many 
times.  I think it was the fact that when you did get an alert, it 
meant something” [P6] 
8. “No, I don’t think I’ve ever ignored it” [P7] 
9. “The first time I used it, it didn’t feel so sophisticated. It seems 
strange that an audio alert, can make a system more 
sophisticated, but that’s what I thought” [P6] 
 
One participant explains that humans are becoming more attached 
to their smartphones and cannot stop themselves from checking their 
smartphone when it sends an audio alert (A2, 10). This participant eludes 
to the fact that this behaviour may be affecting the behaviour associated 
with how we respond to other audio alerts and that maybe one’s response 
to audio alerts is now different to before. The policy in this study was to 
quarantine a product when an alert sounded. If the staff were more 
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sensitive to audio alerts, this may have facilitated an improved adherence 
to policy. 
 
10. “…..if your phone buzzes, oh what’s that, what's going on, 
what's happening? And so, your natural instinct is to find out 
what that noise is, so I think having a noise certainly improves 
the amount of people that are going to be looking at it so your 
results are going to be better” [P3] 
 
Staff members that worked across different sites explained that an audio 
alert may not always be effective at helping staff adhere to work policy, 
especially in a working environment which is noisy or already has 
multiple sound alerts. During the interviews, two separate staff, both of 
whom who worked across different sites suggested a vibrating hand-held 
scanner or keyboard could be useful for larger sites with higher noise 
levels or competing for audio alerts (A2, 11). 
11. “But the keyboard could vibrate, or the scanner could vibrate 
when you scan something that’s a product that shouldn’t…. 
A bit like when you’re using a game console you get a rumble 
on your controller” [P6] 
Auto-Piloting (A3) 
 
A theme which arose throughout the interviews was the concept of 
auto-piloting in the workplace. The repetitive nature of scanning drugs 
itself was perceived as likely to cause staff to “zone out” or “switch into 
auto-pilot”, a process which the participants explained was often broken 
by the active audio alert (A3, 12 -14). 
 
12. “I think so. When you’re doing a job that’s repetitive, you do 
tend to switch off and— It’s like driving a car, isn’t it? After a 
period of time, you just get used to things, and you don’t think 
about them. Then you have to tune back in, in certain 




13. “Yeah, it stopped you doing so much on automatic pilot, I 
think” [P5] 
14. “…….When you’re undertaking a process, it can become quite 
easy to just do that process and not think through the reason for 
that process taking place. It becomes like an auto-pilot and 
you’re just going through the motions. Whereas if you go 
through the motion and get an audio alert, it makes you think 
that you need to act.” [P6] 
 
Furthermore, it appears that the sound reduces the risk of auto-piloting by 
adding priority to the pop-up alert and reducing the risk of alert fatigue 
A3,15-18. 
15. "Some things just flash up on your screen like pop-ups and 
things on computers, and you're just instantly closing them 
aren't you because you don't see that they're of any importance 
but as soon as a noise is generated somehow change the 
dimension of what that message is" [P3] 
16. "I've had pop-ups with noises, and I've gone, oh, what's that? 
And I've looked, and it's drawn me in a little bit more than just 
closing down a window as it flashes and gets in my way." [P3] 
17. "I think the sound is good at notifying you to look at the pop-
up, I think that's if you didn't have the sound you perhaps 
wouldn't pay as much attention to it but because it's got the 
sound you think oh, I need to look at that" [P1] 
18. “Fact I heard a noise that made me look at what happened, 
what that noise was all about made me then see the pop-up and 
what had all gone on and so yeah, I think it's positive" [P3] 
 
Auto piloting was observed in two distinct categories, individual auto 
piloting and team auto piloting. Individual auto piloting had either a 
positive or a negative outcome and team auto-piloting was observed as 
being positive. 
Positive individual autopilot 
 
One of the users made an argument that the dispensing process 
needs to be quick and authenticating medicines should not be a time-
consuming task. The participants explained that an audio alert allowed 
them to scan medicines on auto-pilot and use the active audio alert as a 
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trigger to act, therefore streamlining the process (A3,19) and removing the 
time pressure of checking the on-screen alert (A3,20-24). There was a 
consensus amongst the group that auto-piloting streamlined the process 
and improved efficiency in the presence of an audio alert. 
 
19. "…. it was quite easy just to go scan, scan, scan, scan and just 
go through the whole lot” [P5] 
20. “I felt reassured that there was a sound, which took some of the 
pressure off me having to make sure I’d checked any pop-ups 
that would have come up on the screen” [P6] 
21. “It felt easier to be given an audio alert rather than having to 
read something off a screen” [P6] 
22. “When you’ve got a whole tray of stuff, and you’ve got several 
things in there that need to be scanned, you can just zap it 
without having to check the screen every time. You’re not 
constantly having to look up at the screen, you just hear the 
alert and know that…. It’s like scanning it through in the 
supermarket” [P8] 
23. “When you’ve got a busy screen; you’re looking at your 
prescription, you’re looking at the product, you’ve got a screen, 
so three different places, and then you look at another screen to 
track out the prescription. There are a lot of things to remember 
and having that prompt – because it’s a noise – takes away 
some of the pressure of having to read off a screen.” [P6] 
24. "It's doing the hard work for you, isn't it? It's alerting you to the 
fact that there's something wrong, whereas otherwise, you've 
got to rely on you actually seeing it on the screen. So, if it's 
making a noise, there's a problem with it, whereas before it 
would just pop up and if you weren't 100% on it, that's nearly 
missed." [P2] 
 
Negative Individual Auto-piloting 
 
Participants explained that in a busy environment it was easy to 
scan medicines on autopilot and forget to look at the screen (A2, 25). This 
may have been aggravated by the use of a hand-held scanning device with 
a large cord which facilitates the scanning of a product at a distance from 
the screen during the medicine checking process in the dispensary. 
25. “…if you had a pop up before you might be so busy that you 
just look at it and think oh yeah, there's a pop-up, whereas a 
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noise will definitely alert you that you need to do something…” 
[P1] 
 
It was explained by one participant that the audio alert broke the operator 
out of the ‘auto-piloting’ mode associated with the systematic scanning of 
medicines. However, the opposite of this scenario could be that over-
reliance on a sound alert may also encourage staff to pay less attention to 
on-scree computer alerts (A2,26). 
 
26. “I’m worried that I missed something because I wasn’t looking 




Another concept appeared which related to professional obligation 
and how the noise not only reduced auto-piloting by the individual but 
also by an observer or a staff member in the vicinity who may not have 
been in direct sight of the operator or scanning terminal (A2, 27).  
27. “I think it was positive although I don’t think I ever scanned 
one that came up with an alert saying this is falsified but I heard 
someone else's and that made me look up and think, what was 
that? So, I noticed when there was a falsified one?” [P4] 
 
Regarding auto-piloting, it reduced the likelihood of the user and the team 
missing the alert. It was clear from the interviews that having a sound alert 
encouraged better teamwork. It drew attention to the staff of all experience 
levels who may have required help (A2, 28). 
28. "I think it encouraged us to do it and I think the fact that the 
first time I think for most people they got that, oh it's made a 
noise what do I do, once you've done that you knew because 
everybody realised that, I think most people's attention was 
probably drawn to it by people going, oh it's made a noise 
rather than the noise itself so then somebody could sort of help 




6.4.2: Point of Care Alert Appearance and Characteristics (B) 
Coloured Pop-Ups (B1) 
 
Throughout the interviews, participants explained that there was 
confusion between the two amber pop-ups that could occur. Although they 
contained different written information requiring two different actions 
(Quarantine and dispensing) the staff identified that they would often look 
at the amber response and dispense without reading the text on the alert 
(B1,1). 
 
1. “Yeah [yeah]. You know when the things pop up, and it says, 
‘authenticated here,’ [yeah] and ‘authenticated elsewhere?’ 
[Yeah.] My recollection is that they’re the same colour [that’s 
correct] and I think I’ve probably missed because I’ve just looked 
‘read – authenticated,’ and assumed it would be ‘authenticated 
here,’ so just dismissed it [okay]. So, I think they should be 
different colours…” [P2] 
 
For any pop-ups that were amber irrespective of the product requiring 
quarantine or not the amber pop-ups were largely closed and ignored. 
There was confusion between the two amber alerts because the operators 
looked at the pop-up colour and not the text information within the alerts. 
This resulted in medicines requiring quarantine being mistaken for those 
already dispensed on-site (B1, 2). One of the participants went on to say 
explicitly that the alert associated with medicines “Already authenticated 
here” should be a different colour to those authenticated elsewhere 
(falsified) (B1,1) (B1,3).  
2. "No I didn't find it confusing, I just always had to take a, like when 
it came up in red you knew straight away that you needed to do 
something whereas if it was an orange alert you did a bit more of 
a double take to see what it was coming up on the screen whereas 
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if it was red you knew automatically what you needed to do with 
that” [P1] 
3. “Because when it makes a noise you look at it, and it says 
authenticated, but it’s orange. So, if it said authenticated and it 
was orange, then it’s an authenticated here. If it said authenticated 
and it was green, ‘Oh, that’s elsewhere.’ Do you know what I 
mean? [Yeah.] So, I don’t think you would mistake them so much.” 
[P2] 
 
Point of Care Alert Characteristics (B2) 
 
When participants asked to compare the audio and visual alerts in 
this technology, i.e. coloured pop-up alerts and an audio alert with other 
alerts they are exposed to in their working environment the staff referred 
to a number of technologies present in their workplace. The comparable 
alert technologies included the patient medication record (PMR) system, 
the electronic prescribing record system (EPR), a medicine fridge alert 
system which monitors temperature (FAS), and desktop computer 
calendar alerts (CA). The perceived effectiveness of an alert within these 
technologies was affected by a number of factors. These factors included 
the amount of information contained within the alert, and the faith the staff 
members had in the alert, i.e. Staff in this study explained that an alert 
which is known often to be inaccurate or out of date is often ignored (B2, 
4-7). 
 
4. “Also, you know that the information is up to date and current 
whereas we can get error messages on PMR or information that 
pops up on the PMR and you know that half the time it's out of date 
information, so you don’t always pay attention to things like that.” 
[P1] 
5. "Yeah, we've had a couple of checking errors made where 
somebody has ignored the pop-up." [P10] (Referring to the PMR 
system) 
6. “There are too many, and they get ignored, I think, particularly 
with PMR. It’s because they’re not managed properly; they should 
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be— You get used to things being out of date and not needing to 
pay attention, so you stop paying attention completely.” [P5] 
7. “I think this is better because you get that noise, I think perhaps if 
you had a noise with PMR it might be a slightly more yeah, but I 
think some of those pop-ups on PMR are so old that's why people 
ignore them, they don't get taken off when it's not apparent 
anymore, or it's not applicable do they." [P10] 
 
The audio alert and colour coded alert combination seen in the MAT 
facilitated staff to react appropriately to alerts (B2, 8-9). 
8. "I think these are better because the pop-ups are colour coded as 
well so you know that you need to pay attention to especially the 
expired and things like that, you know that you need to pay 
attention" [P1] 
9. "Because it alerts you to the screen, I think the last one just flashed 
up didn't it and I think some things just flash up on your screen 
like pop-ups and things on computers and you're just instantly 
closing them aren't you because you don't see that they're of any 
importance but as soon as a noise is generated somehow change 
the dimension of what that message is, I've had pop-ups with 
noises, and I've gone, oh, what's that? And I've looked, and it's 
drawn me in a little bit more than just closing down a window as 
it flashes and gets in my way, closes it off, needs to move on." [P3] 
 
Existing alerts within the workplace may have an impact on how 
effective new alert technologies such as MAT’s are, alerts such as a fridge 
temperature monitor alarms, doorbell’s or alerting robotics may affect the 
usefulness of new audio alerts, however in this study the MAT alert was 
effective due to the lack of other major audio alerts in the study setting 
(B2, 10). 
10. “No, I don’t think so. It’s nothing like we’ve got in there at the 
moment. There’s no noise that makes something like that, that 
bleeps or anything. It’s not like working with a robot, where it 
makes different noises. It might be a different kettle of fish then. 
But in ours, it’s quite quiet, isn’t it? So, yeah.” [P2] 
 
Some working environments contain many alert technologies. In these 
circumstances the staff have suggested useful differentials to fight “alert 
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fatigue”. These suggestions included a vibrating hand-held scanner or 
keyboard (B2,11) as mentioned previously. 
11. “But the keyboard could vibrate or the scanner could vibrate when 
you scan something that’s a product that shouldn’t…. A bit like 
when you’re using a play station, you get a rumble on your 
controller” [P6] 
 
When comparing pop-ups alone with pop-ups with audio alerts, it became 
apparent that the operator prefers the audio prompt within this working 
environment (B2, 12). 
12. “I think with screen alerts you can just very easily get rid of them 
and you just kind of bypass them whereas with a noise that makes 
you stop for a moment I think so I think that’s a bit more useful.” 
[P4] 
 
The message contained within a pop up also appears to be important 
(B2, 13-14), the volume of data and how often the same message is 
repeated (B2, 15) also has an impact on how likely one is to act on that 
alert. 
13. “I think this one was better because there were less words to it, it 
was a lot more of a sharper statement so you could quickly just 
glance at it and know what it said rather than on EPR you have to 
read a massive paragraph.” [P4] 
14. “I use EPR, and we get pop-ups on EPR. I find them quite 
frustrating because there’s always a lot of information in the pop-
up…..often it’s the same message time and time again…..you read 
it the first time and then close it down. The next time there’s a pop-
up you think you’ve seen that one before, so you just close it down 
rather than automatically reading it through from beginning to 
end because something may have changed.” [P6] 
15. "With this, it only comes up when you need to make an action, so 
it's not irritating, whereas the ones on EPR tend to come up 
constantly and so you're more likely to click through them. With 
this one, you know you need to action something." [P7] 
 
When asked how the pop-ups with or without audio compared to other 
alert tools within the department the staff explained that a pop-up calendar 
reminder with an audio alert is very effective, but without an audio alert 
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this reminder is less effective (B2, 16). Audio alerts have been explained 
to be more effective when they are not constantly alarming and that 
constant alarming leads to the alert being ignored (B2,17-20).  
 
16. “In terms of other pop-ups, I see, I guess the calendar alert pop-
up and a bell that chimes in the background is the one that I see 
most often. It’s reminding me that in 15 minutes I’ve got an 
appointment or a meeting. I always respond to that because it’s a 
noise. But if I’ve got my sound turned off on my PC, if it pops up I 
wouldn’t automatically look at it because I have so many things 
popping up on my computer all the time. Pop-ups happen on your 
PC a lot of the time for different things and because you use the 
internet a lot outside of work, if you have pop-ups then often it’s 
an advertisement that you automatically want to close down. 
Having a noise with it is a different kind of stimulus for reacting 
to it.” [P6] 
17. “I don’t think PMR makes a noise does it, so it just flashes up as 
it were but I think a lot of people do ignore that, we try and 
discourage people from ignoring it. And the only other noise I can 
think of is that everybody ignores “Fridge Alert System (FAS) 
don’t they, FAS can go on for quite a while without anyone 
actually going, what’s that noise. You don’t seem to notice it 
straight away do you whereas you do notice” [P10] 
18. “I think this is louder isn’t, it but it’s not too loud for anybody else 
if you know what I mean, trying to think now I just know that I 
never notice FAS until it’s been going for some time.” [P10]  




There were examples where staff explained that they learned and 
adapted to new technology in different ways. Some explained that they 
learned as they went along, some felt that repetition was the best way to 
learn, and although the majority of participants seemed dis-incentivised 
by protocols. The concept that protocols are ignored or undervalued is 




1. “I didn’t feel like I needed to continue to refer to the protocol I think 
once I read it and carried out the process a few times it wasn’t 
something that I felt I needed to refer back to.” [P1] 
2. “I think yeah, who likes reading protocols, SOPs but they're one of 
those things that has to be done, and I don’t know, you could have 
perhaps had a log for people to sign after they’ve read the protocol 
or did you do that, I can't remember if you did that?” [P3] 
3. “I think protocols are quite difficult to read on their own so I think 
you kind of need to read it alongside while you're doing things so 
you understand why the protocol is there so I can understand that 
when it's quiet you don’t have the work to generate a problem to 
investigate so then you think ah, this is what we need to do and then 
you can read from the first protocol, so I do understand that.” [P4] 
 
Despite the general consensus that protocols are not positively accepted 
there was a small proportion of staff that were quite happy to conform to 
the employer’s protocol requirements (C1, 4-5). 
4. "No, I think you should still read the protocol when you're busy 
because even if you're busy, you should be doing what the protocol 
is saying so I think you should be doing that anyway" [P4] 
5. "I would probably agree that you don't have time to read the 
protocol when it's busy. But I would also say that if you've signed 
up for the study, then you should have read it prior to it being busy 
or you're doing your checking slot." [P7] 
 
In relation to the concept of learning through repetition, it was clear that 
at least a subsection of participants placed priority on repetition as the 
most effective way to learn how to use a new technology (C1, 6 and 8). 
Others were referred to as being "on the job learners" (C1, 7). 
 
6. “By repeating it. Repetition” [P2] 
7. “Yeah. It’s a funny thing, isn’t it? A lot of those are on-the-job 
learners [right]. So, you’re learning about something, and you do 
it, but to read through something without applying it at the time 
doesn’t stick, does it” [P5] 
8. “I’d say the best way with this kind of thing is to read it, do it, and 
read it again [okay], once you know what the job is.” [P5] 
 
 
Time to reflect upon the technology was described as being more useful 
than the time physically using the technology. Quotes (C1,9-10) echo the 
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reflective thought process of a typical pharmacist or accuracy checking 
technician. 
 
9. “I think reflecting probably made me think I remembered this from 
last time” [P6] 
 
10. “Usually in terms of the technical medicine checking process, 
technical checkers are allowed the freedom to learn a new way of 
operating as opposed to being prescribed the best process by a 
senior.” 
 
There was a perception that training in the second study was different or 
improved, despite it being identical to the first stage. (C1,11-13). 
 
11. “I think the difference was the training was slightly more robust in 
the second study, in terms of the information we were provided 
with.” [P6] 
12.  “I think the information provided the second time around had more 
pictures on. I don’t know if it did or whether I’m making that up, 
but that’s what I seem to remember.” [P6] 
13. “You went through a more thorough training thing this time.” [P5] 
 
It was also clear that being involved in changing the approach of the study 
may have encouraged better co-operation and buy-in (C1, 14-5). 
 
14. “I think the second time around people were more aware that the 
study was happening and that they needed to participate in it. I 
know that they knew they needed to participate in the first study, 
but people took more responsibility the second time than they did 
the first time.” [P6] 
 
15. “I suppose if you’ve suggested something you think it’s going to 
work and, yeah, you’re probably more likely to make it work, aren’t 
you [laughs]. I don’t know. But also, if you think it’s going to work, 
it probably will [okay]. If you ask the people who were doing the 
job, they tend to be the people with, I would say, the better ideas, 
because they’re doing it day in, day out.” [P5] 
 
At the end of the eight-week study in chapter 5, all of the participants 





The participants explained that errors, if they occurred, were not 
intentional. Although this is an expected result to such a question, they did 
admit to some errors in scanning (C2, 16-19). 
 
16. “I don’t think there was an occasion where I knew it needed to be 
scanned and didn’t scan it intentionally because it was busy or 
anything like that, I know that there was a situation where after I’d 
checked and handed something out I realise that I should have yeah 
but unintentionally but not intentionally.” 
17. “I know the reason why I didn’t end up scanning that is because I 
was rushing when I was checking it because it was an outpatient 
had been waiting so long, so it’s just the situation in dispensary and 
don’t know, could take more time over my checking but then I’m 
also conscious that the patients have been waiting longer than the 
turnaround time so…” [P1] 
18. “I think I very nearly didn’t scan something and then realised that 
it had to be.” [P4] 
19. “I think I didn’t realise they needed to be scanned, but then for 
some reason I suddenly thought, oh wait, that might be one that 
needed to be scanned and it was so then I scanned it…” [P4] 
 
When using the MAT, the staff developed a workaround. When a 
medicine with a 2D data matrix was scanned, the 2D barcode was crossed 
through with a pen. Placing a cross through the 2D barcode rendered the 
matrix un-readable (C2, 20). Often workarounds are necessary and 
inventive. However, it remains to be seen whether this workaround will 
be useful or not during full FMD rollout. 
20. "I think since then dispensary is putting a cross through that sticker 
so it's already been scanned out at the OUH so when it's first 
authenticated at the system the checker should put a cross through 
so then if you're re-using the part pack you know it's already gone 






Peer Influence (C3) 
 
The audio alert was not ignored intentionally, and actually, the audio 
alert had a positive impact on the team (C3, 21). When the alert sounded, 
which was only 4% of study cases not only did it draw the attention of the 
operator but it also raised the attention of the sounding workers which 
facilitated co-operation. 
 
21. "Never ignored as far as I'm aware [really] because it was a case 
of, ‘Oh, what have you got?' [Yeah.] And that was not only the 
person checking, that was anybody around it. It was a bit of a, 
‘Oooh, what have you got then?' So, a bit of a competition to see 
who got the best thing [right]. Does that make sense?" [P2] 
 
The following quote (C3, 22) is in relation to authenticating medicines 
(C3, 22). 
 
22. “It was a bit of a competition to see who got the best thing.” [P2] 
 
In response to the question, how did it feel when you were someone 
who was on the outside?  So, you hadn't scanned it, but you had heard the 
following comments were made. It was clear that peer influence was 
positive from a learning perspective (C3, 23-26). 
23. “…when the audio went off, people’s ears pricked up and they came 
over and looked at the screen. Whether that was because they felt 
my experience was lesser than theirs and they wanted to make sure 
that I was dealing with it correctly…. Which I suspected they were. 
I found it quite reassuring that I’d got support if I needed support.” 
[P6] 
24. “I think it’s positive. It made me think that everybody is now 
thinking that this is important, some action needs to be taken, and 
we’re all responsible.” [P6] 
25. "If anyone else was using it and it made a noise and they looked at 
it a bit blankly I think people would sort of help other people too, 
oh you've just got to do that, you've just got to write down what it 
says or whatever." [P10] 
26. “Yeah, I suppose it also would alert, if somebody else was checking 
alongside you and they chose to ignore the noise you would hear 
the noise and say to them that noise is there for a reason, you’ve 
got to do something about it wouldn’t you. So actually, if it was an 
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accredited checking process you would know that that person 
whether they’d done that or not wouldn’t you if you were the person 
doing their exam at the end because that’s what we do we would 
watch somebody checking something so you would be alerted as 
well wouldn’t you.” [P10] 
6.4.4: Impact of the Technology (D) 
On the Individual (D1) 
This technology had an impact on the individual and the team or the 
work environment processes. It was observed that the authentication 
process became part of the individual’s routine and didn’t appear to be a 
cumbersome or onerous task. The quarantine process was also not 
considered as being cumbersome due to the low volume of alerts. 
Furthermore, following completion of the study participants expressed a 
wish to continue with the MAT and new alert. They expressed the opinion 
that authentication became habitual and they missed the process as part of 
their working day (D1, 1-4). 
1. “No. Just was better, seemed to flow, soon got into it. You know, 
a couple of days in, you were sort of, like, just looking for it really. 
Now it’s stopped, you’re looking to see, ‘Oh, this did have a label 
on it, and it hasn’t [laughs].’ So, yes.” [P2] 
2. “No because if you’re actively doing something, and if this is part 
of the process that needs to be drawn in then it’s going to become 
part of your practice, I mean the fact is that if it alerts and it’s 
expired, or it’s not authentic then it just goes into a bin, and it’s 
someone else’s job to deal with that rather than so yeah.” [P3] 
3. “Yeah because you want to know whether this one is the dodgy 
one or not don’t you [okay] and then it’s not too much trouble is 
it because if you do get one that flags up as being unauthenticated 
like I said your just putting it into a box and it’s dealt with by 
someone else, so it’s not hindering you any further in terms of you 
then have to go and do this process and that process.” [P3] 
4. “I wanted to know what it was, so why did it buzz, what was that 
and then it told me it was already dispensed at the OUH and I went 
okay, so that’s what it was, fine, don’t need to do anything else, 




The MAT was perceived to be a positive aid to the individual during their 
working day. Despite the MAT system being described by one individual 
as being initially ‘overwhelming’ (D1, 5). 
5.  “I think within the first eight weeks, I felt a little bit overwhelmed 
by the steps I needed to do to check the product. I felt pressure on 
checking the product and knowing I’d still got to put it through the 
system, to make sure that there weren’t any alerts that came up on 
that. The second time around, I felt more aware that there are 
products elsewhere in the department, other than just in the 
dispensary as well, that would have stickers on. Like in the CD 
room, where you might have to bring something out of the CD 
room and into the dispensary and scan it through the MAT system 
there.” [P6] 
 
The time of day may a risk to verification compliance. When there is 
a pressure to complete dispensary work for the day, and workload is high. 
Working is likely to be rushed which may affect compliance, especially 
for part time staff that will be less exposed to the technology and how to 
react to alert which are likely to be infrequent (D1, 7). 
 
6. (Part-time onsite staff member) "I don't know whether that's 
because of the way my checking slots fell. Quite often my 
checking slots would be I'd go in at the end of the day to help 
support finishing off work. When you're put in a system where it's 
the end of the day, and the work has got to be clear, you don't have 
time to reflect; you just do it. If I'd had a more structured checking 
slot, I think I would have come up with that solution (The best way 
to scan medicines) sooner because it was part of my process and 
my checking slot. I would have felt less pressure to come up with 
a solution, whereas at the end of the day you just feel pressured to 
support getting work through." [P6] 
 
Effect of the technology on the individuals checking process was 
mixed. Feeding once again into the theme of learning, one participant 
explained that reflecting on their work processes was useful (D1, 7). Some 
staff explained that there was a limited effect and as discussed previously, 
the authentication process became habitual with some experiencing 
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trouble re-adjusting. Participants explained that this had a positive impact 
on their checking process when compared to the technology without the 
sound as it took away some pressure to stay tuned into the on-screen alert 
(D1, 8-10). 
 
7. “I think reflecting probably made me think I remembered this from 
last time. It didn’t necessarily feel that streamlined in terms of how 
I work. When I do a piece of work, I like to work through a process 
and know I've done that process correctly. I find it very chaotic if 
I don't have that structure. I guess I wanted to introduce that 
structure myself so that there was a process I could follow and get 
rid of the risk of interjection of errors or chaos." [P6] 
8. “It takes the responsibility away from you having to make the 
decision to stand and read it or go and check this when I know I’ve 
got the rest of the checking bench……?” [P6] 
9. “Having the prompt took away the fact that you didn’t need to read 
a lengthy procedure or protocol.” [P6] 
10. "It helped. I think if it wasn't there I would have scanned the items 
out and then may have just put them through without noticing a 
visual pop-up because it's on a different computer system than 
what I'm scanning out on and checking on." 
On the Workforce (D2) 
There was a perception by the workforce as a group that this HIT 
impacted them as a group. When using the technology one staff member 
documented that they often forgot to scan the controlled drugs. This 
comment was fed back to staff during the qualitative interviews. In 
relation to the workforce dispensing Controlled Drugs (CD's), they 
explained that CD’s located in the separate CD room were missed due to 
the distant between the MAT terminal and the CD room (D2, 11-14). 
11. “Yeah, I think I agree with that but not necessarily because of the 
extra checks but because there isn’t a scanner in the CD room, I 
think probably CD were missed because when you’re checking the 
CDs you have then got to take them out of the CD room to scan 
them, and if you were checking the CDs on the checking bench 
then I think you’d remember but because it’s disrupting your 
normal process for checking I think probably I think there were 
more that were missed.” [P1] 
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12. “When it goes live properly, you’ll probably need an extra 
scanning thing in the CD room to make that easier [okay, yeah] 
because you’ve also, physically, got to travel a bit of a distance 
from the CD room and so on.” [P5] 
13. "I had to, I went back into a few bags afterwards, I don't know if 
that was because I was going into another area away from the 
check-in, but there was sometimes when I almost missed like the 
[7:58 – inaudible] was it on codeine as well?" [P9] 
14. "Yeah that was me because you are going in there, you are 
checking the CD register, you're checking for the working copy, 
and then you come back out and put it in the bag, and you forget 
yeah I did really find it difficult with CD's." [P9] 
 
On the Work Processes (D3) 
 
As explained previously the staff became ‘habitual’ scanners and 
even after the study was complete they explained that they were looking 
for products to scan (D3, 15). 
15. No, I think we just got into a habitual scanning didn't we really." 
[P10] 
The operators felt that there would be little interruption in their workflow 
and that scanning would eventually become part of the process; with some 
taking longer to adopt than others (D3, 16-19).  
 
16. “During the first study my process was to check as normal but put 
the ones that I needed to scan to one side and scan them at the end 
whereas this time I decided to do it differently and scan each item 
as I went along so if I found that it needed scanning I would do it 
at that point instead of putting them all to one side. I think before 
I felt like it was disrupting my process to scan during my checking, 
but this time I think perhaps because I’ve been checking longer I 
felt more comfortable to do that, so I don’t think it…” [P1] 
17. "I think the first time I decided that scanning during my checking 
would disrupt my checking so I decided to put them to one side and 
scan at the end, so it didn't disrupt, but this time I don't know, 
maybe I felt more comfortable with the process but then I decided 
that actually, it wasn't really that disrupting, I just made sure that 
I was checking next to the scanner on some occasions you might 
be a bit further down the bench and have people putting stuff in 
front of you so." [P1] 
18.  “The second time around, I don’t necessarily think it did have an 
impact on workflow because it just became part of the checking 
process. The first time around, because I didn’t have a process, it 
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felt like it was a big ask as part of the work that you were doing 
already” [P6] 
19. "I don't think it's not necessarily something that we can't do it 
because I think it's just a case that we would all have to review our 
process and think which way round was the best place to have the 
scan so is it best to do it at the end or as you're actually just 
checking.” [P9] 
6.4.5: Technology Performance Issues (E) 
 
There was a noticeable issue with offline errors observed in the 
chapter five study. An offline error refers to an occasion when a medicine 
is scanned, and the scan fails to be verified against the NMVS database 
due to a drop in database internet connection. The organisation monitoring 
and maintaining the database were aware of this issue. When frequent 
offline issues were identified to the organisation overseeing the NMVS 
database, they were already aware of the issue as it was affecting their 
European clients. During chapter three and five studies, staff volunteered 
feedback and this feedback was put to the staff during these interviews. 
The following comment was made by one staff member ‘The most 
annoying thing is the offline error when you have to keep scanning’ The 
following responses were volunteered by the participants and were 
representative of the group (E, 1-7). 
 
1. “That is annoying” [P9] 
2. “Yeah, I did, and there were a couple of occasions when I’d have 
to scan something a few times before I’d finally get it to go through 
which was a bit annoying.” [P1] 
3. “I didn’t, no I’ve heard people talk about that.” [P3] 
4. “Well, it was annoying, but it’s technology, and you have glitches, 
yeah.” [P5] 
5. “It was that common for a short period of time, [okay] and then it 
was resolved and it was fine.” 
6. “That was really annoying. But then sometimes when you scanned 
it again you’d still get the error, but if you scanned it again, it 
would be fine. But I suppose if it’s offline it comes back online 
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again. That was a very irritating noise that certainly drew your 
attention to the fact something wasn’t right.” [P8] 
7. "We only had a couple of instances where it went off, and then 
there was, in the beginning, it went off but it wasn't an actual, I 
don't know was there a hiccup at the start I can't remember?" [P9] 
 
Table 6.3: Summary of considerations for the research, design and 
implementation of MAT’s and HIT alerts more generally, categorised 
by theme. 
 
Summary of Chapter Six Findings 
1 The characteristics of an audio alert 
The technical parameters of an audio alert should be user-friendly 
Compliance with the alert will be affected by how staff prioritise the 
alert within their unique context 
 
2 The effect of an audio alert on adherence to policy 
The frequency of the audio alert may affect whether or not the alert is 
ignored 
The perceived level of sophistication may affect alert adherence 
Those that use smartphones may to be more curious about audio alerts 
than those that do not 
New alerts may be influenced by other sounds in the environment 
Vibrating hardware could prove useful in a noisy or multi-alert working 
environment 
 
3 Auto piloting; Positive and negative 
 
An audio alert adds priority to an information pop-up and reduces an 
individual user ‘Auto piloting’ 
An audio alert helps to reduce alert fatigue 
An audio alert brings the incident to the attention of a supervisor or 
colleague which facilitates user learning and support while reducing the 
risk of the alert being ignored 
 
Point of care alert appearance and characteristics 
1 Coloured pop-ups 
Colours presented should be distinctive to prevent confusion 
When colours and text are presented the text is often ignored, and actions 
are based on pop-up colour. Therefore, a written message alone 
shouldn’t be relied upon.  
 
2 Point of care alert characteristics 
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Compliance is increased when pop-ups are perceived to be up to date, 
and the user has faith in the information provided 
A pop-up alert is most effective if combined with a suitable audio alert 
Existing audio alerts within the environment are likely to influence the 
success of a new audio alert 
Frequent repetition of alerts may encourage the user to ignore all such 
alerts 
The desktop calendar alert is a good example of a well adhered to audio 
and pop-up alert 
 
Learning and peer influence 
 
1 Protocols 
Repetition and time to reflect on the new process encourages learning in 
relation to new technologies 
Protocols alone are not adequate learning tools  
 
2 Errors 
Users do not knowingly or intentionally make errors 
Placing priority on one task above another leads to errors in low priority 
tasks 
Workarounds are likely to occur in a new system or technology; these 
can be inventive and useful in some circumstances 
 
3 Peer Influence 
 
An audio alert puts pressure on the user to act upon the alert 
An audio alert encourages surrounding staff to help the user with the 
process, providing help and guidance 
 
Impact of the technology 
1 On the individual 
 
Although initially overwhelming medicine authentication becomes 
‘Habitual scanning” within eight weeks 
Part-time staff working irregular hours may result in poor compliance 
with low-frequency HIT alerts 
 
2 On the workforce 
A technology for authentication medicines needs to be located within all 





Technology performance issues 
 
Offline errors at a frequency of 4.67% caused notable disruption to 
workflow 
 The themes discussed throughout these interviews have 
highlighted a number of research, implementation, and design 
considerations for MAT and HIT alerts and are summarised in Table 6.3. 
6.5: Discussion 
6.5.1: The Effect of an Audio Alert on Behaviour (A) 
The Characteristics of the Audio Alert (A1) 
 
The technical sound deployed in this study was a sine waveform, 
with a frequency of 530 hertz and sound length of 1 second, with the 
volume being between 90 and 98 decibels. This sound was well accepted 
by the staff and described as ‘not being annoying’ and fell within some of 
the technical boundaries of what is considered a good alert for emergency 
situation (137). This theme concerned how the staff group perceived the 
technical sound itself. There is some research which discusses the 
effectiveness of alerts in clinical information systems or prescribing 
systems, (138) but there is little or no empirical data within the literature 
which relates to the effectiveness of specific audio alerts in pop-up 
information systems. The participants in this study identified that the key 
to effective alerts is the ability to be presented with an alert and place 
enough importance, emphasis or priority on the alert to encourage them to 
act (A3,14). It is also important that the noise is perceived as ‘not 
annoying’, which was the case in this study (A1, 1-3). The sound deployed 
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in this study was unique within the hospital dispensary. It was described 
as ‘different to anything else’ and was an alert which made participants 
think they had to act (A1,1-3).  
The Effect of the Alert on Adherence to Policy (A2) 
 
It was clear that an audio alert played a part in an improved 
adherence to policy (OAR) (Table 5.2), but it is not clear why this was 
the case, and what contributing factors facilitated this change in 
behaviour. The importance associated with the sound, and the fact that it 
was a home-grown change may have contributed to an improvement in 
adherence to policy; a concept that is explored later in this chapter. The 
audio alert used in this study would alert for only 4% of the medicines 
included in the study, as well as any individual medicine scanned more 
than once. It appears from participants responses in this study (A2,5) that 
an infrequently heard sound is more effective that one which alarms on a 
regular basis which runs the risk of being ignored; a less frequent alert has 
more meaning than a regularly alarming alert. In reality, the frequency of 
audio alerts will relate directly to the prevalence of falsified, expired or 
recalled medicines within that country, or the compliance in staff scanning 
the medicines. An increase in the occurrence of an audio alert may 
increase the likelihood of an alert being ignored. Conversely, an audio 
alert which sounds very infrequently carry's the risk that the staff member 
is unaware of its significance. Therefore, there are different issues 
associated with alerts of different frequencies. 
Humans are naturally inquisitive. In recent years, we have become 
more and more familiar with smartphones and have been conditioned to 
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react with them when they alert. Perhaps this smart-phone mediated 
change of behaviour has augmented our inquisitive nature relating to 
sounds. When a phone makes a noise, it can be difficult to ignore the 
message or alert. It is in our human nature, now more than ever to deal 
with that noise. It is postulated that this has passed from our personal life 
to our working lives, resulting in audio alerts being more effective than 
ever at attracting attention and therefore improving staff adherence to 
policy. This point explains that modern culture of frequently if not 
instantly or incessantly checking one’s phones has conditioned the general 
public even further to associate a vibration or a beep with a positive 
outcome, information that someone is thinking of us and wanting to 
contact us. Perhaps this behaviour makes those with smartphones more 
alert to audio alerts. As the majority of the users in this study were below 
the age of 50, it is likely that they have regularly used smartphones in the 
past.  
Participants identified the concept of perceived sophistication in 
these interviews and explained that; 
“The first time I used it, it didn't feel so sophisticated. It seemed 
strange that an audio alert can make a system more sophisticated, 
but that's what I thought" [P6]. 
 In reality, this technology with an audio alert was identical to the 
technology without an alert. The audio alteration was the only change. 
Therefore, the concept of sophistication appears to be associated with the 
additional audio sound.  
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Too many competing sounds are likely to confuse the user within the 
environment however innovative methods such as vibrating scanners, 
keyboards or mouse could be used to alleviate this issue. Therefore, audio 




The quotes (A3,10-12) [P5&6] represent the opinion of the group 
as a whole and correlates with the quantitative ODR which improved as a 
result of this audio intervention; as described in Table 5.2. It appears that 
the sound reduces the risk of auto-piloting by adding priority to the pop-
up alert and reduces the risk of alert fatigue, an argument which is aligned 
with improved authentication and detection rates from the previous 
chapter (Table 5.2). As seen in chapter five, sound adds priority to an 
alert, especially in a repetitive working environment and it can have 
positive and negative effects on the individuals and the group as a whole. 
Positive individual autopilot 
There was a consensus that the audio alert caused auto-piloting 
streamlined the verification process and improved efficiency. The 
participants explained that the audio alert allowed them to scan medicines 
quickly without the need to take time to read onscreen messages. The 
quantitative data in chapter five has made it clear that the introduction of 
an audio alert has made a, significant difference to the detection rate of 




Negative individual auto-piloting  
Without a sound alert, a pop-up alone could result in a medicine 
generating a pop up and still being missed, the pop-up being automatically 
closed due to pop-up alert fatigue (139) or misinterpreting information 
resulting in poor quality medicines avoiding quarantine. Despite the ease 
of using the technology and the fact that the audio alert allows the user to 
work more efficiently while providing a safety net for auto-piloting, 
relying on the audio alert could cause complacency and over-reliance on 
an audio alert with little notice taken to the product itself or the associated 
on-screen reminders or pop-ups. This reliance behaviour may increase the 
risk of the operator not looking at the screen and further facilitate a 
behaviour of ignoring pop-ups alerts which do not have an audio alert or 
some kind of ‘active’ element. By allowing this behaviour to develop, it 
may negatively impact the behaviour of operators when using not only 
medicines authentication technology but also other health information 
technologies. Within this thesis, passive alerts were more likely to be 
ignored than their active counterparts, i.e. a sound alert (137). If passive 
alert information is routinely missed, as seen in previous chapters, then 
managers should consider permitting auto-pilot behaviour for the sake of 
efficiency in the process. Some may argue that audio alerts facilitate 
negative auto-pilot behaviour. However, when the primary outcomes, i.e. 
OAR, TDR, and ADR are compared between the study with and without 
an audio alert, it is clear that audio alerts have an overall positive impact 




Depending on the personality of the operator (in a general sense), 
their level of confidence, level of experience or time in the role they may 
feel embarrassed or reluctant to seek help. The participants explained that 
audio alerts which attract the attention of surrounding staff, snapping 
surrounding staff out of autopilot dispensing behaviour and prompting 
them to help their colleagues. This facilitates learning and creates a non-
confrontational avenue for assisting staff with tasks which they find 
difficult. 
6.5.2: Point of Care Alert Appearance and Characteristics (B) 
Coloured Pop-Ups (B1) 
 
Throughout chapters three to five there was quantitative and 
qualitative evidence that staff members looked primarily at the colour of 
the pop-up and not the information contained within. In chapter five, there 
were two pop-up alert types, an amber and a red warning pop-up box 
which both generated an audio alert in chapter five but not in chapter three. 
There were two types of similar amber alerts (Figure 5.5), one which 
required product quarantine (potentially falsified medicine) and one which 
almost exclusively did not (authenticated here). The identification of 
medicines which produced an “Already authenticated here” alert was 
common in both studies and resulted in frequent and correct pop-up 
closing. However, as it was the same colour as the pop up which required 
quarantine, it resulted in many potentially falsified medicines avoiding 
quarantine, which demonstrated a difference in operational detection of 
29% (Table 5.7) between the authenticated elsewhere (falsified) and the 
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red pop-ups (cumulative from chapter three and chapter five data). It was 
possible that the action of closing down pop-ups facilitated a sense of alert 
fatigue and sent staff further into auto-pilot mode for closing amber pop-
ups generally. There was confusion between the two amber alerts  because 
the operators looked at the pop-up colour and not the information on 
screen this resulted in medicines requiring quarantine being mistaken for 
those already dispensed on-site (129). This confusion worsened the ‘alert 
fatigue’ issue. 
Point of Care Alert Characteristics (B2) 
 
The “computer calendar alert’, which is a pop-up alert which 
generated a sound to remind the user that they have an upcoming meeting 
in 15 minutes, was mentioned in the interviews and was believed to be an 
excellent example of an alert for many reasons. It is associated with an 
established technology company i.e. the computer manufacturer and had 
a sense of sophistication due to the presence of a sound with a pop up 
which appears on screen. Furthermore, the information is accurate (as the 
data is retrieved from user entered calendar information), the pop-up does 
not contain much text and is not a frequent repetition of the same message 
i.e.  most commonly a new message for a new meeting. Therefore, the 
message is different every time; this provides a case for alerts which are 
kept up to date and occasionally changed in appearance. Furthermore, the 
calendar alert system is sophisticated, and the alert is active. Also, the alert 
is prioritised by the user as it is a message that they have inputted. The 
expectation to act in response to the alert is optional. Furthermore, by 
accepting a meeting invite you have already agreed and prepared yourself 
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for the alert and are therefore already accepting of its alert. An alert which 
is not pre-planned, like an alert to identify a medicine as being falsified or 
an out of range fridge alert can be stressful as the staff member is in no 
way prepared for this alert. 
The staff referred to old-style pharmacy medication recording 
systems and explained that the alerts on these systems were often old, out 
of date and unreliable. By comparison, the alerts for the MAT examined 
in this thesis were modern, and accurate which were well received 
amongst the staff. Reliability and sophistication seem to be key. Staff also 
identified other noises in the department as important factors when 
considering audio alerts in the environment. Staff also suggested vibrating 
keyboards and handheld scanners to decrease the chance of missing a 
medicine which required quarantine. Simple messages were preferred, 
with the frequency of an alert playing an important role in how well staff 
adhered to the alert. It is hypothesised that the effectiveness of an alert 
relates to the priority placed upon it, and also the personality type of the 
user that is dealing with the alert. Their willingness to raise an alarm 
coupled with their level of experience and ability to prioritise will affect 
the net success of an alert. 
6.5.3: Learning and Peer Influence (C) 
Protocols (C1) 
 
The study by Carthy et al.  (140) explained that protocols are common 
in the healthcare environment, but due to their volume, many are often 
ignored out of the necessity of time-saving. If protocols are often ignored 
or go unused and only form part of a tick box exercise, then resources 
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should not continue to spent on these tools and instead, invest in 
alternative methods of education or procedure communication should be 
considered. The concept that protocols are ignored or undervalued is 
echoed throughout many of the interviews, e.g. C1,2 [P3]  
“Who likes reading protocols, SOPs but they're one of those things 
that have to be done”.  
Protocols are useful for putting clear rules in place, but from the 
participant’s responses they do not appear to be a constructive way of 
educating staff. Everyone learns in different ways and the use of protocols 
alone are not the answer. Some staff explained that repetition was the best 
way to learn this new process. Therefore, this supports the argument that 
technology piloting before widespread roll-out is beneficial in reducing 
the risk of poor quality medicines being missed due to ongoing learning 
or teething issues. 
It was observed that the length of time using the MAT technology 
didn’t necessarily improve adherence to policy as authentication rates did 
not change between the first two-week pilot and the last eight weeks (stage 
one chapter three). Instead, it is theorised that time to reflect upon the 
technology is more useful than the time physically using the technology. 
There was time to reflect on the data collection period during chapter three 
and chapter five. This time to reflect has possibly facilitated a much 
greater effect on adherence to policy due to positive behavioural change 
that is not rushed or forced upon the staff which results in a more mediated 
diffusion of knowledge amongst the staff.  
174 
 
Discussed in the previous chapter, JKK or building quality from 
within ties in with Shojania’s concept that ‘home-grown’ alerts or changes 
to HIT may be more effective than those imposed on the operators 
regarding adherence to protocol. As one participant stated  
“I suppose if you’ve suggested something you think it’s going to 
work and, yeah, you’re probably more likely to make it work, 
aren’t you” [P5]  
or  
“Maybe they felt more part of that change.  They felt they wanted 
to be part of it rather than something that’s going on and they 
didn’t need to be a part of it” [P6].  
As the staff came up with the idea of how to improve this technology this 
seemed to have an effect. Not only did this effect the intended process for 
improvement (the quarantine process) but also overall technology 
compliance i.e. OAR improvement of 17.2% (15.2-19.3% 90% CI) 
p<0.05 (Table 5.2). Furthermore, at the end of the eight-week study in 
chapter five, all of the participants could explain that the inclusion of a 
sound was their own idea. Therefore, home-grown HIT alerts not only 
have a positive impact on the adherence to the specific alert but adherence 
to the wider technology within the environment that the home-grown 
improvement was made.  
Despite the obvious quantitative gains seen in the previous 
chapter, there are concerns that successful home-grown HIT alerts in one 
organisation's site may not be accepted on another. This thesis identified 
a number of examples where cross-site workers explained that they 
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perceived other sites as being different in the way they work. It was 
explained by staff that what works for a district general hospital without a 
robot, for example, may not work for a larger hospital with a robot. 
Beyond this concept there are cultural, regional and team dynamic 
differences across sites which may influence adoption behaviour. 
Although entirely possible there is no concrete evidence, either way to say 
that a technology developed on site A wouldn’t work on site B. It is 
possibly a competitive difference between staff on two different sites 
where one believes that their work is more difficult than another and 
therefore such a system would not be suitable for a more complicated 
working context. 
Errors (C2) 
In chapter three and five the staff explained that they never 
intentionally dispensed a medicine requiring authentication without first 
scanning it. The staff used a workaround which involved using a pen to 
place a cross through the 2D data matrix to ensure the same medicine was 
not scanned twice. Although this was effective, inventive, and helped 
when dealing with part dispensed packs, it would not be advisable long 
term. Although this reduces the need to scan medicine packets which have 
already been decommissioned, which is permitted under FMD legislation, 
it prohibits future verifications. 
Peer Influence (C3) 
 
As mentioned previously the addition of a sound impacted 
individual behaviour, but the external team were also affected by the 
presence of an audio alert. The team influence or peer pressure to 
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quarantine products may have been subconscious. When the alarm 
sounded, it may have created a fear of being considered by one’s peers as 
one who doesn’t appropriately act upon alerts. The influence of the 
surrounding team (similar to the Hawthorne effect) may have created a 
peer influence situation, therefore, facilitating the quarantine or 
justification for not quarantining medicines. Also, feeding into the theme 
of individual and team auto-piloting, this sound raised awareness to staff 
in the close vicinity, that someone has detected a dangerous medicine. 
Raising awareness, facilitated the identification of staff members which 
may have been struggling to remember the quarantine policy and 
encouraged more competent staff to step in at the right time. Therefore, 
an audio alert facilitates the raising of awareness of staff to their peers’ 
activity. 
6.5.4: Impact of the Technology (D) 
On the Individual (D1) 
Some participants said that when the technology was no longer 
being used they missed it, despite being initially overwhelmed by the new 
work process. Missing the sound shows that authentication in the 
workplace can work effectively even if it is at first a little overwhelming. 
Part-time staff have less exposure to alerts and the responses from part 
time participants demonstrated that it takes them longer to adjust to new 
systems. Infrequent alerts and noting using the technology regularly are a 
risk as it takes them longer to learn new systems than their full-time 
counterparts. The issue of part-time staff failing to authenticate, could be 
negated by more intense training for this group, or more frequent 
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revalidation as they pose a risk group for dispensing medicines without 
authentication. This is likely due to the infrequent nature of the alerts in 
this study (4% of all serialised medicines produced an alert). Therefore, 
the chances of a part-time staff member coming across a warning alert was 
reduced and therefore, so too was their chance of knowing how to respond 
in practice. As the WHO explains that up to 1% of medicines in the legal 
supply chain, are falsified and the majority of medicines are due for 
serialisation in the EU in 2019, it is possible that the rate of alerts will be 
similar in reality to the percentage seen in this study. 
On the Workforce (D2) 
There was a perception by the workforce as a group that this HIT 
impacted them. In relation to the workforce dispensing Controlled Drugs 
(CD's), they explained that CD’s located in the separate CD room were 
missed due to proximity to technology terminal. To mitigate the chance of 
authentication non-compliance, scanning terminals could be located in 
every dispensing workflow, i.e. every room where dispensing and 
checking takes place. Furthermore, in busy departments, there may be a 
requirement for multiple authentications stations within the same room or 
on the same checking bench. 
6.5.5: Technology Performance Issues (E) 
 
During chapter five, the rate of offline issues was 4.67% (Table 
5.8), and the qualitative interviews identify that this rate caused 
considerable disruption and was described as being annoying and 
disruptive. Chapter three, on the other hand, identified offline issues at a 
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rate of 0.44% (Chapter five, Table 9.0) and went almost absolutely 
unnoticed with no mention of it in the Delphi method study in chapter 
four. Perhaps this 0.44% mark could be used as a proxy for success in live 
medicine authentication across Europe in 2019; with 4.67% representing 
an unacceptable incidence of offline scans. Although the EU FMD states 
that the response rate limit should be 300 ms, it does not refer to offline 
issues, which can be caused by issues within the hospital, pharmacy or the 
central database which was largely the case in these studies. 
6.5.6: Effective HIT Alerts 
 
This chapter has identified concepts that appear to aid compliance 
to point-of-care alerts in the healthcare information technology sector 
which has given rise to the following schematic for effective HIT alerts 
(Figure 6.0). 
 



















Factors were identified by the staff to improve HIT alerts. The 
most important of which are identified in Figure 6.0 and are summarised 
further below. 
Active: Quantitative and qualitative results from chapter five and the 
study by Shojania et. al. (118) show that movement away from passive 
pop-up alerts and towards more active HIT point of care alerts may be an 
appropriate move. Active alerts that have, either a sound (for the most 
important alerts), a field in a HIT pop-up where data needs to be 
documented before progressing forward or some other ‘Active alert’ may 
be useful. Considering the effectiveness and suitability of active alerts is 
important if we are to combat the patient safety issue of auto-piloting and 
alert fatigue during pop-up alerting; an issue which may become more 
frequent as healthcare information technology becomes more 
commonplace. It is expected that other active alerts such as vibrating 
handheld hardware, e.g. scanner, mouse or keyboards are also likely to 
bring about advantages especially in noisy environments where multiple 
audio alerts may be confusing. 
Trusted: The second attribute which has appeared to be important is the 
element of trust, this is connected to the perceived level of sophistication, 
which if high can associate positive connotations to the effectiveness of 
the HIT but also the reliability of the information being presented. It was 
clear that out of date information or large volumes of information which 
is repeated too often is often ignored and facilitates the issue of alert 
fatigue. Trust is easily lost. Maintaining trust in a technology information 
180 
 
technology relies on a system which has adequate resources to maintain 
and update its content. 
Home-grown: Another principle raised during both quantitative and 
qualitative studies was the concept that building change from within an 
organisation is an effective way to gain user buy-in. The JKK model used 
in Toyota has been an effective well-documented approach which relates 
to the effectiveness of encouraging staff suggested changes to work 
process. Throughout this thesis, it is clear that developing a technology 
and being a part of the change is much more inviting for a staff member 
than following the direction to fulfil the requests of a manager. It is clear 
from this study that the staff knew it was their idea and as a result, they 
were more compliant, beyond the intended task (quarantine) but as part of 
the bigger process of medicine authentication which improved between 
chapter three and chapter five. 
Prioritised: An effective alert is one which is prioritised by the staff 
responsible for adhering to it. The user benefits from understanding the 
context as to why this alert is important, and if staff see value in an alert, 
they are more likely to prioritise it. The value may be a reduction in the 
risk of dispensing a poor-quality medicine, streamlining of a process or 
the facilitation of an existing task. Education and training helps users to 
prioritise, and this is best served through the avoidance of long and 
wielding protocols. Instead, more interactive and memorable education 






The qualitative interviews with healthcare professionals in this 
study have identified a number of findings specific to the context of 
medicines authentication and have suggested some concepts or theories 
which are more general. The findings from this chapter are likely to relate 
to any technical staff working in a healthcare environment using computer 
alerts, staff working on a production line relying on alerts to detect poor 
quality products or in some cases may be relevant to customs inspection 
officials at international boarders, or airport security staff relying on alerts 
to identify unpermitted substances in passenger possession. 
The introduction of an active alert such as an audio alert was not 
only effective at improving the detection and quarantine rate, but due to 
the home-grown nature of the alert, its benefits reached beyond the 
detection and quarantine process to an overall improved rate of medicines 
authentication; moving closer to FMD compliance and increased patient 
safety. There were a number of risks identified in this study which 
included workarounds (e.g. crossing through the 2D matrix to render it 
unreadable), part-time staff and end of day working. All of which may 
affect adherence to policy. Arguably the greatest concern to MAT 
commissioners should be the high prevalence of offline issues. The results 
of this study have demonstrated that a 4.67% offline rate can cause 
significant delays in the safe provision of medicines. According to the 
FMD, (18-19) in offline scenarios, the pharmacist must decide on whether 
or not to supply the medicine without prior verification. The pharmacist 
may feel pressured and awkward in this situation. There is a chance that a 
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pharmacist will supply a recalled or expired medicine without prior 
product verification. Thus far there is no information to help pharmacists 
understand their legal liability regarding this situation. 
The ironies of automation, by Bainbridge in 1983 (141) states that 
despite the marvels of technology, it is often labour intensive, and more 
so if not constructed effectively. Until alerts are designed, based on 
rigorous studies which measure the effectiveness of individual 
interventions, it is unlikely that hospitals will reap the full benefits of HIT 
alerting. The considerations contained within the schematic for effective 
HIT alerts’ (Figure 6.0) are worth considering when designing alerts for 
medicines authentication technologies, electronic prescribing systems, 
patient medication records and screening or identification systems in other 
industries. An effective alert benefits from being active, trusted, 
prioritised and where at all possible be home-grown or have elements of 
such. Having covered hospital digital drug screening in the previous 
chapters, chapter seven involves the creation of a digital drug screening 
app and assesses its potential use in the detection of falsified medicines. 
A convenience sample survey was conducted to learn about people’s 
thoughts and opinions on this matter and are explored in the online 








7.0: Digital Medicine Screening with a Mobile 
Phone App: The Online Medicine Purchasing 
Context 
7.1: Introduction 
The previous chapters investigated the effectiveness of the FMD 
mandated, medicine authentication technology approach. To recap, this is 
a digital drug screening process which will be carried out by European 
organisations with a license to supply medicines. A healthcare 
professional supplying a medicine will be responsible for the scanning of 
a 2D barcode printed onto the outer carton of a medicine packet. The 
information contained within this 2D barcode will then be sent to a 
national database (NMVS) and cross-checked against a list of known 
legitimate product codes, as described in Figure 7.0. The healthcare 
professional performing this scan will be informed if the scanned 
medicine has been recalled, expired, stolen, or falsified. Previous chapters 
focused on hospital pharmacy and how this digital screening approach 
could be implemented and improved within the hospital sector. An 
unexplored area of research is how this same digital drug screening 
method can be converted into a mobile app to allow patients to verify that 
their medicine is from a legitimate source, and how would such an 
approach be accepted by consumers. This would be useful for patients 
buying medicines from unreliable sources in LMIC’s and online. These 
apps could also provide information regarding how to safely and legally 
obtain medicines as well as providing drug specific advice for patients. 
Healthcare costs are rising internationally, with Great Britain’s National 
Health System (NHS) spending increasing from 3.3% in 1960 (of GDP) 
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to 9.9% in 2015 (142). Medicine verification could help to streamline 
healthcare services in the UK. For patients, an app would allow them to 
learn more about their medicines and verify the legitimacy of the 
medication they purchase. This would be especially useful for medicines 
bought online, which is a growing trend. However, there are many 
concerns relating to healthcare providers and pharmaceutical companies 
accessing patient verification data. There are issues around data 
governance, and rights of the individual versus the commercial needs of 
the pharmaceutical company or healthcare provider. This is supported by 
a report from Mckinsey and company, which identifies ‘ A few caveats’ 
to the use of big data in healthcare, and state that ‘ Privacy issues will 
continue to be a major concern’ (143). 
Turkey was one of the first countries to introduce medicine 
serialisation. Turkey also introduced a government app which allows 
patients to verify their own medicines. This app has been downloaded 
between 100 and 500 thousand times (144). The Turkish example 
demonstrates that it is possible for an app to connect to a national database 
or to a pharmaceutical company’s database of known legitimate codes. 
The FMD contains restrictions, such that, data generated by the FMD can 
only be used by competent authorities for falsified medicine 
investigations, pharmacovigilance, and pharmacoepidemiology purposes. 
Although it is not possible for a company to connect directly into the 
NMVS for the purpose of patient led verification, this could be performed 
by a competent authority, which might include a government organisation, 
University department, or hospital. However, there is the potential for a 
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private company owned app to connect directly into the manufacturers 
database of legitimate codes. This would allow a patient to scan a 2D 
barcode on a drug package and check the unique identifier against the 








                                    
Figure 7.0: A diagram demonstrating the flow of medicines and data as part of the FMD; including a communication path between 
manufacturers and patients (a copy of Figure 1.1). 
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 A medicine verification app for patients, if widely used, has the 
potential to generate a large quantity of data including drug names, 
strengths, quantity, and the geolocation where the medicine is scanned. 
This data could be of value to healthcare providers and pharmaceutical 
companies as it provides information on where medicines are being used 
and by whom. Similarly, the data generated from an app could help 
government organisations understand where medicines are being 
purchased and who is purchasing them. An app may also be a useful tool 
to send alerts when medicines are recalled, target patients on certain 
medicines with healthcare advice, or send reminders about medicine 
related check-up. 
7.1.1: Purchasing Medicines Online 
 
The problem of falsified and counterfeit medicines is most 
common in low and middle-income countries (LMIC’s) and online sales 
in high income countries (HIC’s). Therefore, the apps mentioned 
previously are likely to be most useful within these areas. This chapter 
will focus on how an app could be used within the context of buying all 
classifications of medicine online.  
Patients are changing the way that they purchase medicine. From 
1999 to 2003 in the US there was an increase in online sales of prescription 
drugs from $160 million to $3.2 billion (145). The behaviour associated 
with purchasing medicine online is likely to increase as internet access 
increases. In the UK in 2017, 90% of UK households had internet access, 
an increase from 57% in 2006 (146). 73% of adults had internet access 
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“on the go” using a mobile phone or smartphone (146). This availability 
to internet access has also influenced the rate at which goods and services 
are bought online; 77% of adults bought goods or services online, up from 
53% in 2008 (146). 
Consumer behaviour research on the topic of online medicine 
purchasing is scarce. This lack of research is surprising considering the 
rise of internet purchasing, the effect of poor quality medicines on health, 
(147) and the risks associated with buying potent medicines on the web 
(148-149). Online medicine sellers ‘overshadow the nature and risks of 
the actual products they sell’, making online medicine sales even more 
concerning (150). Consumers pay discounted prices (150) for medicines 
of all legal categories (Prescription only pharmacy, and general sales list 
medicines) which have resulted in a number of high profile deaths such as 
a 24 year old young girl that died after buying slimming pills online, (147) 
the death of a medical school student buying weight loss medicine online 
(151), or the death of the 22 year old due to an overdose of medicines 
bought online to treat period pain (152). Consumer behaviour relating to 
the purchase of counterfeit designer products is well researched but 
research into the behaviour, and incentives for buying falsified medicine 
is not (154).  
There has not been any research relating to mobile digital 
screening of medicines and limited research conducted which explores the 
behaviour of consumers who purchase medicines online. Research to date 
falls into three broad categories. The first relates to surveys where 
participants volunteer responses which, although interesting, often extract 
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data from small samples and on a local scale. Although they look at why 
patients purchase medicines online, the majority of studies, like Fittler et 
al. in 2012 (154) are quite basic and focus on a small group of patients 
(hospital inpatients) in specific countries (Hungary). The second type of 
study, such as that conducted by Orizio et al. (2009) (150) looks at the 
legality of online pharmacies based on criteria such as the identification 
of a legitimate address and whether or not a prescription is required for 
the purchase of medicines. This type of study flags-up non-registered 
pharmacies but does not cover the behaviour or attitudes associated with 
the activity. The final type of study by Cicero et al. (2012) used fake 
medicines adverts to attract patients who could then be surveyed (155). 
This survey was an example of an online medicine purchasing survey and 
went some way to answer questions relating to participant decisions to 
buy tramadol online; participants buying tramadol online were at a higher 
risk of adverse events than those obtaining the drug from a doctor and 
pharmacist. Once the subject clicked on the website, a message then 
explained that the website visited was fake and was planted by the 
researcher. The purchaser was then asked to complete online surveys. The 
data collected related to one drug, which generated results specific to one 
population sub-type. Therefore, further research is required to understand 
if the incentives identified by Cicero are applicable for other medicines 
purchased online. Other questions include what participants understand 
about the safe and legal supply of medicines and if an app to verify the 





1. To gain an exploratory understanding of the following issues  
o The motivations of participants to buy medicines online. 
o The knowledge of participants in relation to safe and legal 
medicine supply. 
o Participant opinion on the potential of mobile phone apps 
to verify the status of a medicine. 
o Participants views on sharing their personal data and data 
obtained from medicine verification. 
2. To identify potential areas for future research 
7.3: Methodology 
An exploratory research approach was taken. The recruitment approach 
was intended for scale and breadth. This study followed the Middleton et 
al (156-157) framework and used a convenience snowballing sampling 
method,  via social media such as LinkedIn, Twitter, and Facebook . An 
online mixed method survey was used. This survey included quantitative 
and qualitative questions including a video of an avatar providing 
education regarding the safe purchase of medicine online and how to 
verify a medicine purchased online (Appendix 7.0). As this was an 
exploratory study, the inclusion criteria in this study were broad and 
included English speaking internet users as described in the Middleton et 
al. framework (157). 
Convenience sampling has its advantages. It is useful tool for 
exploratory research in areas where there is little or no existing literature. 
It also has advantages in situations where resources are limited. 
Convenience sampling can generate large amounts of data in a short space 
of time. It can also be useful for identifying hard to reach populations, 
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such as  those that have purchased medicines online (158). The 
disadvantages are, that it is difficult to remove bias from the sample, even 
with large sample sizes. When using a convenience sample it is not 
possible to infer that the results represent the wider population, due to 
participant selection bias (159). There is also a  greater chance of outliers 
(participants that do not belong in the dataset) in the sample due to 
inherent sampling methodology (160). Considering the early nature of this 
research area, and the limited resources available, the recruitment of a 
randomised representative sample was not possible. Therefore, the results 
in this chapter are described to facilitate general learning and the 
identification of future hypotheses. 
7.4: Methods    
An anonymous online mixed methods survey, with a randomised 
response recording, was written by the lead researcher and piloted with 
members of the research team and acquaintances of the lead researcher to 
identify improvements to the survey questions. (Appendix 8.0). An invite 
to this survey was posted by Keele University, the University of Oxford 
and the lead researcher’s professional, LinkedIn, Twitter, and personal 
Facebook accounts. Participants read information regarding the study and 
ticked a box consenting to being involved in the study. Participants were 
asked to answer a selection of open and closed questions relating to the 
study aims (Appendix 8.0). Participants were also asked to view a video 
of a mobile app being used to authenticate medicines. The video showed 
the scanning of a 2D barcode on a medicine packet followed by a 
response, to identify if the medicine was recalled, expired, falsified or 
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authentic (safe to use). The video also contained a video recording of 
someone completing in-app questions relating to the purchase of 
medicines online. The questions within the app regarded whether the 
medicine was bought online, which website it was bought from, whether 
the website purchased from contained a common EU logo (a picture of the 
common logo was provided), if a prescription was requested or if medical 
questions were asked. The app then produced drug information for the 
patient to read followed by an avatar which explained the risks of buying 
medicines online, and how to check if an online pharmacy website was 
legitimate using the EU FMD common logo. The video also contained an 
avatar which was used to demonstrate how to verify a medicine using the 
app. This survey was live for four weeks (12/2/18 until 12/3/18). The 
survey was posted and re-posted through a variety of social media sites by 
the lead researcher, his contacts, and their connections. Payments were not 
made to participants.  
7.5: Ethical Approvals 
 
This study was classified as research according to NIHR 
guideline’s and as such required ethical approvals which can be found in 
Appendix 4.0, p 292. 
7.6: Results 
7.6.1: Sample Demographics 
 
This study attracted 227 respondents of which 219 consented to 
the study. The largest group of participants were aged between 25 and 39 
(n=139) (Table 7.0). There were more female than male respondents 
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(Table 7.0) and participants originating from 22 countries. The majority 
(n=195) of respondents originated from the UK, Ireland, the United States, 
and Australia (Table 7.0). A variety of employment status’s and levels of 
educational were covered by the respondents. The majority (n=198) of 
respondents were full time or part time employed. Full time students 
(n=14) and the unemployed (n=7) were also represented (Table 7.0). 77 
respondents had health insurance, 128 lived in a country which provided 
free healthcare, and 14 participants didn’t have health insurance and didn’t 
live in a country that provided free healthcare; therefore, they paid for their 
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7.6.2: Awareness of Illegal Online Pharmacies 
 
Two of the respondents correctly identified that between 91 and 
100% of online pharmacies were operating illegally; the remaining 169 
participants were surprised to hear that up to 97% of online pharmacies 
were operating illegally. 
7.6.3: The Safe and Legal Supply of Medicines 
The majority (n=217) of respondents knew what a prescription 
was. The majority could identify doctors, pharmacists, dentists, opticians 
and nurses, or a mixture of all five as the main professionals legally 
permitted to supply a prescription, however 21 participants didn’t know 
or were not sure and 67 participants chose ‘other’. The majority of the 
respondents mentioned either pharmacists, dentists, the NHS, or doctors 
as being the professionals permitted to supply drugs with 34 choosing 
other. The majority (n=215) of respondents knew that all medicines did 
not require a prescription. 
 Respondents gave many legitimate reasons why prescriptions were 
needed, for example; 
  ‘Monitor drug usage, … ensure correct medications are given’ 
[#60],  
‘To legally obtain drugs’ [#18] 
  To prevent risk to patients [#109]  






7.6.4: Purchasing Medicines Online 
Respondents were asked whether or not they would consider 
buying medicines online, and 132 said that they would. In another 
question, participants were asked, on a scale of 1-10 how likely they were 
to buy medicines online and the majority (112 of 219 participants) chose 
either one or two (Mean response of 4.35), demonstrating that they were 
unlikely to buy online (Figure 7.1). 51 participants explained that they 





Figure 7.1: The likelihood of respondents to buy medicines online 
with one representing unlikely and 10 representing highly likely. 
 
A free-text option from the survey allowed participants to identify the 
medicine, or medicine type that they purchased online. A summarised list 
of medicines, is included in Table 7.1. These medicines are separated into 
the three most common UK legal class’s, Prescription Only Medicines 
(POM), Pharmacy only medicines (P), and General Sales List (GSL).  
Some medicine classes differ based on the strength, quantity, formulation, 
and country they are purchased in. Therefore, the medicines mentioned in 
this study are listed according to the most frequent class for each product 






Table 7.1: Medicines purchased by respondents. 
 
 POM  P P, or POM 
 
GSL Supplements 
Antibiotics Orlistat Acne Cream Bio-Freeze Chondroitin 













































Inhalers  Sildenafil 
 




 Steroid Cream   
Ventolin 
 











There were a number of reasons why the participants in this study 
purchased their medicines online. Participants selected from a 
predetermined list of motivations for buying medicine online; 
 1. Physically unable to get to a pharmacy,  
2. I have to wait too long to get an appointment from my doctor, 
3. Was embarrassed about my condition,  
4. Buying medicine online is more convenient, 
5. Buying medicine online is cheaper. 
 The two most prevalent reasons for participants, buying medicines online 
were that is was more convenient (n=20), and that buying medicine online 






other responses were offered. These responses mainly focussed on access 
issues; 
‘The specific medication that is most useful for my condition is 
not available in my country’ [#82]  
Or due to their GP not being willing to supply the medicine: 
‘Dr will only prescribe two weeks of treatment, despite chronic 
condition’ [#35].  
The point relating to a GP’s unwillingness to supply was mentioned in this 
study a second time where the same participant stated; 
‘I was desperate as local GP will only prescribe very short-term 
treatment in low doses’ [#35].  
One participant also stated that they bought medicines online because of  
‘GMC stupid self-prescribing rules, and stupid pharmacists’,  
The same participant explained further in this study  
‘I can't self ******* prescribe because of GMC’ [#148].  
Of the 51 respondents that bought medicines online 18 of those purchases 
were for prescription only medicines (by UK classification). Of the 18 
participants, 14 were not asked for a prescription. From this cohort there 
were nine people that were not asked for a prescription or asked medical 
questions when buying prescription only medicines. One participant 
described his consultation as: 
 ‘A rip-off of a fake consultation’ [#148].  
There were some side-effects experienced by the participants that bought 
medicines online; these included: 






2.‘Actually caused lack of side effects which made me think cream 
was fake,’  
3. [#30] ‘Headaches, sweating, anxiety’ [#224], and ‘Fatty stools 
and incontinence’ [#224].  
Despite buying and taking medicines bought online, 12 participants 
explained that they were concerned that the medicine they purchased 
could be fake. From the cohort of 51 participants there were a variety of 
methods used to identify whether or not the website or medicine was 
legitimate. These methods are categorised as themes, represented as 
quotes, and are summarised in (Table 7.2). 
Table 7.2: Themes emerging from methods used to check the 
legitimacy of an online pharmacy website [participant number #]. 
 
No Checks  
None, just had bought from it (online site) many times before but not 
medicines [#17]  
The product is manufactured from the same supplier that a prescription 
could have given me. They are cheaper, and a prescription is not 
required in this case. So, the safety of the website is not a factor to me. 
[#46] 
The bio freeze company was the merchant of record [#98] 
I assumed it was safe [#167] 
None, because the product works (this is bad I know) [#169] 
Word of mouth reviews [#225] 
Reading reviews  
By looking for recommendations on online forums [#30] 
I consulted with a person I knew who was involved with the retailer 
[#99] 
Asked friends where they purchased from [#224] 
Using a well-known or reputable website or company  
It was the website of a pharmacy I used to shop when I lived there [#37] 
Bought through an online pharmacy that is linked to a high street 
pharmacy. They asked a variety of health-related questions [#156] 
Bought from Amazon, reliable source [#220] 
Other checking methods 






I conducted extensive research to ensure that the website was genuine, 
authentic, regulated and safe [#82] 
Research the company I was buying from. Check their address on 
Google earth, recognise the name of the company, ensure site was safe 
(Https) and not a redirect [#87] 
Checked their registration from link to gov (government) website 
[#198] 
Register with regulator GMP approved [#206] 
 
7.6.5: Apps for Medicine Verification 
 
Participants were asked how they checked the medicine they received to 
make sure it was of good quality. The responses varied from not checking, 
checking the packaging, or stating that the products were from a well-
known manufacturer or company. Some participants also explained that 
they used taste or smell as a marker for quality; 
 
‘I have had used Ventolin for 20+ years and would know the 
difference between real or fake, either by its effect or taste’ [#161],   
‘It smelled fine, tested a small amount of the cream on the watch 
strap clasp side of my wrist, didn't break out in a rash, so it seemed 
safe enough’ [#220].  
 
The key methods for identifying whether or not a medicine was legitimate 
was by checking the packaging, relying on purchasing from a legitimate 










Table 7.3: The measures taken to identify if the medicine received was 
safe to use. 
None  
None, had before [#118] 
Checked the packaging and seals  
The medication had my details, the packaging was sealed and secure 
and had the drug name on the packaging with no errors, spelling 
mistakes [#195] 
I look at the covering [#139] 
Checked it was all sealed and not tampered with [#215] 
Came in sealed RX bottle [#135] 
Checked the packaging and seals were in tact [#50] 
Testing  
Tried a very small amount [#35] 
It smelled fine. Tested a small amount of the cream on the watch strap 
clasp side of my wrist. Didn't break out in a rash, so it seemed safe 
enough [#220] 
None, I have had used Ventolin for 20+ years and would know the 
difference between real or fake. Either by its effect or taste [#161] 
Trial and error. Matched effects with those of known active agent 
[#224] 
Source assessment 
Most of the research I undertook was to ensure that the medication was 
safe including contacted the manufacturing lab and receiving 
information about the FDA approval they have and the standards they 
adhere to [#82] 
Collected medication from the high street branch of the online 
pharmacy [#156] 
Collected in store from pharmacy [#159] 
The remedies were from a well-known manufacturer or company [#37] 
Checked the online pharmacy was registered [#198] 
No idea. I wouldn’t buy tablets over the Internet. Maybe creams. I 
wouldn’t know how to ensure they were safe? Only on judgment of 
website, where they are based [#13] 
 
 
The majority of respondents (n=152) explained that they would 
use an app to verify their medicines, 44 participants responded maybe and 
23 said they wouldn’t; 
‘Busy life means that going to the doctors can be time consuming 






prescription online and be sure that the medicine was safe and 
legitimate it would save a lot of time’ [#163]. 
And another participant explained that an app; 
‘Helps to identify counterfeit medication especially when more 
online pharmacies/online doctors (Babylon/ push doctors) are 
providing services’ [#7].  
On a scale of 1-10 the majority identified the app as being more 
useful than not (Figure 7.2) and there was an appetite for the app as a 






Figure 7.2: A rating scale identifying the participants opinion 
regarding how useful the app is with one representing not useful and 
10 representing very useful. 
 
191 participants said they would scan their medicines when they 
received them and 19 said they wouldn’t, with the remainder providing a 
number of caveats as to why they may or may not use it. The participants 
in this study identified a number of ways to support or encourage the use 







Table 7.4: Summary of concepts to support or encourage the use of 
an app to verify medicines in order of preference. 
 
Promotion and Support 
‘The best way to encourage its use would be to get a big community 
pharmacy to endorse it like boots. However, would they? Not so sure if 
we consider they may well be advertising themselves out of a 
profession’ [#65] 
‘Promoted by all doctors that issue prescriptions and supported by 
pharmacies when medicines are collected’ [#138] 
‘App being free plus supported by government [#96] 
Cost 
‘Free access’ [#138] 
Education and Awareness 
‘More exposure on the risks of fake medicine’ [#12] 
‘Might work well if promoted, but people can’t be bothered to use it and 
don’t know the importance’ [#217] 
Data Security 
‘It'll only work if people are buying online. But people may be afraid of 
getting in trouble if their app data is shared’ [#111] 
 
The potential of using an app to verify the legitimacy of a medical product 
was put to this cohort. 122 did not see any barriers to using an app like 
this, 16 were not concerned about the risks of buying medicines online, 
and 14 didn’t have time to scan their medicines, 10 did not have access to 
a good internet connection, and 52 respondents gave other unique 
answers. Participants also identified a number of factors which may 
negatively affect this type of technology (Table 7.5). 
Table 7.5: Qualitative descriptive quotes of why an app like this may 
not work well. 
Age 
If older people need to get the app they may struggle to download it or 
people may forget to use is [#123] 
Lack of awareness or concern 
People may not be bothered they are buying fake drugs [#12] 
…If you are inclined to buy medicine online maybe you aren’t 
concerned about safety [#79] 
Trust and Reliability 






It may not work well if it is deemed as unreliable [#52] 
International Issues 
May not cover internationally produced drugs, my online medicine 
comes from India [#35] 
Being in a different country and not knowing the language or where 
stuff is made [#39] 
Requirement for further information 
I would need to know more about the parameters of its overall use [#41] 
Can you get in trouble, legally if you buy from places like this? Would 
using the app and reporting a fraudulent drug make the end user 
culpable in some way? I'm not sure I would ever buy anything that 
would require an app like this [#50] 
 
7.6.6: Data Sharing 
 
The participants view on data sharing were sought during this 
survey. This involves the scanning of a two-dimensional barcode on their 
medicine pack to verify the legitimacy of their product. Participants were 
shown a video of an app being used to verify a medicine and were asked 
who they were most likely to share their personal and medicine 
verification data with (Figure 7.3).  
 
 
Figure 7.3: Graph representing who the respondent would be most 
likely to share their personal data, drug details and scanning 
location (verification data) with. 
 
61.6% of participants would prefer to share their data with a 
hospital, 26% would prefer a University, 6.3% would prefer a private 






number of key quotes were extracted which support the theme that a sub-
population of the sample were untrusting when it comes to data sharing. 
One participant asked; 
‘How accurate can this app be and why should people trust this 
app?’ [#146].  
Another participant questioned the security and privacy behind the app. 
‘Confidence that the data you are scanning is not being cultivated 
by some out of sight online entity that is now keeping track of every 
drug I am prescribed’  
‘Super shady’ [#154].  
One participant summarised the views of the data conscious by saying  
‘I would definitely not use it if it was collecting personal data 
about me’ [#82].  
7.7: Discussion 
7.7.1: Sample Population and Awareness 
 
The most common respondents of this survey were well educated, 
white, British or Irish, between the ages of 25 and 39, in full time 
employment (Table 7.0). Over 70% of respondents (n=169) were 
surprised that 97% of online pharmacies were operating illegally (161). 
This result identified a poor level of awareness relating to the extent of the 
illegal online pharmacy problem amongst a largely well-educated cohort 
with access to online sources of information. Participants under the age of 
19 were eligible for this study but there were no responses from those in 
this age bracket. This is possibly due to the recruitment methods used. 






survey, however the University of Chicago identify that the most popular 
social media forums for teenagers are snapchat and Instagram (162). 
Snapchat and Instagram were not used as they are primarily photography 
based social media and would not be as suitable for survey dissemination. 
Furthermore, teenagers can be difficult to reach, engage with, and 
convince to participate in research. This may be due to their stage of life 
and the stresses associated with being a teenager e.g. exam stress, physical 
appearance, and friends (163). A larger more randomised sample would 
be required to understand if this is also the case amongst a randomized 
sample.  
7.7.2: Safe and Legal Supply of Medicines 
 
Many respondents gave different answers to describe why a 
prescription was needed. These responses included reasons such as safety, 
legality, drug addiction, and to prevent suicidal overdose with safety the 
top reason identified. These responses correspond to recent deaths 
associated with associated with purchasing medicines online, which 
include the young girl buying slimming pills, which had a toxic ingredient 
such as dinitrophenol (164). Another example was the case of another 
young person self-medicating with medicine purchased online who died 
from an overdose (152). 
 Obtaining medicines without a prescription and associated 
healthcare professional advice can have risks that the general public may 
not be aware of. These risks include interactions with other medicines and 






prescription carry even further risks which relate to the legitimacy and 
quality of the product purchased. 
7.7.3: Buying Medicines Online 
 
132 respondents stated that they would consider buying medicines 
online and 51 participants had purchased medicines online. The highest-
ranking reasons for buying medicines online were convenience (n=20) 
and cost (n=24). In the wider online purchasing context, cost and 
convenience are top reasons for buying products online (166-167). In a 
study by Cicero et al. (155) convenience scored low on motivations for 
buying Tramadol online, which does not correlate with our findings. 
However, this may be due to a reason specifically related to tramadol. The 
top two reasons for buying tramadol online in the Cicero study were 1. 
Difficulty in finding a doctor to prescribe the opioid medicine, and 2. 
Doctor will not prescribe enough; again, this may be a factor that is unique 
to buying potentially addictive drugs purchasing online. The survey 
conducted in this chapter identified one example of a potentially addictive 
medicine being purchased online. This example related to diazepam and 
in that case, the participant that bought the diazepam online also explained 
that he was motivated to do so because his doctor refused to supply enough 
of the medicine. 
I was desperate as local GP will only prescribe very short-term 
treatment in low doses’ [#35]. 
In this case the participant went on to buy this medicine online form a 






is a case of a patient bypassing the GP to obtain medicines, and this 
behaviour puts patients at risk.  
There was an isolated participant in this study who stated that 
GMC self-prescribing rules had encouraged him to buy medicines online 
 ‘I can't self ******* prescribe because of GMC’ [#148].  
This is an example of a healthcare professional knowingly bypassing a 
system and acting against the regulations of his professional body with 
disregard for legal medicine supply. Buying medicine online from a 
reputable source is not a problem if the website the prescriber is 
purchasing from is legitimate, however in this case the website used 
appears to be illegitimate, as the prescriber explains that the online 
consultation he experienced was a ‘Rip off, of a fake consultation’ [#148].  
 Eight of the 51 participants that purchased medicines online 
thought that the medicines they were buying were or may have been fake, 
counterfeit or of poor quality and a further seven thought they might have 
been. This highlights conflicting behaviour. Despite having concerns 
about fake medicines consumers still take risks. For instance, when a 
participant was asked what steps they took to check the website was 
legitimate; 
‘None, because the product works (this is bad I know)’ [#169].  
From the participant results in this study it is not possible to understand 
how prevalent risk taking is amongst those buying medicines online and 
what factors override the risks of buying a potentially falsified medicine. 
Regarding participants that are aware of the risks of buying medicine 






not be effective, and educational campaigns that describe how to verify 
the legitimacy of a website might be more suitable. 
Products like the contraceptive pill, the morning after pill, Valium, 
steroid creams, inhalers, hair loss medicines, sildenafil, weight loss 
medicines, pain relief, blood pressure medicine, and antibiotics were all 
described as being purchased online (Table 7.1). There is scope for 
information to be supplied to a patient at the point of purchase. 
Information could be presented in an app or video, which aids consumers 
within the European Union to verify an online pharmacy website. Many 
respondents took no precautions when buying these medicines online and 
others stated online reviews and reputable sources, as methods of 
checking the legitimacy of a website (Table 7.2). The data from this 
cohort suggest that there is great variation in this cohort. There are those 
that are aware of the risks, but chose to ignore them, and those that have 
developed their own methods for verifying the legitimacy of an online 
pharmacy website. Furthermore, only one person mentioned the EU 
common logo verification process introduced by the FMD. A mobile app 
would be able to provide information regarding a government website 
checking process and may also be able to provide other useful information 
at the point of verification. Future research is required to understand the 
level of knowledge surrounding the EU FMD common logo website 
verification process. In terms of product quality, consumers relied on what 
was perceived to be a reliable website, and often checked packaging as 






practice, are that a well-designed website or well copied packaging may 
not correspond to a legitimate website or legitimate product.  
7.7.4: Mobile App  
 
191 of respondents reported that they would be prepared to scan 
their medicines using an app like the one demonstrated as part of the 
online survey. 122 stated there were no barriers to using the app and have 
identified that the public would be willing to use an app if it was available. 
They considered this to be a useful app which was simple to operate. One 
participant responded to the question ‘What do you think needs to be in 
place to support or encourage you to use an app like this?’ with; 
 “Not much I would love to use it if it was available” [#33].  
In summary the respondents placed a big emphasis on the need for an app 
like this to be endorsed or supported by the NHS, government, or 
established pharmaceutical companies, with more weight being put on 
Hospitals and Universities due to increased levels of trust (168). 
Respondents also stated that the app would benefit from an advertising 
and marketing campaign which would involve online and community 
pharmacies as well as doctor’s surgery’s. According to participants the 
barriers which face this type of app relate to concerns regarding trust, the 
ability of the elderly to use the app and Wi-Fi availability. A participant 
was also concerned that there would be a risk the 2D codes could be faked 
(Table 7.5). Another important point made by a participant was that those 
buying medicine online may not realise there is a problem and therefore 






 Other reasons surrounding why the participants may not use the proposed 
app, include lack of awareness, ignorance to the issue of falsified 
medicines, trust or reliability in the app, or fear of retribution from buying 
a medicine online; according to survey responses. Although there were a 
variety of interesting responses there were no recurring themes through 
the responses as to why an app like this may not work. The only exception 
to this relates to data privacy and security which is discussion in the 
following section. 
 Some participants relied on the reliability of a website or the 
reputation of a company as measures of drug safety. Other participants 
checked the packaging; the majority made no attempt to make sure the 
medicine they received was safe. Some individuals used crude physical 
tests as a measure of quality, such as the taste of an inhaler, the smell of a 
product, or the effectiveness of a cream tried on a small patch of skin 
initially. Although the mobile app method is not an absolute solution for 
patients as it is possible for a 2D barcode to be copied, it is a safer and 
more reliable way of testing the legitimacy of a product, than testing based 
on taste or lack of efficacy. 
According to Bessell et al. (169),  consumers who buy medicinal 
products online; 
 “Have insufficient access to information and advice at the point 
of ordering and on delivery to make informed decisions about their safe 
and appropriate use”(169). This applies equally to medicines they buy 
online. Results from this study identify that a mobile app that both 






product may be a suitable solution to the issue of “insufficient access 
information and advice at the point of delivery”. As online doctors’ 
appointments and online pharmacy orders become more commonplace 
(170),  the need for digital screening tools to verify the status of a medicine 
and provide tailored medicine counselling could for some patients, help to 
maintain trust, and safety in the absence of the healthcare professional 
interaction. 
7.7.5: Data Sharing 
Some participants identified data control as an issue with the 
medicine verification app. The reliability and trustworthiness of such apps 
and the data they produce was also questioned. This is echoed in the 
results relating to whom the respondent would be most comfortable 
sharing personal data, and medicine verification data (geolocation and 
drug details) with. Respondents preferred to share their medicine 
verification data with hospitals (n=135) and universities (n=57) rather 
than pharmaceutical companies (n=13) or a private company owning the 
app (n=14) (Figure 7.5). One participant mentioned  
‘confidence that the data you are scanning is not being cultivated 
by some out of sight online entity that is now keeping track of every 
drug I am prescribed’ and described it as ‘Super shady’ [#154].  
This ties in with data presented earlier in this chapter which explained that 
participants largely suggested Hospitals and healthcare professionals 
should promote the app, in contrast to a smaller sample that suggested 
legitimate pharmaceutical companies should promote the app. Therefore, 






Hospital or a University when compared to a pharmaceutical company. 
Considering comments relating to data sharing, it is of no surprise that 
hospitals are the most trusted, as they already hold personal data for 
patients. This corroborates with data from the UK information 
commissioner’s office (ICO) which states that ‘UK citizens are more 
likely to trust public bodies than private companies or organisations 
regarding holding or sharing their personal information’. The ICO further 
corroborates the findings in this study by identifying that three in five, 
(61%) of the public say they have trust and confidence in the NHS or local 
GP to store and use their personal information (168). Whereas only one 
fifth of the UK public (20%) have trust and confidence in companies and 
organisations storing their personal information (168).  The idea of access 
to verification data has been mentioned in the FMD. In article 39 of the 
FMD it is stated that ‘The member state shall grant access to the 
repository…. (database holding verification information) to competent 
authorities of that member state’(18). Article 39 then states that this access 
should be for the purposes of supervision and investigation of episodes of 
falsification, for reimbursement, pharmacovigilance or 
pharmacoepidemiology studies. Article 39 does not mention the use of 
this data by pharmaceutical companies and therefore the sentiment of 
article 39 is reflected by the respondents of this survey as they state a 
preference for sharing data with a hospital or university ahead of a 
pharmaceutical company. This is corroborated by the UK ICO data. 
Considering this, there are still a proportion of respondents from this 






a pharmaceutical company, and it would be interesting to understand what 
motivates them to do so. Is it a financial incentive, is it a lack of awareness, 
perceived high levels of security, or some other factors? 
The EU horizon 2020 programme puts Responsible Research and 
Innovation (RRI) at the centre of research. ‘RRI implies that societal 
actors (researchers, citizens, policymakers, business, third sector 
organisations, etc.) work together during the whole research and 
innovation process in order to better align both the process and its 
outcomes with the values, needs and expectations of society’ (171). There 
is commercial potential for patient verification of medicines but it is 
important that any innovation in the area of mobile medicine verification 
is an example of RRI. Regarding the development of these apps, it will be 
important to consult with patients to understand what they want, to 
educate them regarding how their data might be used, or where it might 
be stored.  
7.8: Weakness in the System and Drivers for Change 
There are a number of obstacles to patient led medicine verification. This 
relates to database access. If this app was linked to the EU hub or a 
national hub, patients could verify their own medicines. This would allow 
the public to verify all prescription only medicines using an app. Currently 
this is not the case and would require government permissions. 
Alternatively, this app could be connected to the databases of 
pharmaceutical companies. This would mean that this service would only 
be available for some medicines. Both approaches could be funded by 






information at the point of authentication or other useful non-commercial 
material. Government could permit a hospital or university to connect 
apps to this database to allow patient verification. The app will require 
advertisement and members of the public may require incentivising to use 
the app. There are also concerns that mobile devises connected to national 
and European databases could compromise the security of pharmaceutical 
serialisation data. 
7.9: Limitations 
A limitation of this survey was the absence of a section for 
participants to record feedback relating to the survey; which may have 
been useful for example, to understand why some participants did not 
consent to the survey. Also, there were no stratification questions which 








8.0: Summary of Conclusions  
 
The SF medicine problem affects many industrial sectors and 
countries and poses a global health risk. SF medicine is an issue that 
affects healthcare, involving community pharmacy, hospitals and 
commercial companies throughout LIMIC’s and HIC’s. The prevalence 
of medicines fraud is increasing on a yearly basis throughout both 
legitimate and illegitimate supply chains, (172) and it is clear that SF 
medicines are more of a problem in LMIC’s than HIC’s (173).   
Substandard and falsified medicines are in essence a ‘Wicked Problem as 
defined by  Grint (2005) (174). A ‘Wicked Problem’ cannot be solved by 
bureaucratic and technical solutions. It requires adaptive leadership and 
policy making and the convening of new conversations amongst groups 
who can help progress. Such groups include healthcare professionals, and 
the general public.  
This problem extends beyond the individual who fails to receive 
the correct dose of active ingredient and can affect society as a whole by 
exposing populations to low doses of antibiotics resulting in multidrug 
resistant bacteria. In the current age of international travel, these 
microorganisms travel across continents. Therefore, antibiotic resistant 
issues caused by substandard and falsified medicines (SF) in one country 
can easily affect another.  
There is much work to be done in LMIC’s to identify medicines, 
establish SF medicine ‘hotspots’ and provide public health initiatives to 
educate local populations. Although not explored in this thesis, successful 






medicines. This leadership involves understanding financial and non-
financial incentives to collaborate, and bringing relevant policy makers, 
researchers, and government agencies together to pool resources and 
intelligence. The impact of falsified medicines regulations on pharmacy 
practice,  may require pharmacists to alter the way they work to comply 
with the incoming legislation (175). 
8.1: The Prevalence of Falsified and Counterfeit Medicines 
There are a number of organisations that conduct medicine quality 
studies which in part aim to understand the prevalence of SF medicines in 
circulation. These organisations include NGO’s such as WHO, and 
University academic groups that use laboratory techniques to assess the 
quality of medicines, largely antimalarial medicines in LMIC’s. Chapter 
one has identified that these approaches are often cumbersome, expensive, 
require a trained laboratory assistant, and are often destructive, i.e. the 
process of analysing the medicine renders it unusable. This is an important 
factor in LMIC’s as medicines are not always easily accessible. Although 
not ideal these methods are often the only options available in LMIC’s. 
Due to a lack of funding, and the necessary infrastructure required to carry 
out these medicine quality studies on a larger scale, they often yield small 
sample sizes. The number of medicines assessed in these studies are often 
too small to draw any significant conclusions. In 2017, the WHO released 
a report which identified the prevalence of SF medicines to be 10% in 
LMIC’s. The true prevalence of SF medicines in LMIC’s will remain 
unknown until significant samples are gathered. It is anticipated that the 






medicine quality in a given area would be costlier, and labour intensive. 
The emergence of medicine serialisation regulations, manufacturer 
serialisation activity, and healthcare professional verification of medicines 
could be the solution to the issue of low sample numbers. This will only 
be possible in LMIC’s that have widely available internet access and 
medicines that are serialised. 
 Medicine packs will be serialised with a 2D data matrix in Europe 
by February 2019 with a 2D data matrix and a unique identifier code in 
many regions around the world, e.g. EU, US, Brazil, China and Turkey. It 
may be possible for a healthcare professional or patient in Europe to scan 
this 2D data matrix with a smart phone and verify its legitimacy against 
the manufacturers database of known legitimate products as seen in 
Figure 7.0. If pharmaceutical companies fund the drug serialisation 
process in LMIC’s as well as HIC’s, the cost of verification to healthcare 
professionals and patients with a computer or mobile phone would be 
minimised. Although it is possible to copy a 2D data matrix of a product, 
once the copy of the 2D data matrix is scanned and verified against a 
database, the database would raise an alert to explain that this is a barcode 
that has been scanned elsewhere. This would trigger an investigation into 
both products to identify which was falsified, therefore this risk is 
somewhat mitigated. Verification is not destructive, it does not require 
intensive training and if performed by healthcare professionals and 
patients, it could generate a greater volume of medicine quality data than 






Chapter three and chapter five presented how the use of a digital 
screening technology resulted in thousands of medicines being screened 
for quality in a hospital over an eight-week period. This avenue would 
facilitate the systematic screening of medicines and would empower 
healthcare professionals, and potentially patients, to assess medicine 
quality in large numbers. The data generated from such a strategy could 
help health service payers to understand the true prevalence of falsified, 
recalled and expired medicines in a given region. Facilitating the 
mobilisation of healthcare professionals and patients through the 
provision of tools to verify the legitimacy of their products, if successful, 
would generate an enormous quantity of data relating to drug quality, 
suitable for inferring a prevalence of falsified medicines in a given region. 
This data could also be a valuable public health resource to target public 
health campaigns and could be used to inform national medicines 
regulatory authorities of SF medicine cases. Policy makers and 
government organisations could permit a University, Hospital, or 
government agency to connect into the UK NMVS with an app. Policy 
maker could be encouraged to use this medicine verification data, 
generated by healthcare professionals and patients, in a responsible way 
to understand more about the pharmaceutical supply chains in Europe and 
internationally. It is hoped that a UK government funded department or 
University group is established to analyse the data generated by medicines 
verification, and patient apps, and analyse that data to understand the true 
prevalence of falsified medicines within the legitimate NHS supply chain 






8.2: Implementation of Serialisation Regulations 
Serialised medicines are due to enter European pharmacies before 
February 9th 2019 in Europe. Other countries such as the US, Turkey, 
Brazil and China have already begun this process and further nations are 
following. Chapter two examined the impact of the FMD on hospital 
practice and identified a key feature of the FMD was the requirement to 
re-commission medicines which are decommissioned in error or require 
returning. It was established that this must be done within ten days of 
decommissioning, otherwise the medicine cannot be sold on to another 
organisation. This would have financial implications for hospitals and 
community pharmacies in the UK that are involved in wholesale dealing.  
Chapter two also identified the effect that FMD regulations and 
associated drug screening technologies may have on pharmacy practice, 
in terms of where in the dispensing process to scan medicines. Decisions 
will have to be made by hospitals regarding where to scan their medicines 
and these decisions will be based on the services the hospital provides, the 
physical layout, and flow of medicines throughout the hospital. Some 
hospitals will find that their only solution is to scan all their medicines at 
the ‘Goods-in’ stage, while others will opt for medicines to be scanned at 
the ‘Goods-out’ stage, namely as medicines leave the pharmacy to be sent 
to a ward as ward stock or leave the dispensary to be sent to a ward for 
administration to a specific patient. Both options will satisfy the FMD 
regulations, however it is anticipated that the most secure method would 
be to scan medicines at ‘goods-in’, ‘goods-out’, and at the bedside as part 






band, their drug chart, and then the drug to ensure the safe administration 
of medicine. This is likely to generate more value from the medicine 
scanning operation. Government organisations such as the MHRA, and 
NHS England could promote the value in using the FMD generated data 
to streamline purchasing and stock control within the NHS. It may also be 
useful for government agencies and relevant working groups produce and 
promote materials to outline a roadmap to FMD compliance for hospital 
and community pharmacy. 
8.3: Digital Medicine Screening Technology  
When looking at methods of identifying SF medicines it is difficult 
to avoid paying attention to incoming global supply chain regulations, 
such as those emerging in the US, Europe, Turkey, China, Brazil and 
Europe and beyond. These regulations look to use database cross checking 
and blockchain technology to support the identification of SF medicine. 
The NHS has often struggled with successful technology implementation 
projects and considering these previous failures, UK hospitals that are 
currently unprepared are also likely to struggle to reach FMD readiness 
by February 9th 2019.  
If managed appropriately, the FMD and its associated serialisation 
and Digital Medicine Screening Technology (DMST) approach could be 
a success. DMST success can be measured against a number of parameters 
which include OAR, ODR, and ADR. When the DMST is rolled out these 
parameters will show that compliance is not initially absolute, as seen in 
chapter three. It is anticipated that the Response Rate (RR) of the Digital 






however offline issues may pose a threat to medicine dispensing. In 
chapter three, offline errors made up 0.44% of scans. In chapter five they 
made up 4.67% of scans. It was only during chapter five that the offline 
errors were identified by staff as being problematic, and therefore a rate 
of 4.67% is an unacceptable level. When the DMST goes offline 
pharmacists will have to make a judgement call whether to dispense a 
medicine or ask the patient to call back until the DMST is back online, the 
frequency of this event will depend on the reliability of the national 
database (NMVS). This thesis suggests that in terms of OAR, checking 
staff are best suited to medicines verification in the dispensary, ahead of 
their dispenser colleagues. However, the margins were small and there 
were no statistically significant differences between both study groups in 
chapter three in terms of medicine detection (ODR). Therefore, if 
decommissioning of medicines at the dispensing stage works well from 
an operational standpoint, a decision to decommission at the dispensing 
stage could be justified. If introduced at the dispensing stage, PMR 
software could be configured to generate dispensing labels only if the 
medicines 2D barcode is scanned. This is likely to generate much 
improved authentication and detection rates. Each hospital pharmacy will 
have a different context and it is useful to consider this context when 
rolling out the FMD. Staff compliance to authentication, detection and 
quarantine processes has been shown to be an issue (Chapter five and 
chapter six) therefore any roll-out of a FMD verification system will 
require some form of staff monitoring. The greatest FMD related risk to 






is suggested that the UK NMVO could mitigate the risk of this incoming 
technology through contractual obligations with NMVS providers. 
Payment for these NMVS database services should be performance based, 
and financial penalties should be in place for excessive periods of offline 
instances. Without these penalties, the NMVS providers have no incentive 
to deal quickly with offline issues. 
Digital drug screening technologies do not require a skilled 
operator. However, they are only as good as the operator. It is unlikely 
that a technically accurate screening tool will translate into a 100% 
decommissioning or detection rate. During this thesis it is clear that human 
factors will play a key role in the rate of authentication (OAR), quarantine 
(ODR), and overall removal of recalled, falsified, and expired medicines 
from the hospital supply chain (ADR). It is important that hospitals do not 
assume that because a technical solution is in place that staff are 
appropriately identifying and quarantining products. In pharmacies, both 
community and hospital, dispensing errors and near misses are recorded 
and reviewed by management on a regular basis. The same should be done 
for OAR, and ODR through the monitoring of scanning data when 
compared to dispensing figures. (The same cannot be done for ADR as 
this would require knowing how many expired, recalled, and falsified 
medicines were in the system to begin with. Knowing this without 
removing them would be unethical) A national authentication and 
quarantine rate standard should be released and audits should be 







8.4: Consensus Studies 
This thesis suggests that consensus studies are useful tools which 
help a team to decide on the most suitable changes for their context. In the 
chapter four the consensus approach united staff in decisions and helped 
to identify changes which brought about positive change. In this thesis we 
saw that a consensus study was responsible for the addition of an audio 
alert to a DMST, at the point of identifying a medicine that required 
quarantine. This sound was largely responsible for the 13.5 % (Table 5.2) 
improvement in ODR and 30.1% (Table 5.2) improvement in ADR. This 
Delphi study identifies a number of other improvements for DMST’s 
which include reviewing the colour of alert pop-ups, encouraging staff to 
act on warnings, and adding a mandatory ‘action’ taken step. If these 
improvements were implemented in isolation it may be possible to 
understand the effectiveness of each change, which would contribute to 
the literature on the effectiveness of HIT alerts. Policy makers should 
consider the effectiveness of consensus studies when implementing larger 
HIT projects. Results from this thesis identify that consensus studies bring 
teams together and improve compliance to change. Stakeholders regularly 
report that they are not considered enough during HIT change and that 
change is often pushed upon them (111). In order to alleviate this issue, it 
is recommended that during the implementation of large HIT projects, 
consensus studies are reported to the funder to evidence that the opinions 








8.5: The Effectiveness of HIT Alerts 
When the quantitative results from chapter three and five are taken 
into consideration alongside the qualitative results in chapter six it 
becomes clear that there were a variety of factors that contributed to the 
improvement in authentication and detection rates in this thesis. The 
considerations contained within the schematic in Figure 6.0 (repeated 
below) may help with the design and effectiveness of HIT alerts. The 
qualitative and quantitative results showed that the colour of the alert was 
important and affected how the user reacts. The confusion between amber 
and red alerts was referenced by participants in both studies (Chapters five 
and chapter six) and demonstrated the need for clearer alerts in busy 
healthcare environments. It was also evident that ‘home-grown’ ideas 
were easier to implement than those introduced by an external manager or 
consultant, which was supported by the results in this thesis, further 
supporting the consensus study method mentioned previously. Involving 
staff in consensus studies is similar to the JKK practice used by Toyota. 
JKK encourages staff to make improvements, through encouragement, 
staff feel empowered, which in turn results in more ideas and better change 
implementation and compliance. It was clear from qualitative interviews 
that the staff were aware that it was their idea to add the audio alert, and 
some participants went as far as to say that because it was their idea they 
were more willing to make it work. Beyond the micro process of medicine 
detection, it is possible that by involving the staff in the change it also 
affected wider compliance. In this case the staff suggested audio alert 






scanned. The increase in authentication rates was not anticipated by both 
researcher and participating staff; this was confirmed in interviews. Using 
JKK principles to build in quality with ownership appears to not only to 
have motivated staff to be more complaint during the micro-process of 
correct medicine quarantine, but also had a positive impact on a meson-
process i.e. overall technology compliance (authentication rates) (OAR).  
Other factors which have contributed positively to an improved 
OAR, ODR, and ADR include the active element of the alert (audio alert) 
and the fact that the alert was not constantly alarming. As the alert was 
infrequent it reduced the likelihood of autopilot behaviour at the time of 
identifying that a medicine that required quarantine. It was clear from 
these interviews that Health Information Technology (HIT) alerts that are 
not trusted e.g. are not accurate, up to date, relevant, or lack sophistication 
are less likely to succeed than those which are. Protocols were identified 
as a poor method to educate HIT users and should be used less frequently. 
Instead a more interactive learning approach is preferred with the 
opportunity to reflect and re-try the HIT. Although there is a risk of staff 
becoming over reliant on the audio alert and ignoring pop-ups, this 
research identified that the OAR, ADR, and TDR all improved in the 
presence of an audio alert making it possibly the most effective method 
for identifying recalled, expired and potentially falsified medicines. 
 It was clear that an audio alert not only raised the awareness of 
the operator but also those surrounding them. This raised awareness which 






This interaction promoted help and education between staff members in 
relation to medicine quarantine. The interview data also suggests that the 
widespread use of smart phones which often ‘Ping’ and vibrate may have 
conditioned those who use them to be more curious to the outcome of a 
‘Ping’ or vibrate.  
Finally, from an operational perspective, decommissioning 
stations would be useful in multiple locations. Qualitative interviews in 
chapter six, show that movement between rooms for the purpose of 
decommissioning, disrupts the dispensing process, and increases the 
likelihood of medicine de-commissioning non-compliance. Therefore, the 
results from this study would recommend that there is at least one 
decommissioning facility in every room where medicines are dispensed 







Figure 8.0: Considerations for effective HIT alerts (repeated figure 
6.0 for reference) 
 
This thesis demonstrates the advantages of involving staff in the change 
management process. As Shojania et al. (138) explains, home grown 
technology or change can be most effective. It would not be feasible for a 
technology company to create a different version of their HIT to suit every 
customer context. However, if technology companies provided a number 
of alert options such as different pop-up displays, different sounds, or 
vibrations this would allow the customer to conduct consensus studies 
with their staff on the best combination of settings for their environment. 
This would add an element of home grown change in a pragmatic way and 






















8.6: Online Medicines and Mobile Digital Medicine 
Screening Technology 
In today’s society many consumers prioritise cost and convenience 
when buying products and according to the findings in this study this is 
also the case when purchasing pharmaceuticals online. The appetite for 
convenience drives up demand for medicines ordered online and although 
there are plenty of legitimate online pharmacies the vast majority are not. 
Chapter seven was conducted as exploratory research and aimed to 
generate hypothesis from the results to facilitate future research. The 
largely ‘well educated’ cohort from our sample had good knowledge 
regarding the safe and legal supply of medicines and took calculated risks 
when buying medicines online.  Many purchased medicines online even 
though they were concerned they may be dangerous. It is unknown which 
reasons compelled participants to buy online despite their concerns of the 
associated risks. Further research might include repeating this survey with 
a randomised sample to encourage those from different backgrounds (such 
as different educational backgrounds or ages) to understand their 
behaviours in relation to the purchase of medicines online.  
The app demonstrated in chapter seven, facilitated the safe supply 
of medicines from legitimate online sources through education, and had 
the ability to verify a product. In order for such an app to progress beyond 
the demo phase, such an app is likely to benefit from an awareness 
campaign backed by government organisations such as the NHS, and by 
healthcare professionals. Only one of the 51 respondents who bought 
medicines online eluded to the idea that they may have used the EU FMD 






‘Checked their registration from link to gov (government) website’ 
[#198] 
 
More could to be done to educate the those buying medicines online about 
the risks of this practice and how to verify the legitimacy of online 
websites. Another contributing factor amongst this cohort was the 
confusion regarding what medicines required a prescription and which did 
not. There was confusion over who was legally permitted to write a 
prescription. This coupled with a poor level of education surrounding 
which medicines require a prescription leads to a sense of perceived 
safety. If a medicine is perceived to be safe, then it may be perceived that 
a prescription is not required, which may lead a patient to buy a 
prescription only medicine online without an online consultation or 
prescription.  
Participants positively accepted an app for the verification of 
medicines and demonstrated more willingness to share their data with an 
hospital or university as opposed to a pharmaceutical company or other 
private company. This means that in this cohort, in order for an app of this 
description to be used and trusted it would require governance of a 
hospital or a university, with the former being the preferred option by 
participants in this study. Trust is an important factor to consider when 
discussing electronic commerce and it is likely that a relationship with a 
hospital or university would generate the trust required for a medicine’s 
verification app like this to be successful (176). 
Currently, at the point of receipt there is no systematic, cost-






received is safe to use. Giving patients the ability to verify their own 
medicines may allow them to be involved in the battle against SF 
medicines. Through the empowerment of patients, we can potentially 
understand better the prevalence of substandard and falsified medicines, 
and the areas worst hit. In the future apps like the one demonstrated as part 
of the chapter seven survey, which contain avatar education, provide an 
opportunity to educate HIC and LMIC country populations to the risks of 
buying medicines from illegitimate sources at the point of receiving their 
medicines. If patients have the ability to verify medicines, this will be a 
concern for any pharmacies that purchases medicines from illegitimate 
sources. The reputational damage associated with a patient self-
identifying a medicine as falsified may be enough to deter any community 
pharmacy from purchasing medicines from illegitimate sources.  
The problem of SF medicines cannot be tackled by one industry or 
discipline alone. The problem is best solved through collaborative work 
between government, pharma, primary care, secondary care, medical 
researchers, social science researchers, and most importantly patients and 
consumers. The problem of SF medicines is indeed a ‘wicked problem’ 
(174). It is suggested that government bodies could allow a secure mobile 
phone app to connect to the UK NMVS. This will allow patients to verify 
their medicines against the list of known legitimate products. This tool 
will also help the MHRA to record which online pharmacies are being 
used, and whether or not the medicine received is from a legitimate source.  
It may be useful that these apps and the data they collect are kept under 






data security. It may also be useful for this app to be supported by 
government agencies to promote usage by the general public and to 
maintain trust in the product.  
Legitimate online pharmacies could educate patients regarding the 
process of verifying a legitimate website, this in turn will help to retain 
business for legitimate online pharmacies. It is recommended that 
legitimate online pharmacies provide education regarding how to verify 
an online pharmacy website using the EU FMD common logo, with 
interactive educational videos or avatars. It is anticipated that this 
education may raise awareness amongst those buying medicines online 
and systematically educate those involved in online medicine purchasing. 
This may add an extra level of sophistication and reliability to the 


















9.0: Future Research 
 
Further medicine verification pilots may be useful to understand 
how FMD medicine verification could be incorporated into the national 
scan for safety project. Another useful pilot may be the verification of 
medicines at the ‘Goods-out’ stage, as medicines leave pharmacy stores. 
Further pilots would provide an understanding of the obstacles facing 
these processes. Other future research relates to the financial implication 
of the FMD in terms of drug wastage and resources required to facilitate 
the implementation of the FMD safety features, i.e. the 2D data matrix and 
tamper proof seal. Government organisations overseeing FMD roll-out 
such as the MHRA, and department of health could consider the findings 
of this thesis when advising on the implementation of the FMD safety 
features across great British hospitals and community pharmacies.  
Further research may include the assessment of the average OAR, 
ADR, ODR, RR, and frequency of offline periods nationally and 
internationally to investigate contexts where these rates are closest to 
perfection. From this data it may be possible to better understand what 
management techniques, or other contextual factors facilitate higher rates 
of technology compliance.  
Future research may include questions such as, will the 
introduction of these technologies and the requirement to verify medicines 
slow down the delivery of medicines to patients? and what are the 
implications of product serialisation on SME pharmaceutical companies, 
and how will the FMD effect drug shortages (177). From the healthcare 






management in terms of how medicines move around hospitals, how to 
improve efficiency and how to better alter organisational behaviour to 
promote improved innovation adoption of technology to improve 
efficiency. 
Future research may also include the trialling of different sounds 
to understand acceptable technical ranges for a certain technology in a 
particular context. Each of the parameters in Figure 6.0 could also be 
tested individually to see if they improve compliance to HIT alerts in an 
effort to generate meaningful comparative data to inform the design of 
future HIT alerts. 
Research in the area of online medicines purchasing requires 
further attention. This might include repeating the chapter seven survey 
with a randomised sample to encourage those from differing backgrounds 
and age groups to participate and to understand their behaviours in relation 
to the purchase of medicines online. It may also be worthwhile conducting 
a more randomised study which targets specific groups such as teenagers 
at school.  
There was very little evidence to suggest that the cohort of 
participants in this study used the EU FMD logo to verify the legitimacy 
of the online website they used. This participant sample was not 
randomised, and therefore a future study which randomizes the sample 
would be useful to understand if the lack of awareness of the FMD 
common logo seen in this study is the case across the rest of Europe.  
More research is required to understand the concept of ‘perceived 






interviews would help to gain a deeper understanding of the behaviours 
associated with buying medicines online and how financial incentives 
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Appendix 1.0: Inclusion criteria and selection process for 
study medicines  
The inclusion and exclusion criteria (Figure 1.0) facilitated the choice of 
a balanced cross-section of drugs in the study dispensary, ensuring that 
product groups with the highest level of medicine counterfeiting are 
included while also ensuring that medicines legislated by the FMD are 




















• Unlicensed medicines 
• Clinical trial material 
• GSL Medicines 
• Medical device without drug 
component 
• Medicines not issued 
directly to a patient 
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Figure 2.0: Decision tree for selection of portfolio of medicines. 
In accordance with the FMD annexe one licensed POM medicines 
have been included in this study. An exception has been made for a small 
number of high volume medicinal products which are not POM. This 
exception facilitated the inclusion of some of the highest turnover drugs. 
Products such as clinical trial material and medical devices (without drug 
component) are not covered by the FMD and coincidentally do not fall 
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into either of the two top 50 categories. Contrast media has not been 
included in this study in accordance with the FMD (annex one). Products 
not containing medicines, such as clear dossette box containers, a common 
non-pharmaceutical product which appears on the hospital patient 
medication record (PMR) have been removed from the study. Both top 50 
lists were checked for duplications, which included low molecular weight 
heparins and common intravenous fluids. General sales list medicines 
(GSL) e.g. Senna and unlicensed medicines such as Pentosan are removed 






















Appendix 2.0: The optimisation of a medicines 
authentication system. A study protocol  
The Impact of Audio on Counterfeit Medicines Detection 
Protocol 001: Research Stage 1 
Author: Bernard Naughton 
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Research Ethics Committee Reference: ERP 2289 
 
Protocol Version Date 
3.0 06/06/16 
 
Funding:  Keele University, Aegate Limited and the University of Oxford 
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Foundation Trust. 
Roles and Responsibilities: 
Primary Investigator: Mr. Bernard Naughton (University of Keele, 
University of Oxford and Oxford University Hospitals). 
Senior Tutors: Professor Stephen Chapman (Keele University), Dr. David 
Brindley (University of Oxford) and Professor Sue Dopson (University of 
Oxford). 
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A project steering group committee meeting took place on November 11th 
2015 at the University of Oxford Said Business School. The following is 
a list of all attendees. Prof. Sue Dopson (Oxford), Prof. Stephen Chapman 
(Keele), Dr. David Brindley (Oxford), Dr. Nick Scott-Ram (AHSN), Dr 
Lindsey Roberts (AHSN), Mr. Bernard Naughton (Keele/Oxford/ 
OUHFT), Mark Di Simone (Aegate), Paul Thomas (Aegate), Emma 
Pullan (OUHFT), Bhulesh Vadher (OUHFT/AHSN) Cristiano Ressi di 
Cerviav (Aegate).  
Apologies: Professor Sir John Bell (Oxford), Graham Smith (Aegate) and 
Professor Georg Hollander. 
Ethics committee approval is granted for this project [1].  
 
Background and Rationale:  
Prevalence: 
The prevalence of counterfeit medicines has risen internationally over the 
past number of years [2]. According to the Pharmaceutical Security 
Institute there were 2077 incidents in 2014, up from 196 in 2002 [3]. 
Although this may be due to improved security and detection methods, 
this statistic clearly identifies an increase in the incidence of 
pharmaceutical counterfeiting. Furthermore, it is currently estimated that 
1% of medicines in the developed world, 30% in the developing world 
and 50% of online medicines are counterfeit [4].  
European Law and the Falsified Medicines Directive (FMD) 
There is a range of legislation relating to falsified medicines in Europe. 






which requires medicines to be tracked to the point of sale using two 
barcodes [5] and laws in Belgium and Greece, introduced in 2005 which 
have resulted in mass serialisation of drugs by manufacturers [5]. The 
FMD was introduced in 2011 by the European Union and aims to 
harmonise legislation across Europe to ensure the highest standards in 
medicines authentication. This FMD legislation can be summarised into 
six key points (Table 1.0).  
Table 1.0: The key points arising from the FMD [5] [6]. The new FMD 
promotes non-invasive medicine verification and authentication. 
1 Serial numbers and 2D barcodes are to be attached to medicinal 
products at manufacture 
2 Over the counter medicines (unless deemed vulnerable) will 
not require authentication 
3 All prescription only medicines (unless excluded via risk 
assessment) will require authentication 
4 Tamper-evident seals will be required for all products 
5 All European pharmacies will be affected by this directive 
6 Manufacturers are responsible for the cost of the Medicines 
Authentication System 
 
Importance of study: 
By 2019, all member states must be fully compliant with the regulations 
set out in the FMD delegated acts; published in the first quarter of 2019. 






publication of the delegated acts and will require significant learning 
before the 2019 deadline [7][8]. 
The European Medicines Verification Organisation (EMVO) has 
recommended three national blueprint systems to provide verification 
services throughout Europe. These providers are Aegate Ltd, Arvato and 
Solidsoft Reply.  
The introduction of MAS has proven to be a suitable option for medicines 
authentication in secondary care however some issues have been raised in 
terms of authentication and therefore detection rates. It is of vital 
importance to optimise the medicines authentication technology (MAT) 
in preparation for the 2019 deadline in order to facilitate a fluid transition. 
In Q3 2015 a service evaluation project was conducted by this research 
team to evaluate a medicines authentication system in an effort to 
understand the process, how it would affect hospital practice and to 
identify any issues that may influence its effective implementation. 
 It is critical to build on and improve the medicines authentication process 
and to establish best practice for medicine authentication in secondary 
care before the 2019 deadline [7][8]. 
Choice of comparators: A dispensary in a district general hospital, part of 
a larger NHS foundation UK trust UK hospital, with a standard medicines 
authentication system and the same site with the same system altered to 
create an audio sound to alert staff when a potentially unsafe medicine has 








Research hypothesis:  
The inclusion of audio sounds triggered by the authentication of 
counterfeit or unsafe medicine improves the authentication and detection 
rate of counterfeit medicines 
Null hypothesis: 
 The inclusion of an audio sound does not improve the authentication and 
detection of counterfeit medicines. 
Primary objective: 
To identify the authentication and detection rates of a counterfeit, recalled 
or expired medicines over an 8-week period with an audible sound 
notification and compare this to the identical scenario without an audible 
sound notification (service evaluation stage). 
Secondary objectives: 
To identify reasons for less than 100% authentication/detection rate(s). 
To identify commonly un-detected medicines 
MAT down time 
MAT response time 
To identify the incidence of false positives 
Methods: 
Study setting – A district general hospital that spans a wide range of 
medical and surgical wards with specialist treatment areas including 
Cancer, Renal, Coronary Care and Paediatrics.  
Product identification: 
A small unpublished audit of medicines was undertaken at the pilot site 






compliant 2D data matrix code (2D code) printed on the product by the 
manufacturer. This number was deemed insufficient to capture the data 
required for the study. Therefore, serialised adhesive 2D code labels must 
be created* (Appendix 1.0. Point 9), accompanied by a database (from this 
point onwards referred to as “the database”) detailing data for each 
adhesive label. This database must be maintained by the site researcher 
under password protection and backed up on a weekly basis by the site 
researcher. 
Researcher labelling procedure 
2D code labels must be attached to selected products (Appendix 2); the 
barcode database must be updated to document the product name, form, 
strength and pack size of the labelled product. 
To identify inclusion in the study a small purple label (Appendix 1.0, Point 
6) must be placed beside the expiry date of each selected product line 
(Appendix 2.0). 
2D codes must be placed on products using the following hierarchy: 
1. Beside the expiry and batch number 
2. On the opposite edge to the expiry and batch number  
3. An area without text  
4. In the rare circumstance that text is covered, this text must be repeated 
on at least one other location on the packet. 
A single 2D barcode label was placed on the outer container of medicines 
that contained numerous medication vials. 
3Restrictions: 
                                               






Labels must be attached to all available products in each location on 
Monday and Wednesday between 7:00am and 14:00 every week. These 
criteria have proven to be appropriate in the pilot study. 
96% of medicines labelled are to contain pre-programmed 2D code labels 
identifying the product as “Authenticated” or safe. In order to simulate the 
detection of products with warnings, 1% of medicines are to contain a pre-
programmed 2D code label to identify the product as either “dispensed 
elsewhere”, “recalled pack” (1%), “recalled product” (1%) or “product 
expired”, products with intentional warning labels are to be placed on 
randomly allocated boxes, in randomly allocated areas within each 
product location. Warning labels must be placed on both loose products 
and groups of products enclosed in clear plastic sheath to maintain error 
message label randomisation. All products labelled with a pre-
programmed 2D code containing a warning message must also have the 

















Study design:  
A Study to Understand the Effects of Audio Alerts on the Authentication 
and Detection of Counterfeit Medicines 
  
Figure 1:0: Schematic to illustrate the study design and to 
demonstrate that both the service evaluation and research stages 
occurred sequentially (i.e. not in parallel). Please note that research 
stages one and two will involve the comparison of results with those 














Study timeline:  
Table 2.0: Medicine authentication study research stage one 
 
Stage one: 
Week -2: An educational presentation will be followed by the consent 
procedure. Consent forms must be signed before week one of the study. 
This process will be supported by the chief pharmacist. 
Week 1-6: The study must begin officially at the checking stage by 
qualified checking staff. Labels must be attached as per restrictions above 
including 4% of warning labels (1% x each of the 4 warning categories). 
A copy of the protocol must be attached to an email to all Horton Hospital 
pharmacy staff to introduce stage 1 of the project. 
Week 7-8: No further labels are to be attached and a two-week wash-out 
period must be permitted to minimise the number of test products 
remaining in the dispensary. On Friday of week 8 all remaining products 
on the shelf must be recorded on the database. (Research Stage 1 is to be 
conducted for a total of 8 weeks) 
 
Expected results: 
Research data will include data entered into the system, data retrieved by 






The following results will be achieved for stage 1. 
Quantitative results will include: 
1. Operational Authentication Rate (%) (OAR) 
2. Technical Detection Rate (%) (TDR), Operational Detection 
Rates (ODR1 and ODR2) (%) 
3. Identification of commonly un-authenticated medicines 
4. Identification of commonly un-detected medicines 
5. MAS down time 
6. MAS response time 
7. Incidence of false positives 
 
The results of this study are expected to be published in the first quarter 
of 2017. This protocol was produced in line with the spirit checklist [9]. 
Participant requirements                          
Manual authentication procedure- falsified, expired and recalled 
medicines 
1. Start up the desktop computer (p.c) on the checking bench. 
2. Log on to the p.c using user name and password. 
3. On the desktop, select the patient medication record software 
(PMR) icon and sign in using username and password. 
4. Select the Aegate function. 
5. This will bring up a grey screen, with two input fields labelled 








Figure 1.0: Screenshot displaying data input fields 
6. Only products with a small purple label beside the expiry date are 
included in this study. 
 
Figure 2.0: Image showing the purple sticker attached to study 
medicines 
 
7. It is advised that scanning of all products is completed before 
starting the professional checking process. 
 
8. If the product you are checking contains a small purple label (point 
6) simply scan the EAN barcode on the box (see below), this 








Figure 3.0: The barcode which must be scanned initially  
9. Scan the 2D barcode box which will be located next to or at the 
opposite end to the expiry date and batch number (see below) 
(Please note that the cursor should automatically begin in the EAN 




Figure 4.0: The 2D data matrix to be scanned directly after 
linear barcode scanning 
 
10. Once the 2D barcode is scanned a small purple Aegate symbol 
beside the 2D barcode field will appear to highlight the medicine 
as authenticated. This symbol can be double clicked to expand 

















If the product is suspicious, expired, batch recalled, product 
recalled, dispensed elsewhere, then a large Red message will 
pop up to indicate the status of the medicine. If the product is a 
split pack it is likely that it will have already been authenticated 
at this dispensary and will therefore display Amber message 
stating “Already dispensed here” (This product is safe to be 




Figure 6.0: A screenshot displaying the type of message which 
appears. 
 
11. All products authenticated that day will remain on screen until the 
application is closed. This gives the operator an option to recheck 
product status by double clicking on the product scanned on 
screen. 
12. A message may appear to say “Item scan is invalid please scan 
product again") if this occurs please close PMR software and re-
open as per protocol. When re-opened please re-scan the product 
to ensure the product has been scanned. If the system declares that 






the initial message was transmitted. In this instance please 
highlight the product in question and click undo. 
13. If a red warning message appears after 2D scanning then remove 
the product and place in the quarantine area.                                         
14. If the product scanned with warning is the last of its kind in the 
dispensary and is for urgent use then simply write down the 2D 
barcode information on the log of medicines with warning (Or 
remove 2D barcode sticker if possible and place on the list) also 
detailing the product name, strength, formulation and if otherwise 
suitable dispense as normal. (The 2D barcodes on these products 
contain pre-programmed messages and do not relate to the real 
status of the medicine). If the medicine is otherwise fit for delivery 
to the patient according to departmental procedure checks then this 
medicine can be checked and delivered to the patient. 
16. If a product is authenticated in error or requires returning to stock 
please highlight the product in question and press the undo button. The 
product will remain on screen but will be classed as not verified. 
 
 
Figure 7.0: A screenshot identifying the ‘Undo’ button, requiring to 






Please note: Scanning is only necessary for products that contain a purple 
sticker beside their expiry date and a 2D label on their product box. 
Please note: Some medicine containers may have two 2D labels, one 
printed onto the box by the manufacturer and one fixed to the box by the 
researcher. Please only scan the larger adhesive label. Please see service 
log below and record service errors, feedback/complaints, log of 
medicines with warnings or medicines dispensed as stock without being 
authenticated. 
Service Logs 
Log of service errors or incidents 







Log of complaints or feedback 













Log of medicines with warnings / Products issued as stock and labels 
removed  
Medicine name and 
Warning/removed as stock 





Table 1.0: Total portfolio of medicines included in study. 
Value  Volume Dispensed 
Afatanib 40mg injection Paracetamol 500mg tablets  
Aflibercept injection 40mg/ml Codeine 30mg tablets 
Bosutinib 500mg injection  Omeprazole 20mg capsules 
Botulinum toxin type A 
injection 100 units 
Prednisolone 5mg tablets 
Darbopoetin alpha 300 mcg 
injection 
Co-amoxiclav 625mg tablets 
Dexamethasone 2mg tabs  Macrogol 3350 sachets 13.125g 
Ferric Carboxymaltose 
injection 50mg/ml 
Lactulose 300 ml liquid 10g/15ml 
Infliximab 100mg infusion Dalteparin 5000 units syringe 
Lenalidomide 10mg tablets Aspirin 75mg tablets 
Lenalidomide 25mg tablets Ibuprofen 400mg tablets 







Pomalidamide 1mg tablets Adcal d3 tablets 1500mg/ 400 units 
Rivaroxaban 15mg tablets Salbutamol inhaler 100mcg 
Trastuzumab 600mg injection Morphine Sulphate 10mg/5ml 
solution 
Pentosan polysulphate 100mg 
capsules           
Tramadol 50mg capsules 
 
This table lists the top 15 products by value and top 15 products by 
transaction, extracted from the initial portfolio of 87 lines. This range of 
medicines contains the most highly counterfeiting medicine categories by 
clinical indication, which includes oncology/cytostatics, musculoskeletal, 










The Optimisation of a Medicines Authentication Technology 
The impact of a robotic dispensing system on the detection of 
counterfeit medicines (Proposed but not conducted) 
Protocol 002: Research Stage 2 
Author: Bernard Naughton 
Protocol Version Date 
3.0 06/0/15 
 
Funding:  Aegate Ltd, Keele University and the University of Oxford. 
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Roles and Responsibilities: 
Primary Investigator: Mr. Bernard Naughton (University of Keele, 
University of Oxford and Oxford University Hospitals). 
Senior Tutors: Professor Stephen Chapman (Keele University) and Dr. 
David Brindley (University of Oxford) 
Commercial Sponsor Representative: Mr. Paul Thomas (Aegate Ltd). 
AHSN Representative: Dr. Lindsey Roberts. 
OUHFT Representatives: Mrs. Emma Pullan and Mr. Bhulesh Vadher. 
Pilot Sponsor: Keele University 
The funding source provider had no role in the design of this study, 





A steering group committee meeting took place on November 11th 2015 
at the University of Oxford Said Business School. The following is a list 
of all attendees. Prof. Sue Dopson (Oxford), Prof. Stephen Chapman 
(Keele), Dr. David Brindley (Oxford), Dr. Nick Scott-Ram (AHSN), Dr 
Lindsey Roberts (AHSN), Mr. Bernard Naughton (Keele/Oxford/ 
OUHFT), Mark Di Simone (Aegate), Paul Thomas (Aegate), Emma 
Pullan (OUHFT), Bhulesh Vadher (OUHFT/AHSN) Cristiano Ressi di 
Cerviav (Aegate).  
Apologies: Professor Sir John Bell (Oxford), Graham Smith (Aegate) and 
Professor Georg Hollander. 
Ethics approval: TBC 
Background and Rationale:  
See protocol 001. 
Methods: 
Study Setting – A large teaching hospital with robotic dispensing system. 
Product Identification: 
See protocol 001 
Labelling Procedure 











Pilot design:  





Figure 1:0: Schematic to illustrate the study design and to 
demonstrate that both service evaluation and research stages are 














Study Timeline:  





Week -2: An educational presentation will be followed by the consent 
procedure. Consent forms must be signed before week one of the study. 
This process will be supported by the chief pharmacist. 
Week 1-6: The study must begin officially at the checking stage by 
qualified checking staff (the same group type involved in stage one). 
Labels must be attached as per restrictions above including 4% of warning 
labels (1% x each of the 4 warning categories). A copy of the protocol 
must be attached to an email to all Horton Hospital pharmacy staff to 
introduce research stage 2 of the project during week 3. 
Week 7-8: No further labels are to be attached and a two-week wash-out 
period must be permitted to minimise the number of test products 
remaining in the dispensary. On Friday of week 8 all remaining products 
on the shelf must be recorded on the database. (Authentication at the 





The robot dispensing system will automatically authenticate each 
medicine as it is dispensed from the robotic unit. If a medicine containing 
a pre-programmed error code is scanned it will alert staff. The robot will 
remove the product from the unit and place it in a separate area with a 
label affixed highlighting the product as potentially dangerous. The 
accredited checking staff will then remove the product and place it in a 
quarantine area. See robotic authentication procedure below. 
Expected results: 
Output will include data entered into the system, data retrieved by 
authentication technology and data detected by staff.  
The following results will be achieved for stage 1 and stage 2.  
Quantitative results will include: 
1. Robotic Authentication Rate (%) (RAR) 
2. Robotic Detection Rate (%) RDR 
3. Technical Detection Rate (%) (TDR),  
4. Operational Detection Rate (ODR) (%) 
5. Identification of commonly un-authenticated medicines 
6. Identification of commonly un-detected medicines 
7. MAT down time 
8. MAT response time 
9. The incidence of false positives 
 
The results of this study are expected to be published in the third quarter 





Robotic authentication procedure: Falsified, expired and recalled 
medicines 
1. The robot will be preconfigured to authenticate any medicine with 
a 2D barcode and this will occur without participant instruction or 
intervention. 
2. Log on to the p.c on the checking bench using user name and 
password. 
3. On the desktop, select the patient medication record software 
(PMR) and sign in using username and password. 
4. Select the Aegate function. 
5. This will bring up a grey screen, with two input fields labelled 
EAN barcode and 2D barcode. 
 
Figure 1.0: A screenshot identifying the EAN barcode and 2D 





6. Only products with a small purple label beside the expiry date are 
included in this study. 
 
 
Figure 2.0: An image of a medicine with sticker which 
identifies it as being part of the study 
7. All products will be scanned by the robot and appear on screen. 
 
8. If the product you are checking contains a small purple label (point 
6) this will automatically be scanned by the robot, this should 
generate a line of text that describes the product on screen. 
 
Figure 3.0: An image of medicine EAN barcode.  
9. The robot will also scan the 2D barcode box which will be located 
next to or at the opposite end to the expiry date and batch number 
(see below) (Please note that the cursor should automatically begin 
in the EAN barcode field and after EAN scanning, it should 








Figure 4.0: An image of a study medicine containing a 2D data 
matrix 
10. Once the 2D barcode is scanned a small purple Aegate symbol 
beside the 2D barcode field will appear to highlight the medicine 
as authenticated. This symbol can be double clicked to expand 




Figure 5.0: A screenshot of the Authentication technology 
integration with purple logo, which highlights that a product 





11. If the product is suspicious, expired, batch recalled, product 
recalled, dispensed elsewhere, then a large Red message will pop 
up to indicate the status of the medicine (a sound may also alarm 
depending on the results of research stage one, TBC). If the 
product is a split pack it is likely that it will have already been 
authenticated at this dispensary and will therefore display Amber 
message stating “Already dispensed here” (This product is safe to 
be dispensed). See example below. This is however unlikely as the 
robot should not be dispensing park packs. 
 
 
Figure 6.0: A screenshot displaying the message which appears 
when a recalled, expired or suspicious medicine is scanned. 
 
12. All products authenticated that day will remain on screen until the 
application is closed. This gives the operator an option to recheck 






13. A message may appear to say “Item scan is invalid please scan 
product again “) if this occurs please close PMR software and re-
open as per protocol. When re-opened please re-scan the product 
to ensure the product has been scanned. If the system declares that 
the product has been “already dispensed here” this signifies that 
the initial message was transmitted. In this instance please 
highlight the product in question and click undo. 
14. If a red warning message appears after 2D scanning (with or 
without audio sounds) then the product will be labeled with a 
warning label to identify it as potentially dangerous. Remove the 
product and place in the quarantine area.                                         
15. If the product scanned with warning is the last of its kind in the 
dispensary and is for urgent use then simply write down the 2D 
barcode information on the log of medicines with warning (Or 
remove 2D barcode sticker if possible and place on the list) also 
detailing the product name, strength, formulation and if otherwise 
suitable dispense as normal. (The 2D barcodes on these products 
contain pre-programmed messages and do not relate to the real 
status of the medicine). If the medicine is otherwise fit for delivery 
to the patient according to departmental procedure checks then this 
medicine can be checked and delivered to the patient. 
16. If a product is authenticated in error or requires returning to stock 
please highlight the product in question and press the undo button. The 







Figure 7.0: A screenshot highlighting the ‘Undo’ button, required 
when a medicine has been authenticated in error. 
 
Please note: Scanning is only necessary for products that contain a 
purple sticker beside their expiry date and a 2D label on their product 
box. 
Please note: Some medicine containers may have two 2D labels, one 
printed onto the box by the manufacturer and one fixed to the box by the 
researcher. Please only scan the larger adhesive label. Please see service 
log below and record service errors, feedback/complaints, log of 
medicines with warnings or medicines dispensed as stock. 
Service Logs 
Log of service errors or incidents 












Log of complaints or feedback 








Log of Medicines with warnings / Products issued as stock and labels 
removed  
Medicine name and 
Warning/removed as stock 







See procedure for selection in protocol 002. Product selection is 







Appendix 3:0 Data cleansing and analysis form 
UK- pilot- serial codes 
1. Starting with ‘authenticated + authenticated elsewhere', custom 
sort column M (full pack 2/10/15) in alphabetical order and 
remove data described as a full pack as of 2/10/15. Repeat this for 
all groups.  
2. Remove data recorded as ‘removed as stock’ (n=__ from disp. 
identified warnings) 
3. Select a group (i.e. authenticated + authenticated elsewhere, 
expired, pack recalled or product recalled) Select all data in the 
selected group < Sort by stage< highlight by stage to calculate the 
number of 2D data labels entered by category in each group. 
(This process allowed the researcher to identify the number of 
medicines included in the study, taking into consideration those 













Complete table below 
   UK Pilot Serial codes – Data in 











Horton Stage 0       
Horton Stage 1       
Horton Stage 2       
CH1 + CH 2 Testing       
JR1 + JR2 
(1M57V02 + 





Authentication Data  
1. Total scans identified by the software.  n=___ 
2. Study periods (Stage 0: 1/6/15 – 12/6/15, Stage 1: 15/6/15- 7/8/15, 
Stage 2: 10/08/15 – 2/10/15) Remove scans, prior to 1/6/15 and 
post 2/10/15 (validation periods) – (n= __+__) 
3. Create, and label new column (K) as "stage". Split data into stages 
according to the data scanned. Removing scans that occurred 
during weekends between study periods 0-1 and 1-2. (n= _+ _) 
4. Custom sort date by dispensary (column C) in alphabetical order, 
remove all non-dispensary scans from column C I.e. Researchers 
PC (Processed to generate dispensed elsewhere message) (n= 
___). 
5. Highlight the JR and CH dispensary scans in blue and green 
respectively for ease of identification. 
6. Sort each dispensary by EVENT and remove NONDISPENSE 
from each dispensary separately CH (n=_), JR (n=_), Horton (n=_) 
7. (Non-dispense is when a staff member pressed undo after 
authenticating or the system is down and recorded the attempt as 
unsuccessful) 
8. Select JR dispensary group and custom sort by response code in 
alphabetical order. All response codes are now grouped. Highlight 
each response code groups serial codes and click remove 





an authentication response code, and select remove duplicates on 
the ‘Data’ tab on 
9. Microsoft excel, unselect all and select Column F. Continue this 
process for each response code in each dispensary with the 
exception of ‘Already dispensed here’.  JR (N= __ x already 
dispensed here, N= __ x authenticated, N= __ x pack expired, N= 
__ x pack recalled, N= __ x product recalled). CH (N= __ x already 
dispensed here, N= __ x authenticated, N= __ x pack expired, N= 
__ x pack recalled, N= __ x product recalled). Horton (N= __x 
already dispensed elsewhere, N= __ x authenticated, N= __ x pack 
expired, N= __ x pack recalled, N= __x product recalled) 






Complete the results table below to summarise scanning numbers by category 
  Database Authentication Data – Data Generated 








Recalled   Already Dispensed here 
Horton Stage 0       
Horton Stage 1       
Horton Stage 2       
CH1 + CH 2 Testing       
JR1 + JR2 
(1M57V02 + 





Appendix 4.0: Ethical approval letters (NHS R&D, HRA 







Directorate of Engagement & Partnerships 

















Re: The Investigation and Optimisation of a Medicines Authentication System to Detect 
Counterfeit Medicines 
 
Thank you for submitting your revised application for review. I am pleased to inform you that 
your application (Phase 1 and 2) has been approved by the Ethics Review Panel.  The following 
documents have been reviewed and approved by the panel as follows: 
 
 
Document(s) Version Number Date 
Staff Consent Form (Chief Pharmacist Research Stages 1 
and 2) 
3 07-06-2016 
Protocol 001 and 002 3 06-06-2016 
 
 
As previously discussed, the Panel understand that you will be submitting a separate application 
for NHS REC and HRA approval for the third phase of this project, which involves NHS patients.  
 
If the fieldwork goes beyond the date stated in your application, 8th October 2017, or there are 
any other amendments to your study you must submit an ‘application to amend study’ form to 
the ERP administrator at research.erps@keele.ac.uk stating ERP2 in the subject line of the e-

















Directorate of Engagement & Partnerships 














Re: The Investigation and Optimisation of a Medicines Authentication System to Detect 
Counterfeit Medicines 
Thank you for submitting your second application to amend study, informing us of the addition 
of semi-structured interviews with a purposive sample.  I am pleased to inform you that your 
application has been approved by the Ethical Review Panel.  The following documents have been 
reviewed and approved by the Panel as follows:- 
 
Document Version Date 
Survey Monkey  1 05-12-2016 
Research Protocols 001 and 002 4 05-12-2016 
 
If the fieldwork goes beyond the date stated in your application, 8th October 2017, or there are 
any other amendments to your study you must submit an ‘application to amend study’ form to 
the ERP administrator at research.erps@keele.ac.uk stating ERP2 in the subject line of the e-
mail. This form is available via http://www.keele.ac.uk/researchsupport/researchethics/ 
 
If you have any queries, please do not hesitate to contact me via the ERP administrator on 






Dr Colin Rigby 
Chair – Ethical Review Panel 
 



















PI:  Bernard Naughton 
Title:  The Safe Purchase of Medicine: An Anonymous General Public Health Survey 
Ref:  ERP2369 
 
Thank you for submitting your application for review.  The proposal was reviewed by full 
Panel.   I am pleased to inform you that your application has been approved by the Ethics 
Review Panel. 
 
If the fieldwork goes beyond the date stated in your application, or there are any 
amendments to your study you must submit an ‘application to amend study’ form to the ERP 
administrator at research.governance@keele.ac.uk.   This form is available via 
http://www.keele.ac.uk/researchsupport/researchethics/ 
 
If you have any queries please do not hesitate to contact me, in writing, via the ERP 








Dr Colin Rigby 
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Mr Bernard Naughton 
Said Business School 






05 September 2016 
 
Dear Mr Naughton     
 
 
Study title: The Investigation and Optimisation of Medicine 
Authentication Technology: A Secondary Care Study 
IRAS project ID: 210334  
Protocol number: n/a 
Sponsor Keele University 
 
I am pleased to confirm that HRA Approval has been given for the above referenced study, on the 
basis described in the application form, protocol, supporting documentation and any clarifications 
noted in this letter.  
 
Participation of NHS Organisations in England  
The sponsor should now provide a copy of this letter to all participating NHS organisations in England.  
 
Appendix B provides important information for sponsors and participating NHS organisations in 
England for arranging and confirming capacity and capability. Please read Appendix B carefully, in 
particular the following sections: 
• Participating NHS organisations in England – this clarifies the types of participating 
organisations in the study and whether or not all organisations will be undertaking the same 
activities 
• Confirmation of capacity and capability - this confirms whether or not each type of participating 
NHS organisation in England is expected to give formal confirmation of capacity and capability. 
Where formal confirmation is not expected, the section also provides details on the time limit 
given to participating organisations to opt out of the study, or request additional time, before 
their participation is assumed. 
• Allocation of responsibilities and rights are agreed and documented (4.1 of HRA assessment 
criteria) - this provides detail on the form of agreement to be used in the study to confirm 
capacity and capability, where applicable. 
Further information on funding, HR processes, and compliance with HRA criteria and standards is also 
provided. 
 
It is critical that you involve both the research management function (e.g. R&D office) supporting each 
organisation and the local research team (where there is one) in setting up your study. Contact details 


























If you have a concern about any aspect of this project, please contact Bernard Naughton 
(bernard.naughton@keele.ac.uk or bernard.naughton@sbs.ox.ac.uk mailto:) or Professor Stephen 
Chapman (s.r.chapman@keeele.ac.uk) and they will do their best to answer your query. The 
researcher should acknowledge your concern within 10 working days and give you an indication of 
how he intends to deal with it. If you remain unhappy or wish to make a formal complaint, please 
contact the Chair of the Ethical Research Panel 2 at the University of Keele (using the contact details 
below) who will seek to resolve the matter in a reasonably expeditious manner: 
Chair, Ethical Research Panel 2, Keele University. Email : research.erps@keele.ac.uk :Innovation 
Centre 2, Keele University Science & Innovation Park, Keele University, Staffordshire, ST5 5NH, UK, 























Directorate of Engagement & Partnerships 
















Re: The Investigation and Optimisation of a Medicines Authentication System to Detect 
Counterfeit Medicines 
Thank you for submitting your application to amend study, informing us of a typographical error 
within the Consent form.  I am pleased to inform you that your application has been approved by 
the Ethical Review Panel.  The following document has been reviewed and approved by the 
Panel as follows:- 
 
Document Version Date 
Staff Consent Form (Chief Pharmacist Research Stages 1&2) 4 05-10-2016 
 
If the fieldwork goes beyond the date stated in your application, 8th October 2017, or there are 
any other amendments to your study you must submit an ‘application to amend study’ form to 
the ERP administrator at research.erps@keele.ac.uk stating ERP2 in the subject line of the e-
mail. This form is available via http://www.keele.ac.uk/researchsupport/researchethics/ 
 
If you have any queries, please do not hesitate to contact me via the ERP administrator on 






Dr Colin Rigby 
Chair – Ethical Review Panel 
 







Appendix 5.0: Complete Delphi study results 
Round one 
 
Table 1.0: This table lists each question used in the survey, whether 
consensus was met and the average result from round one. 





Rating = 1-7 
(r)  
Likert Like= 
1-5/1-4 (p)  
Descriptive: 5 








4. Based on your experience of the 
Medicines Authentication System 
(MAS), how would you rate its 
general speed on a scale of 1 to 7? 
(1 represents very slow and 7 
represents very fast) 
Yes  6.00/7 (r) 
5. Based on your experience of the 
MAS, how would you describe its 
usability on a scale of 1 to 7? (1 
represents very difficult and 7 
represents very easy) 
 
Yes 6.50/7 (r) 
6. There were some system errors 
reported by the MAS users 
throughout the pilot. On a scale of 
1 to 7, how often did you 
experience these types of errors? 
(1 represents never and 7 
represents very often) (These 
errors may have included issues 
with reading the 2D barcode, 
duplication of the scan on screen 
or warnings such as "The system 
has no resources",” item can is 





invalid please scan product again" 
or "test product not found") 
 
7. The following are a list of 
reported, proposed improvements. 
Please rank them in order of 
importance (1-5) 
  
(i) Remove/Solve the " Item can is 
invalid please scan product again " 
warning 
 
Yes 4.00 (Less 
important) (l) 
(ii) Change the medicine scanning list 
on screen to ensure the last 





(iii) Include less product lines in the 
pilot study 
Yes 4.50 (Less 
important) (l) 
(iv) Review the pop-up screens as the 
Red "Warning" screens could be 
mistaken for the common 




(v) Incorporate "important 
information" pop-ups into the 
authentication system 
Yes 2.50 (mean) 
(Important) 
(l) 
8 Excluding the suggestions above, 
please describe any other 
changes that you think could be 
made to improve the MAS or the 
Pilot. 
 
No (Suggestions categorized 
as themes and included in 
round 2) 
9 How would you rate your 
understanding of the terms 




9(I) Medicines Verification Yes Average (d) 
(ii) Medicines Authentication Yes Average (d) 
10 How would you rate the impact of 
the MAS on the service you 
provide on a scale of 1 to 7? (1 
represents very disruptive and 7 
represents not disruptive at all) 
No 






11 It has been established during this 
pilot that not all medicines were 
scanned (authenticated) before 
being handed out to our patients. 
In the future, this may result in 
patients receiving expired, 
recalled, unsuitable or 
falsified/counterfeit medicines. 
Please, can you list three 
suggestions that may increase the 
rate of authentication of medicines 
(in order of importance)? 
 
No 
(Suggestions categorized as 
themes and included in 
round 2) 
Median = 5.5 (δ 1.2) 
12 There have been occasions where 
products have been handed out 
despite showing a red pop-up box 
warning. Please list three 
suggestions of how this 
occurrence might be reduced (in 
order of importance). 
 
No 
(Suggestions categorized as 
themes and included in 
round 2) 
 
13 How would you describe this 




14 How would you describe the 
length of this survey? 
 
Yes About right 
(d) 
15 Please suggest any amendments 
that may improve this survey 
 
No 
3 suggestions made.  All 
considered for round 2. 
 
Round Two 
Table 2:0: This table lists each question used in the survey, whether 








Rating = 1-7 
(r)  
Likert Like= 
1-5/1-4 (p)  
Descriptive: 
5 options (d) 
1 Demographic    








4 During round one we asked how 
you would rate the impact of the 
MAS on the service that you 
provide on a scale of 1 to 7? (1 
represents very disruptive and 7 
represents not disruptive at all). 
There appeared to be a difference 
of experience in terms of impact, 
the question and choices have been 
amended (below) to make the 
options clearer. 
Question 4: How would you rate 
the impact of the MAS on the 
service you provide on a scale of 1-
7 (where 1 represents very 
disruptive and 7 represents very 
helpful). 
 
Yes 4.00(r) (Not 
disruptive)  
5.  During round one of this survey, 
further suggestions were made to 
improve the Medicines 
Authentication System (MAS) or 
the pilot. Please rank the suggested 
changes below in the order of 
importance (1 being most 




 (i) Split Pack Count Down (A function 
to identify how many tablets were 
used for each dispensing if not a 
full pack) (MAS) 
Yes 5.00 (Less 
Important) (l) 
(ii) Sounds could also be enabled to 





(iii) Clearer Terminology of Warnings 
(MAS) 
No 4.00 (No 
result) (l) 
(iv) Cover the manufacturers 2d 
barcode to avoid these being 
scanned in error (Pilot) 






(v) Make the symbol indicating an 
item that needs to be scanned 




6 During round one of this survey, 
there were a variety of suggestions 
made to increase the Rate of 
Authentication (scanning). Valid 
suggestions were subdivided into 
three categories 1. Process Change 
2. Technology change and 3. 
Education. In terms of Process 
Change please rank these 
suggestions in order of importance 
(with 1 being the most important 
and 5 being the least important) 
 
  
(i) Make the symbol indicating an 
item that needs to be scanned 




(ii) A checkbox on scripts to tick once 
items authenticated (scanned) 
(Process) 
No 2.5 (No 
result) (l) 
(iii) Sign the barcode when scanned out 
(Process) 
Yes 3.0 (No 
result) (l) 
(iv) More terminals available for 
scanning products could place 
them at various locations in the 
dispensary and then have a big 
screen so you can see that products 
have been authenticated (Process) 
Yes 5.00 (Less 
important) (l) 
(v) Scan all products in the 
dispensary (Process) 






7 During round one of this survey, 
there were a variety of suggestions 
made to increase the Rate of 
Authentication (scanning). Valid 
suggestions were subdivided into 
three categories 1. Process Change 
2. Education and 3.Technology 
change In terms of Education and 
Technology change please rank 
these suggestions in order of 
importance (with 1 being the most 




(i) Have a list of the drugs in the study 
by the dispensing benches as a 
double check (Education) 
No 4.00 (no 
result )(l) 
(ii) An alarm that sounds when the 
items leave the department un-
scanned (Technology Change) 
No 5.00 (no 
result) (l) 
(iii)  Education of staff on the 
importance of medicines 
authentication (e.g. examples of 
patient harm, figures that highlight 
the extent of the problem) 
(Education) 
No 3.00 (no 
result)(l) 
(iv) A system change that knows how 
many items have been booked in 
and prescription is not able to be 
tracked out as verified until all 






(v) Encourage dispensers to look at the 
expiry dates (Education) 






8 During round one we explained 
that there have been occasions 
where products have been handed 
out despite showing a Pop-up 
Warning Box. We asked you to list 
three suggestions of how this 
occurrence might be reduced. 
Valid suggestions were subdivided 
into two categories 1. 
Education and 2. Technology 
change. In terms of Education 
please rank these suggestions in 
order of importance (with 1 being 




(i) Encourage the dispenser/checker to 





(ii) Have a list of the warnings near the 
scanning out computer so it is 
clearer for them (Education) 
No 3.0 (no result) 
(l) 
(iii) Increase knowledge of those that 
manage the process (Education) 
No 2.7 (no result) 
(l) 
(iv) System user training (Education) No 2.5 (no result) 
(l) 
9 During round one we explained 
that there have been occasions 
where products have been handed 
out despite showing a Pop-up 
Warning Box. We asked you to list 
three suggestions of how this 
occurrence might be reduced. 
Valid suggestions were subdivided 
into two categories 1. 
Education and 2. Technology 
change. In terms of Technology 
Change please rank these 
suggestions in order of importance 
(with 1 being the most important 
and 4 being the least important) 
 
  




(ii) An audible alert to accompany the 








(iii) Making it mandatory to complete 
an "Action Taken" documentation 
process so that staff scanning are 
prompted to think about what the 
red warning means and 
be accountable for it (Technology)  
Yes 2.00 
(Important)(l) 
(iv) An alarm triggered as the un-





10  How would you describe this 
survey's ease of completion? 
 
Yes About right 
(d) 
11 How would you describe the length 
of this survey? 
 
Yes About Right 
(d) 
12 Please suggest any amendments 
that may improve this survey 
 
8/14 answered n/a 
2/14 made suggestions that 



















Appendix 6.0: Chapter six interview Guide 
 
 
In 2015, a study was carried out at the Horton Hospital to assess the 
effectiveness of medicines authentication technology. It was decided that 
in an effort to improve this technology an audio alert would be included 
which would alert upon scanning of a medicine that required action 
(quarantine/other action). You have recently been involved in an eight-
week study where an existing medicines authentication technology was 
adapted to include the suggested audio alert alongside a number of 
existing visual pop-up alerts. This semi-structured interview aims to gauge 
your opinion on that sound intervention. Results may be published 
anonymously. Do you consent to be involved in this part of the study? 
 
Thoughts and Opinions of a Visual Pop-Up Accompanied by an Audio 
Alert 
 
1. What is your job role? 
Accredited Checking Technician 
Pharmacist 
 
2. How old are you? 
 
3. How many years’ experience in healthcare do you have? In the NHS or 
otherwise? 
 
4. Have you used the medicines authentication technology with pop-up 
alerts (without audio alert) on more 




5. On how many occasions have you used the medicines authentication 





Greater than ten times 
 
6. During the recent 8-week study did you scan a medicine which 









7. Did you think the inclusion of an audio alert had a negative or a positive 
impact on the detection of 
expired, recalled or falsified medicines? And why? 
Negative 
Positive 
I did not ever hear the audio alert when authenticating medicines 
 
8. Please take a moment to think about your experience of the audio alert 
which alarmed at the detection 
of an expired, recalled or potentially falsified medicine and explain your 
opinion on this sound. Feel free to 
comment on the volume, the tone, the pitch, the duration or any other 
thoughts which relate to it. 
 
9. A negative alert might be too regular, overly irritating or often ignored. 
A positive alert might be one 
which draws attention to an important issue without being so irritating it 
distracts other from other work. 
Would you describe this audio alert as being a negative or positive 




10. Did you feel that the audio alert hindered or helped you to detect 
expired, recalled or potentially falsified 




11. Do you feel that the inclusion of an audio alert encouraged, 
discouraged or had no effect on 
your authentication rate of medicines? And why? 
 
12. Was the technology with the audio alert better or worse than the 
previous version (without audio)? And 
why? 
 
13. The following is a list of comments recorded by participants during 
this study, please would you like to 
identify whether you agree or disagree with the comments and why? 







14. Do you think that there was an occasion where you knew the medicine 
needed to be scanned and 
didn't scan it? If so, why? 
 
15. Do you think there was a time when you came across a medicine that 
required quarantine but didn't? 
Why was that? 
 
16. How does this audio alert compare to other Information Technology 
(IT) alerts you are exposed to? For 
example those that appear in Electronic Prescribing records, Patient 
Medication Record or other 
Information technology programs? 
 
17. Do you think the inclusion of an audio alert affect other workflows 
within the department positively or 
negatively? 
 
18. Would you recommend that this technology adopt the audio alert 
approach seen in this study? And 
why? 
 
19. The noticeable change to this study was the inclusion of an audio alert. 
Do you recall any other? 
differences between this study and the previous study, conducted last year, 
for example, implementation, 
education and training etc. or can you remember? 
 















Appendix 7.0: Chapter seven survey questions  
The Safe Purchase of Medicines Online: An Anonymous General 
Public Health Survey  
 Data suggests that many online pharmacies around the world are 
operating illegally. Many of these pharmacies sell fake or poor-quality 
medicines, many others may be failing to provide adequate patient 
information. This compromises patient safety. This study is being 
conducted by researchers at Keele University and the University of 
Oxford.  
 
You have been invited to take part in this anonymous survey because you 
are a member of the general public that uses the internet. It does not matter 
if you have or have not purchased medicines online, you can still 
contribute. We would like you to complete this survey to help us 
understand more about three key issues which relate to online medicine 
purchases.  
 
1. What would motivate you to buy medicines online?  
2. What do you know about obtaining medicines safely?  
3. What is your opinion on mobile phone apps which verify the status of 
a medicine, delivering education about buying medicines online and also 
providing healthcare advice?  
Our research team is eager to hear your perspectives on these topics. 





survey should take less than 10 minutes and will help our team to 
understand more about key issues relating to online medicine purchases. 
Participation in this survey is optional.  
 
This is an anonymous survey and will be used for academic purposes only. 
The outcomes of this research will be published in a peer-reviewed journal 
to ensure this learning is shared with fellow researchers. Your data will be 
stored according to Keele University data handling policy. A layperson 
summary will also be distributed through the same mediums used to 
recruit participants.  
 
If you have any concerns about this study, please feel free to contact the 
lead researcher at b.naughton@keele.ac.uk. They will respond to your 
questions or concerns within 3 working days.  
Consent  
I understand that my participation is voluntary. However, once this survey 
is completed it will not be possible to withdraw at any time because my 
responses will be stored anonymously. I understand that research data 
collected during the study may be looked at by designated individuals 
from Keele University or the University of Oxford where it is relevant. By 
taking part in this study, I give permission for these individuals to access 
the data contained within my survey response. I understand that this 
project has been reviewed by, and received ethics clearance through, the 





access to the data I provide and that this data will be stored according to 
Keele University data handling policy. I understand how this research will 
be written up and published. I understand how to raise a concern or make 
a complaint.  
 
 1. Considering the statements above do you consent to participate in this 
study? *  




The Extent of the Problem  
 
2. What percentage of online pharmacies do you think operate illegally? *  
Mark only one oval.  
 













3. Studies show that up to 97% of online pharmacies are operating 
illegally, are you surprised by this figure? *  












This section is designed to gather information about the participants of 
this study. This will help us to learn about the general level of education 
around medicine purchase, the types of people who buy medicines online, 
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4. What is your age? *  
Mark only one oval.  
 
0 - 12  
13 - 15  
16 - 18  
19 - 24  
25 - 29  
30 - 39  
40 - 44  
45 - 49  
50 - 59  
60 - 69  
70 - 79  
80 - 89  
90 - 100  
Over 100  
 
5. What is your gender? *  








6. What is your level of education? *  
Mark only one oval.  
 
I have a Primary School education  
I have a Secondary School education  
I have an Undergraduate Degree  
I have a Postgraduate Degree  




7. What is your employment status? *  
Mark only one oval.  
 
 
Full-time employed  







Full-time Student  
 
8. How do you pay for your healthcare? *  
Mark only one oval.  
 
I have health insurance  
Healthcare is free in my country  
My country does not provide free healthcare and I do not have health 
insurance, I pay  
for my healthcare myself when needed  
 
9. What is your ethnic origin? *  
Mark only one oval.  
 
British White  
White - Irish  
Irish Traveller  
Gypsy or Traveller  
Other White background  
Black or Black British - Caribbean  
Black or Black British - African  
Other Black background  
Asian or Asian British - Indian  
Asian or Asian British - Pakistani  
Asian or Asian British - Bangladeshi  
Chinese  
Other Asian background  
Mixed - White and Black Caribbean  
Mixed - White and Black African  
Mixed - White and Asian  
Other mixed background  
Other ethnic background  
Not known  
Information refused  
 









Mark only one oval.  
 
(List of all countries)  
 
11. Where do you currently live? *  
  Mark only one oval.  
 
(List of all countries)  
12. If you are from the United Kingdom or the US please state the first 
two or three figures of your postcode or zip code below, this will allow us 
to compare different regions of the UK and US in terms of medicines 
purchased online. e.g. Liverpool might be L5, Oxford might be OX1 or 
100 might be New York. *  
 
Knowledge Relating to the Safe Supply of Medicines 
 This section aims to understand your knowledge on the subject of "Safe 
Medicine Supply"  
 
13. Do you know what a prescription is? *  





Not sure  
 
14. Do you think you always need to see the doctor to get a prescription? 
*  




Not sure  
 
15. Who else can write legal prescriptions? *  
16. Who do you think is legally permitted to supply you with medicines 
in your country? *  
17. Could you explain what you think a prescription is used for? *  
 
18. Do you think that all medicines require a prescription? *  








Not sure  
 
19. Did you know that some medicines can be bought from a supermarket, 
some can be bought from a pharmacist without a prescription and some 
must always be obtained with a prescription? *  





20. Why do you think there are restrictions on the sale of medicines and 
why some require a prescription and some do not? *  
21. Would you consider buying a medicine online? (This includes any 
medicine e.g.  
creams, ointments, injections, tablets, capsules, liquids, suspensions, 
inhalers, eye  
drops, ear drops etc.) *  





  22. On a scale of 1 to 10 (with 1 being unlikely and 10 being highly 
likely), how likely are you to buy a medicine online? *  
Mark only one oval.  
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 910  
 
23. Have you ever purchased medicines online? (This includes any 
medicine e.g. creams,  
inhalers, tablets, injections etc. which you requested and paid for online) 
*  
Mark only one oval.  
 
Yes  
No (Skip to question 38).  
 
Medicines Purchased Online  
 
In this section, we would like to understand more about the behaviour 
associated with buying medicines online. Please think about a time or 
times that you bought medicine online.  
 
24. Do you normally buy medicines online for yourself, your partner, a 
friend or a relative?  
*  








My partner  
 
A friend  
 
A relative  
 
I have never bought medicine online  
 
25. What medicines are you most likely to buy online? (select option or 
options that apply)  
Tick all that apply.  
 
Those for cosmetic conditions e.g. hair loss, weight loss or erectile 
dysfunction for  
example those with a long-term condition e.g. diabetes, asthma, arthritis 
or blood pressure control. Those with a short-term condition e.g. pain 
relief or antibiotics for an infection  
Other:  
 
26. What devise did or do you use to buy the medicine online? *  
Mark only one oval.  
 
A smartphone  
 
A tablet  
 
A laptop  
 
A desktop computer  
 
Asked someone else to buy them for you online  
  27. Please, could you describe the medicine(s) or type of medicine(s) you 
purchased? *  
28. What were the reasons for you buying your medicine online? (please 
select the option  
or options which apply) *  
Tick all that apply.  
 
Physically unable to get to a pharmacy  
Buying medicine online is cheaper  
I have to wait too long to get an appointment with my doctor  
Buying medicine online is more convenient  
I was embarrassed about my condition  
I do not have health care provided by the state or health insurance, and 
cannot afford medicine from the local pharmacy  
Other:  
 





might be fake,  
counterfeit or of poor quality? *  








30. Were you asked for a prescription? *  




I cannot remember  
Other:  
 
31. Were you asked medical questions about your condition? *  






 32. Did you, or the person that these medicines were bought for, take 
these medicines? *  
Mark only one oval.  
Yes  
No After the last question in this section (skip to question 35).  
I am not sure After the last question in this section (skip to question 35).  
 
 
33. Did you or the person that these medicines were bought for think that 
the medicines bought online resulted in any side-effects which were 
different from usual? *  
Mark only one oval.  
Yes  No, After the last question in this section, skip to question 35.  
Not sure After the last question in this section, skip to question 35.  
 
34. If you believe the medicine caused side effects, could you explain what 
these were? *  
35. At any stage were you ever concerned that the product(s) you were 
buying may have been fake, falsified, substandard or of poor quality? *  









36. What measures, if any, did or do you take, to make sure the website 
that you are buying from is or was safe? *   
37. What measures, if any, do you take, to make sure the medicine(s) you 
received was safe? *  
 
Mobile Phone Apps for Medicine Verification 
 
Mobile phones will soon be used by patients to verify whether or not their 
medicine is legitimate. This section hopes to gather your opinion on these 
app-based solutions, using a specific example created by Keele University 
School of Pharmacy.  
 
Smartphone app demonstration: Please watch this short video of someone 
using an app which has been developed to help patients verify whether or 
not their medicines are legitimate. Once the video is finished, please 
answer the questions below. (A link to a YouTube video showing the  





38. If a mobile phone app was available as above, that could tell you 
whether or not your medicine was legitimate, simply by scanning the 
medicine when it arrived, would you use it? *  






39. On a scale of 1 to 10, how useful do you think this app is, with 1 
representing not useful and 10 representing very useful? *  
Mark only one oval.  
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 910  
 
40. What do you like about the app? *  
41. What don't you like about the app? *  
42. Would you be happy to scan your medicine when you received it (from 
your community pharmacy or online) to understand if the medicine was 
legitimate and to learn more about your medicine? *  






43. What do you think needs to be in place to support or encourage you to 






44. What would be the main barrier to you using this app? *  
Mark only one oval.  
 
I do not have a smartphone  
I do not have access to a good quality internet connection  
I do not have time to scan my medicines  
I am not concerned about the risks of buying medicines online  




45. Why might an app like this work well or not? Please think about your 
specific context  
i.e. your personal circumstances, local factors or surroundings.  
46. These apps have the potential to capture drug details, scanning location 
and personal data. Which of the following organisations would you be 
most happy to share this data with?  
Mark only one oval.  
 
 
A University  
A Hospital  
A Private Company that owns the app  
A Pharmaceutical Company  
 
47. When you scan a drug, the drug details and the geographical location 
of the scan is recorded. Would you be happy to share this data with a 
University for research relating to "fake" or falsified drug detection? *  




Only if I was provided with an incentive such as healthcare advice, 
tailored to me  
Only if I was provided with some type of financial reward or benefit  
  
48. When you scan a drug, the drug details and the geographical location 
of the scan is recorded. Would you be happy to share this with a legitimate 
Pharmaceutical  
Company? (This data would be used by the pharmaceutical company to 
understand  
more about their products) *  
Mark only one oval.  
Yes  
No  
Only if I was provided with an incentive such as free healthcare advice, 
tailored to me  






49. Would you be willing to share your health data with a University for 
research purposes? *  




Only if I am getting something in return  
 
50. Would you be willing to share your health data with a Pharmaceutical 
Company to help them learn more about their products? *  




Only if I am getting something in return  
 
